Single or Return - the official history of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association

Chapter Fifteen

• Black Friday;
• Red Friday;
• Prelude to the General Strike;
• The General Strike;
• The End of The Strike;
• The Aftermath of The Strike;
• The 1926 Annual Conference.

"The Railway Clerks came out on strike,

Veteran and youth alike,

And in the reek of battle thrown,

They made the miners' cause their own.

All honour to the R.C.A.,

Unflinching in the battle day,

For veteran and youth alike,

The Railway Clerks came out on strike."

G. Boothman

Liverpool No. 4, May 1926.

Black Friday

The brief period of prosperity that Britain experienced after the war turned into a slump during the winter of 1920, with most employers attempting to revoke many of the advances that had been won by the trade union movement since 1918. The employers' central strategy was to weaken the powerful miners' union both industrially and politically and thus reduce wages. This was of importance to railway workers as any conflict within the mining industry affected the movement of coal, most of which was by rail. The mines, like the railways, had been placed under Government control during the war and in order to avert a strike Lloyd George set up a Royal Commission in 1919 to examine the future of the mining industry. Pressure from the miners had ensured that half the members of the Commission were appointed by its Federation, and the chairman John Sankey, was a Conservative whose experience on the Commission later moved his politics towards Labour.

When the Commission reported, it recommended an increase in wages, the reduction of the working day from eight hours to seven, and the nationalisation of the mines with a measure of worker control. Nationalisation was ignored and the Government handed the mines back to their former owners on 31st March 1921. They immediately announced it was their intention to return to district negotiations, and demanded cuts which, in some cases, resulted in wages below those of 1914. This led to the Miners' Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) asking for assistance from the other members of the Triple Alliance, the NUR and the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU)1.

Fearful of a repetition of the 1912 miners' strike, when some railway companies had issued notices of dismissal to their staff, the RCA's Executive was in constant session. On 5th April 1921, branches were told to be prepared for a special conference, and three days later the NUR formally advised ASLEF and the RCA that they and the TGWU had decided to strike in support of the miners. The Executives of the RCA and ASLEF met on the 9th April; the following day a meeting of all five London councils of the Association took place to prepare for the impending strike. The RCA held its special conference in London on 11th April and the President Thomas Gill, asked the 400 delegates to do everything they could to support the miners.2 W.E. Williams, the Treasurer, proposed that the strike decision should be left in the hands of the Executive. This was supported, an attempt to hold a ballot prior to strike action being defeated. However, the delegates were not totally confident that the strike would be supported by the membership unless they were fully informed of the facts behind the dispute. The conference was then adjourned to enable delegates to report back to the branches, and it would be recalled when necessary.

Events moved rapidly and on the 13th April the RCA and ASLEF were invited to a meeting of the Triple Alliance and urged to ask their members to cease work on the 15th. ASLEF agreed to do so, and as there was insufficient time for Walkden to recall conference, he sent a telegram to all branches, stating:

"Triple Alliance asks us to join impending strike. Please get members to consider coal dispute facts given in special conference circular eleventh instant at mass meeting tomorrow and wire me result immediately. No time for further conference but our Executive strongly recommend participation, believing vital interests of all organised workers involved. Locomotive Society have decided to join strike."3

Walkden sent a further telegram, advising branches that the principal railway companies were considering a reduction in salaries as soon as the Government relinquished control of the railway system. This was strongly denied by some of the railway companies and Walkden was obliged to reiterate his statement, assuring members that his claims were well founded. It now became a war of nerves, and with the EC alarmed at the poor response it had received for strike action, Walkden deferred the decision to go ahead. Before the Executive had its next meeting, both the TGWU and the NUR called off their decision to strike, leaving the miners isolated. The background to this decision was an offer of a temporary settlement made by the Miners' Secretary, Frank Hodges during a speech to MPs. Hodges was severely criticised by his EC for making such an unauthorised offer, and they refused to accept his settlement. This incident was used by Robert Williams and Ernest Bevin of the TGWU and J.H. Thomas, as an excuse to call off the strike.

The 15th April, the day the strike was cancelled, became known as "Black Friday" and it was to haunt Thomas and Bevin for years to come. Later Thomas explained that when he helped to form the Triple Alliance he thought it would hold such power that it would act as a safeguard of industrial peace. He certainly did not envisage its strength being used more than once and considered that its formation had been a mistake.4 With Black Friday now behind them, the miners were immediately locked out; they suffered extreme hardship and by the end of June they were obliged to return to work, with lower wage rates being imposed. During the lock out the Association donated £1000 to them, and at its 1921 Annual Conference delegates made a collection of £30 for the Daily Herald Children's Fund.

The defeat of the miners, the most powerful section of the working class, enabled the railway companies and other employers to launch an assault on their own employees. The guaranteed working week, established for railway workers in 1919, was, with the reluctant agreement of all three unions, suspended in May 1921. Further cuts followed, including redundancies and short-time working, although, in the main, clerical workers were given a minimum of three days work per week. Membership of the Association slumped to 51,137 in 1922, its lowest figure since 1915.

Cotton workers were locked out in June, and in the autumn thousands of engineers shared the same fate for over eleven weeks. To assist the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), the RCA donated £600 and made them a loan of £2,000. The onslaught against the trade union movement continued, with seamen, farm workers, building workers and many others forced to accept cuts in their pay.

Table 14

(excluding benefit issued during the General Strike)

Red Friday

Throughout 1923 and 1924 there was a relative upturn in the economy; unemployment declined and trade unions were able to obtain improvements in pay. By May 1926, railway wages and salaries were approximately 90-100 per cent above those of 1914, whilst the cost of living had only risen by 70 per cent. Miners had also won improvements, but by 1924 the real value of their pay still remained below the pre-war level. The progress that had been made in the mining industry had resulted from an increase in coal exports, caused by the closure of German mines following the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923; but economic pressures turned against British miners when the French withdrew. In 1925, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill, decided to return to the "Gold Standard". This resulted in a further attack on wages, with the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, saying that in order to put industry on its feet, every worker had to expect a reduction in wages.5 The coal owners were quick to respond, and on 30th June 1925 they advised the MFGB that they intended to terminate their existing agreement at the end of July. The guaranteed minimum wage, won in 1924, was to cease, and wages were to be reduced. Any new increases would be granted only if miners accepted an extension of their working day. The MFGB, led by its President, Herbert Smith,6 and its new General Secretary, A.J. Cook, rejected the owners' terms and once again turned to the trade union movement for assistance.

The RCA had already pledged itself to support the miners at its 1925 Annual Conference and when the MFGB asked the Association for help it was forthcoming. A meeting to discuss mutual support7 was held at the Caxton Hall, London, on 4th June 1925, to be followed by one between the MFGB and the TUC General Council on 10th July. Support was readily offered and a committee of nine was appointed including A.G.Walkden, John Marchbank (NUR) and John Bromley (ASLEF). Seven days later, on 17th July, the MFGB met the three railway unions and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, AEU, Electrical Trades Union, Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades Federation, Society of Boilermakers, Ironmoulders' Association and the TGWU. The meeting held in the Essex Hall, London, had been called to discuss the inherent weaknesses in the original Industrial Alliance that had proved so costly to the miners. Although the TGWU had initiated the meeting and Ernest Bevin was appointed as its secretary, the original idea had come from the AEU who, frustrated at their own difficulties in obtaining decent wages, sought an offensive alliance8 of the most powerful unions. The agreement reached was:

"To create by means of an alliance of the specified organisations, a means of support to assist any or all of the allied organisations, defending the hours of labour and wage standards and securing advancement of the standard of living, and to take action to secure acceptance of, or to defend any principle of an industrial character which may be deemed vital by the allied organisations."9

This meeting was followed by one held on the 25th July between ASLEF, the RCA, NUR, MFGB and the General Council to determine their attitude to the coal-owners proposals. The Association's delegation was composed of A.G. Walkden, G. Lathan, W.E. Williams and T.H. Gill who told the meeting that if the General Council took control and mobilised the trade union movement, he was sure that the membership would respond. That same day, the TUC agreed that if the miners were locked out, an embargo would be placed on the movement of coal whereupon the RCA agreed that it would instruct its members to comply.10 Events moved rapidly, and with the coal owners' decision to terminate the existing agreement due to expire on 31st July 1925, a conference of the TGWU, NUR, ASLEF and the RCA took place on the 29th July; they immediately agreed that the embargo would come into force at midnight two days later. On 30th July, a conference of Trade Union Executive Committees met at the Central Hall, London, supported the transport unions' decision and offered financial support. As the deadline approached, the scene was set for a major confrontation, but whereas the labour movement was united, the Government and its supporters were not.

As a direct result of the solidarity displayed by the transport unions, the General Council and the new Industrial Alliance, the Government introduced a nine month subsidy for the coal industry which it had previously refused to contemplate. Wages were untouched, and Baldwin appointed a further Royal Commission which resulted in the miners' strike being cancelled on 31st July 1925 - Red Friday. The stigma of Black Friday had been erased and the movement was jubilant. When the EC met in July it recorded its pleasure at the victory and thanked the General Secretary for the part that he had played to make it a success.11 Not everyone in the labour movement shared this enthusiasm and during a speech to an ILP Summer School, Ramsay MacDonald criticised the Government's handling of the coal settlement. He accused it of having given in to militancy which had

"increased the power, the reputation, and the prestige of those elements that did not believe in political action at all. It has simply handed over the appearance, at any rate, of victory, to the very forces that some well considered, thoroughly well examined Socialist feels to be its greatest enemy".

He went on to say that if the Government had fought for its policy he would have respected it, but it just caved in.12 J.H. Thomas repeatedly warned his members of the dangers of extracting concessions by industrial action, and in a statement to the New York Times said that he was very far from happy at the victory of the miners.13 It was an indication of things to come.

Prelude to The General Strike

The Industrial Alliance held its next meeting on 5th November 1925 at the Essex Hall, to finalise its constitution. A.G. Walkden was asked to take the chair when Herbert Smith left early to attend a meeting with the Coal Commission. The unity which had played such an important part in achieving Red Friday did not last. The NUR attempted to make membership of the Alliance a basis for amalgamation of unions within the same industry and when this failed, it withdrew. The RCA debated the merits of the Alliance at a special conference in January, but by now members were nervous of its strike implications and deferred joining. The Boilermakers' Society and the United Operative Plumbers refused to affiliate, but even though there were still several powerful unions in the Alliance, including ASLEF, without the NUR it was considerably weakened and virtually collapsed.

In January 1926, the Government held a number of conferences at both national and local level in order to co-ordinate its activities in the event of a strike, and the CP warned repeatedly that the Government would take its revenge as soon as the coal subsidy came to an end. These warnings, along with speeches made by prominent Communists, were rejected by the majority of trade union and Labour leaders. Much the same advice came from the MFGB and the National Minority Movement which had been initiated by the CP in 1924; these, too, were ignored by the General Council and the Labour Party. It was not only the most militant sections of the movement that were alert to the Government's intentions. Walter Citrine, the General Secretary of the TUC, made a similar point and urged the negotiating committee of the General Council to make preparations. His counsel was largely ignored. The gulf between the attitude of the CP and that of the Labour Party was vast. The CP saw the clash between the miners and their employers as inevitable, and therefore preparations had to be made if the miners were to win. The leadership of the Labour Party, especially Ramsay MacDonald and J.H. Thomas, sought to find a compromise and believed that any form of preparation made by the unions would only encourage the Government and increase the likelihood of a strike. Meanwhile the Government was busy laying its plans.

The composition of the General Council had changed since the heady days of Red Friday and the majority of its members had no desire for a confrontation of the magnitude envisaged by the MFGB or the CP. Some were afraid of the militancy of their own members and were placing their faith in the Royal Commission to find a solution. The General Secretary of the TUC, Frederick Bramley, who had been a sound ally of the miners, had died in October 1925 and the position was now held by W.M. Citrine. The chairman was Arthur Pugh, and John Marchbank had been replaced by J.H. Thomas; Margaret Bondfield was also elected to the General Council in September 1925. The right were now very much in charge of events and in January 1926 A.G. Walkden, A. Pugh, W. Citrine, R.B. Walker, A. Hayday, J. Bromley, G. Hicks, B. Tillett and J.H. Thomas were appointed to its Industrial Committee.

The Commission of Enquiry into the coal industry was chaired by Sir Herbert Samuel, a Liberal; unlike the Sankey Commission, it had no nominees from the MFGB nor indeed did it contain any representatives from working class organisations. The other members included Sir William H. Beveridge, another Liberal; General Sir Herbert Lawrence, a banker, and Kenneth Lee an industrialist. The Commission's report was presented on 6th March 1926. It ignored Justice Sankey's findings that private ownership in mining stood condemned and rejected nationalisation; it praised the management of some pits but considered many to be badly planned, with defective equipment, poor management and too small to be profitable. To overcome the problems of the industry, Samuel proposed its reorganisation, a project that would take years to become effective. The Commission considered that the Government subsidy was indefensible and said that it should never be repeated. It failed to oppose an increase in the miners' working day and supported district rates, instead of the national agreement sought by the MFGB. A number of measures such as more pithead baths, profit sharing, the establishment of joint pit committees and the extension of payment by results were recommended by Samuel, but these were not expected to come into effect until the industry became more profitable. To achieve profitability, the Commission recommended that wages should be reduced immediately. Once again, working people were expected to pay for a crisis not of their making.

Samuel had done his job efficiently and had produced a report which suited the interests of the Government and the coal owners. At the same time he had provided a lifeline to those within the labour movement who were desperate to find a compromise. Ramsay MacDonald welcomed it and Arthur Henderson suggested that within the limits of the report, something could be done to restore the prosperity of the mining industry.14 The former leader of the MFGB, Frank Hodges, told a meeting of businessmen in Nottingham that, in the main, the recommendations of the Commission were good.15 The coal owners were sufficiently pleased, gave it qualified approval, and immediately proposed wage reductions.

A series of meetings were held between the miners and the coal owners but negotiations became deadlocked. With the average daily pay of a miner varying from 8s. 5d (42p) in South Staffordshire to 10s 10d (54p) in the Eastern Division, the cuts envisaged ranged from 7d (2.9p) in the Eastern Division to 3s 8d (18.4p) in Durham.16 The MFGB refused to accept any cuts in their members' wages and with the Government's subsidy coming to an end on 30th April, the owners declared a lock out from that date. The TUC General Council called a special conference of Union Executive Committees and this was held at the Memorial Hall, London, from 29th April to1st May 1926. The General Council did not advocate a strike and Thomas Gill later remarked that there was a strong feeling at the conference that the Council had not given a lead and that the TUC preferred not to use the big stick.17 On the first day the Industrial Committee was asked to secure an honourable settlement and the conference declared its willingness for the negotiations to continue, providing that the miners' lock out was not enforced. At 09.30 hours on 30th April, Walkden told the EC that following a meeting the previous evening between the TUC Negotiating Committee and the Prime Minister, there appeared to be no likelihood of a settlement as the Government refused to ask the coal owners to revoke their lock out. The RCA then resolved, on the proposition of W.E. Williams, that it would place itself in the hands of the General Council and obey any call that was made.18

The lock out was imposed on the duly appointed day but negotiations continued, with the General Council clearly anxious for a settlement. The coal owners, who had been adamant that a national standard rate of pay was one they could not possibly entertain, finally made an offer at 13.15 hours on the 30th April. This gave the miners a national agreement but one based on an eight hour day, with pay reduced to unacceptable levels. This was rejected by the MFGB. Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson, who had been co-opted to the Industrial Committee, endeavoured to get the miners to compromise but they were unsuccessful, as was J.H. Thomas, who exerted the strongest influence throughout all the negotiations. Thomas also tried to get the Government to settle, and after one meeting said that he had never begged or pleaded like I begged and pleaded all today, and I pleaded not alone because I believed in the case for the miners, but because I believed in my bones that my duty to the country involved it.19 Thomas was willing to go to any lengths to avert the strike and on the 3rd May, speaking in the House of Commons, he stated: For 10 days we said to the Government, you force the coal owners to give us some terms, never mind what they are. Let us have something to go upon.20

The conference of Union Executives was still in session on May Day when thousands of trade unionists, unemployed people, Labour and Communist supporters marched past the Memorial Hall on their way to Hyde Park; the streets echoed to the persistent call, Help the Miners!21 Similar expressions of solidarity were heard at May Day rallies throughout the country; over 20,000 marched in Glagow where banners of the Co-operative Movement, Labour Party, ILP, trade unions, the CP and the Young Communist League (YCL) were displayed. Support also came from the leader of the Irish Labour Party, Thomas Johnson, in a speech during a May Day Rally at Black Rock, near Dun Laoghaire.22

On Saturday 1st May the General Council finally asked the 824 delegates at the conference to call a strike. A roll call was made, union by union, and the RCA's delegation voted in the affirmative. The result showed that there were 3,653,529 in favour and 49,911 against, with 31,900 still awaiting instructions. The RCA decided that it would take action in common with ASLEF and the NUR, but before this could take place, the deep hostility that had developed between them since the 1924 ASLEF strike had to be resolved. As Walkden had left the EC meeting to rejoin the General Council, George Lathan was asked to contact the NUR who agreed to leave the matter in the hands of the RCA.23 When Walkden returned from the General Council he immediately took up the role of peacemaker, and, in view of events, achieved a remarkable success.

The miners remained adamant that they would not accept any reductions in pay, but negotiations continued and the final attempt to find a solution took place on Sunday 2nd May when J.H. Thomas, A. Pugh and A.B. Swales held a meeting with the Prime Minister at Downing Street. During an adjournment to appraise the miners of their progress they were suddenly recalled by Baldwin and told that the Government now considered that no solution could be found to resolve the dispute unless the Commission's report was accepted. He complained that some unions, including the RCA, had already instructed their members to strike, and exploited an incident that had occurred that evening at the Daily Mail. This arose when members of the National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants were angered by a leading article headed For King and Country, which said that the strike was a revolutionary movement. The Operative Printers said that this was contrary to the Premier's plea for cool heads24 and asked the Editor to modify his article. He refused to do so, whereupon they declined to print it. The Government demanded that the TUC repudiate the actions of the printers and unconditionally withdraw the instructions for a General Strike. The General Council failed to support the printers and expressed its opposition to independent and unauthorised action in a letter to the Prime Minister. They also regretted that they had not been given an opportunity of investigating and dealing with the incident before the Government had made it an excuse for breaking off the peace discussions.25 This letter, signed by Citrine and Pugh, was delivered to Downing Street at 03.30 hours on 3rd May, but it had no effect as the Cabinet had left. The Government had already decided its course of action and negotiations were at an end.

The General Strike

The Government was, on this occasion, well prepared, and even before the union executives had concluded their business, the Emergency Powers Act was initiated, with the state machine brought into play at both national and local level. All military leave was cancelled and troops were dispatched to positions throughout the country. The Government's broadcasting policy was placed under the control of J.C.C. Davidson the Deputy Chief Civil Commissioner, and the BBC came under police protection. The Government used the BBC to produce a steady flow of anti-strike propaganda, including appeals for volunteers and anyone critical of the Government, or who sought to bring the opposing sides together, such as the Archbishop of Canterbury, found it impossible to broadcast. With the printing unions now on strike, the Government published The British Gazette to promote its case. This eventually reached a circulation of over two million, but it was so biased and full of propaganda that it had little influence. It reached into every corner of the trade union movement to find renegades to speak against the strike, or branches willing to declare their opposition, but they were few in number. One trade unionist who condemned railway workers for their participation in the strike was a former Editor of The Railway Review, Fred Maddison. He had also been a National Liberal MP and was Chairman of the TUC in 1886, but he lacked any credibility amongst the NUR as he had departed from the union under a cloud, having been accused of sabotaging a strike in 1897. The TUC responded to The British Gazette by publishing the British Worker, which was printed on the Daily Herald's press. Production of the first copy was delayed when the police arrived with a warrant issued by the Home Secretary, and demanded that, prior to publication, copies of the paper be passed to the City Commissioner for his approval. Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur Henderson intervened, and eventually, to the singing of the Red Flag, printing commenced. As newsprint was soon in short supply, the Government interfered once again and on 7th May it diverted supplies of paper from the British Worker to the British Gazette. The British Worker was then obliged to reduce its pages by 50 per cent. Despite this, by the end of the strike, its circulation was over one million. The Scottish TUC's own paper, The Scottish Worker, eventually reached a circulation of 70,000 copies.

Several months earlier, the Government had appointed ten Civil Commissioners throughout England and Wales, (with a separate organisation established in Scotland under the direction of the Lord Advocate, W. Watson). It instructed them and their committees to commence recruiting volunteers to distribute supplies. These committees contained representatives from the police, post, railways, road, water, coal industries and local bodies. The Organisation for the Maintenance of Supplies (OMS) which claimed to be strictly non-political and non-party, had been set up in September 1925 as a strike-breaking organisation, under its President, Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. He announced on the 4th May, that their entire organisation had been handed over to the Government and it was now at the disposal of their local Volunteer Service Committee. Fascist organisations proclaiming King and Country also played their part to defeat the strike and worked hand in glove26 with the voluntary bodies.

People who volunteered to break the strike were a mixed bag. The first to step forward were, in the main, composed of those who directly identified themselves with, or were indeed part of, the establishment. Titled ladies, unused to work, joined nobles and knights, retired military officers, students in their plus fours and Oxford bags, all eager to do their bit. Some of the railway companies pressurised "loyal" salaried staff that had had some experience as drivers earlier in their career to drive locomotives, even though they were not familiar with the engine or the track. Those that refused were immediately dismissed. As the strike progressed, many of the volunteers consisted of unemployed workers, some of whom were subsequently retained by the companies instead of reinstating their former employees. On the LNER young men who had been made redundant when they reached the adult rate were taken on as volunteers, and after the strike, retained on a permanent basis. The volunteers took on a variety of jobs, but those in the public eye were the most popular such as special constables, bus and train drivers or porters. Volunteers were quickly trained to carry out signalling duties.

During the strike there were a number of minor incidents and three serious accidents on the railways, two of which resulted in loss of life. The Government's plans to utilise the OMS to the full on the railways did not succeed as it was assumed that railway supervisors would refuse to take part in the stoppage. The heroic solidarity of the RCA 'responsible' grades broke the spine of the companies' resistance at the outset. Any plans that they may have had for running the O.M.S. service under skilled supervision were wrecked at once.27

The conference of Trade Union Executives had agreed that each union would ask its own members to strike in support of the miners, with the most powerful unions, those in transport, iron and steel, the printing industry, construction, gas and electricity being the first to be called upon - 89 unions in all. On May Day Walkden sent a circular to all RCA branches, confirming a telegram he had sent earlier asking them to stop work on the morning of 4th May, and stating that stationmasters, and all those members who handled money, should secure all cash, and place the safe keys with accredited company representatives. Branch officers were asked to organise a central committee room in a member's home, with someone permanently on duty to answer enquiries, and to receive reports. Members were asked to volunteer as cyclists to take messages and reports to outlying areas; branch officials were told to keep in touch with NUR and ASLEF members to ensure that they acted in harmony throughout the stoppage.28 The die was now cast for the greatest industrial test in the history of the Association.

When the telegram from Walkden arrived, the normally slow moving trade union machine was galvanised into activity. Old antagonisms disappeared overnight, and on the morning of 4th May, RCA members joined union colleagues on the picket line outside railway stations the length and breadth of the nation. Men and women, most of whom had little knowledge of miners and their conditions, had now taken industrial action in their support. They were fully aware that any stoppage affecting coal would have a serious affect on their future and that of the railway industry. With the exception of RCA members in Ireland, those with dual membership of the NUR, and the minority that had participated in the strike for recognition in 1919, very few railway clerks had any experience of industrial action. That so many responded in a manner equal to that of the most hardened trade unionist came as a surprise to the railway companies and to many in the trade union movement.

As the tension mounted during April, the RCA recruited over 3,000 members, one of whom was Arthur Chandler, now employed as a stationmaster at Cheltenham. Over 70 former members of the Sheffield branch, who had left with Chandler in 1913 to join the NUR, also asked for permission to rejoin the Association if they could receive unemployment pay, but their application was turned down. Several hundred enrolled in the Association during the strike, the majority coming from London, Birmingham, Sheffield, Southampton, Watford and Wigan. In all, over 6,000 joined during 1926, but by the end of the year membership had decreased by 11,335, with worse to follow.

George Lathan was given the responsibility of organising the financial arangements; the Co-operative Bank already had £8,000 on a fourteen day call and an additional £50,000 was transferred from the deposit to the current account. Lathan also asked Barclays Bank to place all the Association's money in a current account and when the strike commenced, the RCA had £77,000 at its immediate disposal. This had to be augmented and within the first two weeks £120,000 was withdrawn. Not everyone was honest and the Richmond branch agreed at a meeting, held on 18th May, to inform head office of some members who had received strike pay and had immediately gone to work by using back door methods.

The Association was obliged to employ additional staff at its head office for the duration of the strike; some slept overnight in the office, others were accommodated in hotels. One member of the head office staff owned a motor car and another vehicle was purchased on the understanding that it would be taken back by the vendor when the strike ended. The fleet of two cars, a number of bicycles and a motor-cycle ensured that speakers, organisers and money were transported where required. All the full-time staff turned down any payment for overtime and volunteered to accept the same strike pay as the members for the duration of the strike. This was £1 per week, plus five shillings (25p) for each child up to the maximum allowable under rule, £2 per week. Walkden also turned down his usual annual wage increase.

The RCA received offers of assistance from the Dutch union BANS which appealed in their journal for members to raise £100 per week for the Association. Further offers came from the ITF which also provided a loan of over £27,00 to the TGWU. The TUC willingly accepted donations from the IFTU and the trade union movements of India, South Africa, Sweden, Norway, Mexico and the Socialist Party, USA, but it refused to accept financial help from the Russian trade unions. Their donation was passed to the Russian miners' union who in turn gave it directly to the MFGB.

To deal with the many problems that developed during the events of May, the EC appointed a sub-committee composed of W.E. Williams, T.W. Burden. H. Chadwick, J.H. Ritchie and A.S. Umpleby29 all of whom stayed in London, with the remainder of the Executive dispersed to their respective Divisional Councils to assist in the strike. Both Williams and Umpleby were appointed to the TUC Sub-Committee for Food Supplies and Walkden was placed on the General Council's Publicity and Communications Committee. Walkden, along with A.B. Swales, J.H. Thomas, J. Bromley and Arthur Pugh, spoke at a number of meetings in London.

Before the strike there were approximately 107,000 employed in the Clerical and Supervisory Grades, of whom 67,000 were members of the RCA. On the Southern, LMS and LNER approximately 44 per cent of all clerical and supervisory staff came out on strike. The weakness was on the GWR where only 25 per cent were willing to do so. Nevertheless, very few returned to work during the strike and of the 3,185 that initially walked out, 3,113 were still on strike ten days later. Similarly, of the 4,130 supervisors, station masters and goods agents employed on the GWR,1,179 came out on the first day with 1,062 on strike on the 14th May.30 Edward Wilson, the Paddington branch secretary, recalled in 1994 that the number responding was pathetic.31 From a staff of 200 employed in the audit office, approximately 50 were members of the RCA. Of these, only about 12 came out and 3 defected after the first day. Prior to the strike the branch membership was approximately 850 but this dropped to 200 when the strike was over. Their spirits were unbroken, but it was several years before the membership was built up to its pre-strike figure. The strongest backing for the strike on the GWR was at Swindon where between 80-85 per cent of RCA members participated. On 7th May a rally in the town attracted approximately 8,000 supporters, many of whom were railway workers. At Cheltenham, virtually every member of the stationmasters' branch came out, no doubt strongly influenced by the persuasive Arthur Chandler.

The overall response from the RCA was widely acknowledged and, given its history, quite remarkable. Walkden asked every branch to indicate the membership's response to the strike call, and within the first two days, he learned that of the Association's 469 branches, 195 had more than 75 per cent of their members on strike - approximately 50,000 members.32 When Walter Brindley, the Divisional Officer for the Midlands, attended a meeting of railwayworkers on Sunday 9th May at the Alhambra Theatre, Stourbridge, he told those present that from the figures that had been collated at the weekend more than 80 per cent were currently on strike.33 This momentum was not maintained and the figure dropped to 55 per cent by the time the strike was terminated. Some NUR members also refused to strike, or returned to work prematurely, but the highest proportion of those who participated came from ASLEF of whom there were not fifty members out of over 60,000 who failed to answer the call.34

When the first edition of the British Worker was published on 5th May it contained a letter from T.H. Gill and A.G. Walkden congratulating RCA members for their support and called on them to Stand Firm and True. The following day Walkden told the TUC:

"We are very happy to be able to report that although the present experience represents our members' first real baptism of fire in a general withdrawal of labour, the immediate response to the call to cease work was highly gratfying and showed a measure of unanimity amongst our grades that was encouraging. The spirit and morale of the members is splendid, and we have received many advices of non-members joining up and taking their places alongside their colleagues. A good deal is being made of the reports of a few supervisors continuing at work, but according to authentic information the latter are a negligible quantity compared with the situation as a whole. These supervisors are often in isolated positions, and are influenced by the view that they occupy posts involving 'safety' and considerations of that sort. The broad outstanding fact is that the overwhelming majority of the clerical and allied grades of the service are standing four-square with the other workers in the struggle, and this state of affairs extends from John o' Groats to Land's End."35

This solidarity surprised many within the labour movement; the ITF, whilst not wishing to detract from the role of the NUR and ASLEF, singled out the RCA for its work during the strike.36 The old wounds of the past were healed by the positive relationship that existed between Charles Cramp, John Bromley, A.G. Walkden and J.H. Thomas and was complemented at branch level where everyone had a common objective. The Railway Review told its readers:

"The decision of the RCA to take part in the struggle upset all our calculations, and the way in which the members of that organisation answered their first strike call was really amazing. Stationmasters, supervisors and clerks forgot all about their superannuation schemes, and were to be found playing their part in the local strike committees, along with the 'bottom dogs' of the service. In every district there were joint strike committees composed of ASLEF, RCA and NUR members, and the way in which all pulled together has done more to create the spirit of one union for all railway workers than years of propaganda could possibly do."37

In Scotland, there was not one important strike centre which failed to have a member of the Association taking an active part in its work. In Glasgow, no less than 2,000 of the union's 2,400 members came out on strike and William Monteith38 was Secretary of the Glasgow Central Strike Committee. Within three days the RCA had an effective relay system in operation covering most of Scotland. The administrative and organising ability of RCA members was admired by other unions and several used its communication machinery. This was acknowledged by the press which stated:

"A notable example of ready organisation has been provided by the Railway Clerks' Association, a comparatively young organisation whose administration is perhaps something of a model."39

Everywhere members assisted the strike by volunteering to act as pickets, runners, despatch riders and office workers. They established a reputation for the quality of their strike bulletins and in York two were published every day.40 In Manchester, three meetings were held on the eve of the strike, and on the first day, thousands of railway workers came out with every branch organising its own strike committee. From these a Central Strike Committee was formed, working in conjunction with the other railway unions. In a great display of unity, 20,000 railway and tram workers marched through the city in a column over half a mile long, carrying banners in support of the miners, passing the University, from where so many students had volunteered in their attempt to break the strike.

Branch officers hardly had a moment to rest. This is best illustrated by the Sheffield branch minute book which reveals that between 5th May and 21st May at least 28 meetings were held, some of which were mass rallies. Sheffield's support for the strike grew stronger as it progressed and whereas the branch had 75 per cent out at the start, by the time it ended, this had increased to 95 per cent. In Crewe where the railway dominated the lives of the people 11,000 railway workers joined the strike, with only 80 of the 800 railway clerks remaining at work, leaving the station and railway workshops deserted. The response throughout the Midlands was similar with a high percentage of clerks on strike at Derby, Rugby, Nottingham, Birmingham and throughout the Black Country. There had been concern within the Divisional Council before the strike that some branches would not respond, but they were wrong; in every town throughout the Midlands RCA branches formed joint strike committees.

Backing for the strike in North Wales was high and in South Wales, where there had always been a close affinity with the miners, the response was virtually 100 per cent. Even in areas outside the immediate coal-producing communities, there was a good response, and in Cardiff over 500 members of the Association withdrew their labour.41 An article in the journal of the NUR South Wales Council stated:

"In every district Clerical workers, Loco. men, Traffic and Shop Workers helping side by side in the common cause of assisting the Miner. In my own locality it was an inspiration to me to see Lady Clerks from the D.S.O. working with the Strike Committee taking short hand notes of interviews and deputations and typing messages from despatch riders etc. No one can deny that the RCA members played a great part in the dispute."42

When the strike was called 99 per cent of the London Underground staff responded. Over 9,000 volunteers were employed by the Underground group during the strike but even by the 14th May only 37 per cent of the trains were operative. To keep up morale, the joint committees organised a vast array of social activities. The Wimbledon strike committee organised a football match between the NUR and the RCA, which was won by the Association by four goals to two. G.E. Matchen, a member of the RCA and secretary to the Joint Strike Committee at Windsor, reported that football and cricket matches, indoor sports and socials had been well attended and at the end of the first week: We find ourselves in a more solid position than when we started. Members on strike have pledged themselves not to return until they receive instructions from their Executive.43

One weakness within the TUC's organisation was that it never had a clear policy towards the transportation of food. Initially, the General Council had been prepared to issue permits for the transport of essential foods, but this offer was rejected by the Government, with food being handled by volunteers and government agencies. Local strike committees issued permits for food supplies, but the railway unions, at a meeting on 3rd May, agreed that it would be foolish to transport food by train, even on a voluntary basis. The General Council accepted their views and left the matter entirely to the unions concerned, whereupon the NUR placed a statement in the British Worker that it was opposed to the movement of traffic of any kind, food stuffs or otherwise.44 The movement of goods between Britain and Ireland was considerable but no-one had consulted the Irish LP & TUC to determine what should be done to stop this traffic. By coincidence J. T. O'Farrell was Vice-President of the Irish LP & TUC and on 3rd May it offered help, which the General Council accepted with hearty thanks for offer of assistance.45 This was not followed through by the General Council and when it was announced on the 5th May that a limited ferry service would start shipping food to Britain, the Irish LP & TUC once again contacted the General Council. Administrative mistakes delayed a reply until 7th May, when the TUC sent a telegram asking for the movement of goods to be stopped. Immediately this was received a meeting of the RCA, NUR, Irish TGWU, the Amalgamated TGWU and the Sailors' and Firemen's Union took place and though there were problems getting people to respond in Northern Ireland, NUR members refused to tie up ferries at Dun Laoghaire. Non-unionists were employed but William Davin, who was the Pier Master at Dun Laoghaire, refused to supervise their work and was promptly suspended.46 By Wednesday, 12th May, railwaymen, dockers and members of the RCA employed at the North Wall, Dublin, refused to handle goods intended for shipment to Liverpool. Their action quickly spread to Belfast, Waterford and Londonderry and although the strike in Britain was over, in some parts of Ireland the action lasted until the 16th May. The Irish LP & TUC later expressed its surprise that the General Council had failed to communicate with them when the strike was first called, and regretted that it had not decided a policy in respect of food supplies from Ireland in advance.47

Although morale within the Joint Committees was higher than when the strike had started, this confidence was not shared by J.H. Thomas who, speaking at a meeting in Hammersmith on Sunday 9th May said that he had never been in favour of the principle of a General Strike. The following day the headline in The Times declared: The General Strike Condemned.48 The Manchester Guardian preferred Mr. Thomas on his position. Against Principle of General Strike49 and of course the British Gazette "milked" it to the full. The message to those in power was loud and clear, the end was now in sight.

Months later, Thomas, in a reflective speech, declared to a meeting of railway workers in Derby, My views on a General Strike are well known. I had not only opposed it, I had not only condemned it, I had not only argued against it, but I had said to all its advocates: It must not only fail, but from this moment it is inevitably a failure.50 One can only ask, was there a need to sabotage it? After the strike Charles Cramp made similar statements which pleased those RCA members who had refused to take part and it was seen as justification of their stance. This was brought to the attention of the EC and consideration was given to taking the matter up with the NUR but eventually it was decided to drop the subject.

The End of The Strike

Throughout the strike Walkden received several reports from branches, indicating that members had been intimidated by company officials or scabs to persuade them to return to work. On 11th May, Walkden told members to ignore all the overtures that had been made by the companies, saying that the General Council was continuing its efforts to secure a satisfactory settlement. Later that day, he telegraphed all the branches with the following message:

"Despite repeated efforts to create breach, our position still splendidly maintained. Ignore all communications from Companies and stand firm. Full reinstatement will be definite condition of settlement."51

A number of the General Council remained anxious for a settlement, and when they had been secretly approached by Sir Herbert Samuel on Friday 7th May, they readily accepted his offer of mediation, but concealed this from the MFGB. On the Saturday, Baldwin repeated a statement made earlier to the House of Commons offering the General Council negotiations if they called off the strike. Sir Herbert Samuel diligently set about his task of finding a formula to end the dispute. On Monday 10th May Samuel had concluded his memorandum and presented it to the General Council. Later that day, the miners' leaders, who had become aware of the unofficial negotiations over the weekend, were given a copy of the document, and made an unsuccessful attempt to amend the proposals but this was turned down by the General Council. The leaders of the MFGB were concerned that all those on strike should be able to return to work on the same conditions that they left, but were told by Thomas that he had seen to it that the members of the railways would be protected.52 In other words, the miners should mind their own business.

The strikers remained unaware of these developments and the General Council actually denied that any trade union leaders had attempted to reopen negotiations to end the stoppage. In the middle of the negotiations between Samuel and the TUC Negotiating Committee, the General Council was still calling on its supporters to Stand firm. Be loyal to instructions and trust your leaders.53 Millions continued to do so and on the 12th May, a few hours before the General Council called off the strike, shipyard and engineering workers joined those who had indeed remained loyal.

On Wednesday 12th May, the General Council decided to terminate the strike and at mid-day Thomas, Pugh and Bevin met the Prime Minister and members of his Cabinet at Downing Street, where they told him in a brief statement, that the strike was at an end. It was a complete, unconditional surrender and a betrayal of millions of trade unionists who had remained loyal to the General Council and the miners. Bevin, to his credit, attempted to get some measure of security for those returning to work and asked that there should be free and unfettered negotiations54 for the miners, but Baldwin was noncommittal. The General Council had been hopeful that the Samuel Memorandum could be used as a basis for future negotiations but Baldwin had no intention of reaching a compromise, even one worked out by Samuel. He agreed to consider its contents but gave no assurance that it would find acceptance by the Cabinet. It was a humiliating experience and one that would be uppermost in the minds of the leadership of the General Council for many years to come. In the meantime, the families of thousands of working people paid the price for the Council's disloyalty. A telegram was sent to all affiliated unions telling them that the General Council had terminated the strike and they were to instruct their members to resume work. Still working in unison, Walkden, Bromley and Cramp telegraphed their branches to tell them that the strike was at an end. The message said, Complete reinstatement secured without penalties. All members should report for duty immediately.55

The RCA's Glasgow Southern branch said that the cessation of the strike was an unprecedented example of incapability displayed by the General Council of the British TUC56 and went on to demand that the leaders be expelled. The former Labour Housing Minister, the Rt. Hon. John Wheatley MP said, Not only had the TUC deserted the miners, but they had gratuitously thrown their own members to the wolves.57 The Labour correspondent of the Manchester Guardian wrote:

"The General Council, although it had declared the general strike, feared the monster it had created. The strength of the strike resided not on Eccleston Square, with its not very efficient organisation, but in the country in the solidarity of the rank and file. The leaders lost no chance of trying to end the strike."58

The miners' attempts to stop any movement of coal continued, but the railway unions were found lacking. Concerned at the fate of their own members, at a Joint Meeting of ASLEF, RCA and the NUR, held on 21st May, a request from the MFGB not to move coal was turned down as it was deemed they had fulfilled their obligations during the strike. With the odds now against them, the miners continued their strike until the end of November when they were forced to return under conditions that were worse than those of 1921. The Government ignored Samuel's memorandum and his report. The Coal Mines Act 1926, which received the Royal Assent in July, enabled the coal employers to increase the working day to eight hours, and locally-based wage cuts were imposed. Thousands of miners were victimised; many were sacked, others placed on short-time working.

The MFGB called for financial assistance and received help from working people and their organisations running the length and breadth of the country. Support came from unions at home and abroad, and by December collections for the Relief of Miners' Wives and Children totalled £1,843,839 but of that, £1,161,459 had been donated by Soviet trade unionists and co-operatives. The Association's first response for financial assistance was approved by delegates to the Association's 1926 Annual Conference who agreed to send £1,000. A further appeal to the EC failed to evoke a response, although both Harold Chadwick and Thomas Burden gave it their support. In September the Coventry, East London and Doncaster branches asked the EC to assist the miners, but this too was refused on the basis that the Association must give priority to the interests of its own members. By November many branches had collected money for the miners who were, by now, suffering extreme distress. One more attempt was made by Executive members Harold Chadwick, Harold Oatts and Frederick C. Watkins to send £1,000 but, yet again, the proposal was turned down. When the Prince of Wales made an appeal for the miners on Christmas Day and launched a National Fund on their behalf, the EC deferred a proposal to contribute £100, as no request had been received from the MFGB or the TUC.

The Aftermath Of The Strike

The day after the strike ended, many of the scab volunteers failed to turn up for work; of those that did, some were reluctant to continue when rumours began to spread that strikers would not be allowed to return under their old conditions. Ramsay MacDonald raised this with the railway companies and was told that any rumours that railway employees would receive reduced pay and lose seniority on their return to work were without foundation.59 So strong were the rumours that the companies confirmed this in writing to the unions on 13th May.60 The manner in which the railway companies greeted their staff on their return to work stands in sharp contrast to the statements expressed by the Prime Minister, railway directors and general managers, to say nothing of the King, who had declared, We should forget whatever elements of bitterness the events of the past few days may have created.61 Stanley Baldwin told the House of Commons that the British people should resume work in a spirit of co-operation and put behind us all malice and all vindictiveness.62 Sir Felix Pole, the General Manager of the GWR endorsed the sentiments of the Prime Minister, and Sir Herbert Walker, Chairman of the Southern Railway Company stated, The strike is over and done with; there is, and shall be, no spirit of bitterness or malice. H.G. Burgess, General Manager of the LMS, said, Let us avoid all forms of recrimination and provocation.63

In fact the railway managers were determined to exact their revenge, particularly upon the more senior of their employees who had displayed loyalty to the union rather than to the company. Those known to have taken a prominent part in the strike were only allowed to resume their duties if approved by senior managers at head office level. Everyone was asked to sign an obnoxious document64 that accepted their responsibility for participating in the strike which, in effect, signed away all their conditions of service. Thousands were told to go home, to be sent for when required; others quickly found that privilege tickets and new season tickets were refused. Some weeks later, the GWR refused to pay its "marriage dowry" to women who had participated in the strike, evoking strong protests from the Western Divisional Council. In Holyhead, soldiers were on duty as a precautionary measure,65 even though there had been no disturbances and the strikers had been congratulated on their exemplary conduct. In Manchester, the staff were furious and demanded that the strike continue. At Crewe, less than 100 of the 11,000 railway employees had started work as late as the 15th May, and in Sheffield a mass meeting of railway workers decided not to return until the railway companies agreed to take them all back, and in their same posts. Railway workers were enraged at the reception they received from their employers and thousands spontaneously continued to strike; they were far from demoralised.

On the 12th May, when news of the companies' attitude reached the Association's head office, Thomas Gill and Charles Cramp approached ASLEF for a joint meeting. This took place the same day at 9 Arkwright Road, London, the headquarters of ASLEF, with J. Cordrey, President of ASLEF, in the chair. ASLEF had already told its members to continue the strike, and the NUR and the RCA decided to do likewise. A telegram was sent out in the name of all three unions saying:

"In view of the difficulties concerning reinstatement, the Joint Executive Committee calls upon all railwaymen to continue strike until we receive satisfactory assurances. Bromley, Cramp, Walkden."66

To the dismay of the Government the Postmaster-General reported to the Cabinet on 13th May that the strike was continuing in protest at the employers' unwillingness to take back all the strikers. The three railway unions and the TGWU (who had members in the London Underground Combine) formed a national strike committee to resolve the new situation. Representing the RCA were T.H. Gill, W.E. Williams, A.S. Umpleby and George Lathan. The next day Bromley, Cramp and Walkden met Lord Ashfield, Chairman of the London Underground, at the House of Commons, along with representatives from the Railway Companies Association, to agree terms for the strikers' reinstatement. Ashfield came to an understanding67 with the union leaders, whereby they admitted they had committed a wrongful act against the Company. This understanding was accepted by the Joint Executive Committees and later that evening, A.G. Walkden, T.H. Gill, G. Lathan along with the other union leaders attended a meeting with the Railway Companies' Association.

There they faced the chairman Sir Felix Pole; despite his conciliatory words immediately after the strike, he was now exceedingly angry, and protested that the unions had called out their members without any justification.68 From the start, Pole took a very hard line indeed and told the union delegation that as the coal strike had drastically affected the railway business, the companies required very few staff. He expected strikers to make up their losses by contributing a week's pay, and possibly up to £15 per person would have to be paid. Pole told Walkden that no member of the Supervisory Grades, including stationmasters, goods agents and senior clerks, who had joined the stoppage, would be allowed to resume work. The railway managers demanded that the unions should furnish a security of £100,000 to ensure that they would observe clause three of the final agreement. The next day, the general managers softened their tone and the most extreme demands were dropped. The final terms were still a bitter pill to swallow, and the settlement, finalised on 14th May 1926, can be ranked amongst the most infamous in the history of industrial relations.

Table 15

The General Strike Settlement

1. Those employees of the Railway Companies who have gone out on strike to be taken back to work as soon as traffic offers and work can be found for them. The principle to be followed in reinstating to be seniority in each grade at each station, depot or office.

2. The Trade Unions admit that, in calling a strike, they committed a wrongful act against the Companies, and agree that the Companies do not, by reinstatement, surrender their legal rights to claim damages arising out of the strike from strikers and others responsible.

3. The Unions undertake:

(a) Not again to instruct their members to strike without previous negotiations with the Company.

(b) To give no support of any kind to their members to take any unauthorised action.

(c) Not to encourage supervisory employees in the special class to take part in any strike.

4. The Company intimate that, arising out of the strike, it may be necessary to remove certain persons to other positions, but no such persons' salaries or wages will be reduced. Each Company will notify the Union within one week the names of men whom they propose to transfer, and will afford each man an opportunity of having an advocate to present his case to the general manager.

5. The settlement shall not extend to persons who have been guilty of violence or intimidation.

(Signed) On behalf of the General Managers' Conference: Felix J.C. Pole, H.G. Burgess, H.A.Walker, R.L.Wedgwood, R.H.Selbie.

On behalf of the Railway Unions:

J.H.Thomas and C.T.Cramp, National Union of Railwaymen.

J.Bromley, Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers & Firemen.

A.G.Walkden, Railway Clerks' Association.

At the very moment when the railway companies were meeting the trade unions, Alexander Walkden received a telephone message from Ernest Townend that all strikers employed on the Manchester Ship Canal69 had been offered unconditional reinstatement. Regardless of this offer, they were adamant that they would not return to work without the approval of their respective unions, which they received later that evening.

All three General Secretaries vigorously defended the settlement and J.H. Thomas, in a radio broadcast on the 14th May said that it was not only satisfactory but it would set an example for others to follow.70 He later justified this by asserting that it was loyalty to the railway clerks which made them sign the agreement as it had been the intention of the employers to eliminate the RCA.71 Bromley was also convinced that a very satisfactory arrangement has been reached; Walkden was grateful to the railway companies for the magnanimous spirit in which they had conducted the discussions.72

The General Managers also considered that the settlement was satisfactory, but for different reasons. When the companies celebrated their victory with a dinner to thank some of the 5,620 volunteers who worked on the GWR, and the 700 Special Constables they had enrolled during the strike Sir Felix Pole announced, amidst cheers, that they had secured a settlement which he believed was going to make all the difference in the relations between employers and the employed, for a very long time to come.73

When Walkden met the EC on 16th May he told them that clause 2 (which admitted that they had committed a wrongful act), had only been allowed to stand after assurances had been given that no action would be taken in respect of the clause, and it had been left in as it was the only feature which left them (the managers) with any shred of dignity.74 Walkden's statements should not be perceived as simply off-the-cuff remarks or comments made in the heat of the moment. When he prepared the 1927 Annual Report he wrote, The predominant spirit in which the Agreement was eventually signed was that there was to be no victimisation on either side; that was why this Strike Settlement Agreement was described at the time as being satisfactory and, indeed magnanimous.75 Whatever the reasons for signing the Settlement, the reality was that the hardship borne by thousands of railway workers was just beginning, and in some cases, difficulties would not be resolved for several years.

Many branches in all three unions complained bitterly at the lack of progress towards reinstatement, and separate meetings were held with each railway company but these failed to bring results. Eventually the Southern Railway discreetly approached the ASLEF President to see if the unions would drop the guaranteed working week. Cordrey reported this to the Joint Executive Committee when it met on the 18th and 19th May. The unions had no desire to lose the guaranteed week but with so many out of work they felt obliged to choose the lesser of two evils. T.H. Gill proposed that the best solution was to share the work equally amongst all employees, rather than have some employed and some unemployed, and this was agreed. The three unions then proposed to the railway managers that the guaranteed week be dropped, but with the exception of the Southern Railway, this was rejected. As the unions were now paying out large sums in unemployment benefit, they were convinced that the employers' objective was to destroy their organisation by depleting their funds. Succour came from an unexpected source. The Government, desperate to save coal stocks, brought pressure to bear on the railway companies to drop the guaranteed week from 21st May. A three day week and short-time working lasted until 11th April 1927, considerably longer than the unions envisaged, but those who had remained loyal to the railway companies were exempt from such restrictions. Their future careers were also ensured as their record cards were marked "loyal".

When Walkden signed the General Strike Agreement he had knowingly accepted that disciplinary action would be taken against a number of agents, stationmasters, supervisors and senior employees who had supported the strike but whose staff had remained on duty. His action was unforgivable and there was considerable unease and dissatisfaction that better safeguards had not been secured. Walkden felt betrayed by the General Managers and although he honestly believed that those disciplined would be few in number, this was irrelevant to the individuals concerned. As the companies' reprisals were intensified, many railway employees were removed from their former positions and placed in lower graded jobs, not necessarily because they came within the terms of the settlement but simply because their departmental head personally resented their participation in the strike. Some were dismissed, then reinstated. Others were moved from their post at headquarters to country stations, as William Stott had been nineteen years ealier. Management attitudes and practices had, in reality, changed very little.

There were 113 clerical or supervisory staff listed under clause 4 of the Strike Settlement of whom 28 worked in Scotland. Many of these were stationmasters and well known activists such as Arthur Chandler, John Gillies,76 M.L. Bonvanni77 and F.T. Hawkins.78 Other prominent RCA members listed under Clause 4 were F.J. Ollier, the Secretary of the Socialist Fellowship, and A.W. Longbottom, who remained unemployed until 1st January 1928. The hearings that examined the cases of members categorised within clause 4 were often of a perfunctory character, and most of those interviewed considered that the verdicts had been decided before the meeting. Walkden protested at this treatment and, as a result, some were restored to their former posts but many suffered severely.

By 22nd May 1926, 6,321 members of the Association were still waiting to be reinstated and on 19th June, a conference of all members listed under clauses 4 and 5 was held. They remained in excellent spirits79 regardless of their bitter experience, and displayed their loyalty to the Association by passing a vote of confidence in the EC. In September George Lathan had a meeting with the LNER's Assistant General Manager, after which he told the EC that any prejudice arising from the events of 1926 had been removed, but a month later, there were still 45,000 railway workers unemployed and 200,000 on a three day week.80 Gradually members were reinstated; a social was held by the Cricklewood and Hendon branch to celebrate the return to work of J. Lee, a District Inspector who had been locked out for twenty-three weeks, and G.R. Richardson a Controller who had been kept out of work for sixteen weeks and who had still not been reinstated to his former position. They, and the branch secretary F.J. Gray, were awarded an RCA gold medallion; five women members of the branch were presented with fountain pens for their work during the strike. The NUR also expressed their gratitude for the work of Lee and Richardson when they made a further presentation to them on 9th December.

By November 1926, 300 RCA members were waiting to be reinstated and of the original 113 RCA members who had been placed on the clause 4 list in May 1926, 19 were still unemployed in March 1928. The LMS achieved unenviable notoriety for its attitude to reinstatement and the union made repeated representations to its leading officials. Political action began when the company presented a Bill to Parliament in 1927 and it was "blocked" by Ernest Townend MP to force a change of attitude. Assurances were then given that reinstatement would be accelerated, whereupon the Bill was allowed to proceed. Two years later, there still remained a number of outstanding cases, and the EC authorised Walkden, as its Parliamentary Secretary, to make arrangements to block any Bills proposed by the railway companies. Townend and the newly elected RCA MP A.W. Longbottom proceeded to do this until assurances from the LMS, the Southern and the GWR Companies enabled the "block" to be lifted. Despite all their promises progress towards reinstatement continued at a snail's pace.

Greater success was achieved in April 1929 when the RCA took action against Bills proposed by the Underground Electric Railways Company Ltd. This resulted in Lord Ashfield giving an undertaking to restore one clerk to his former position. On 1st January 1931 the last member to be reinstated under the arrangements for Clause 4 was a former Goods Agent at Warrington, Arthur Moss,81 who was offered the Goods Agency at Bolton.

To avoid violent disturbances during the General Strike the TUC had issued instructions to strikers regarding their conduct, and members of the RCA appeared to have been eminently law-abiding. A number did find themselves in court and the RCA spent £2,048 in providing legal assistance. Not one member was found guilty, but the railway companies went to great lengths to fabricate or magnify a number of incidents. J.R. Gardner, along with his colleagues in ASLEF and the NUR, had to answer nine charges of intimidation based upon a letter their Joint Committee had sent to non-strikers, but the wording was so innocuous that the magistrate immediately dismissed the case. W.R. Robins82 who was the Vice-Chairman of the Swindon Central Strike Committee, a local councillor and a Primitive Methodist preacher, had been thanked by the police for his efforts in maintaining peace during the strike, but still found himself accused of intimidation and "watching the Company's premises". Charged under the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875, there was a possibility of imprisonment but, when one of the company's own witnesses was subpoenaed to give evidence and gave Robins a glowing reference, his case, too, was dismissed, to the applause of supporters in the court. R.C. Wallis, a branch collector, and Bert Watkis, the Chairman of the Manchester No.6 branch were charged with intimidation. Both cases were dismissed, but Watkis had the honour of being awarded 40 guineas (£42) costs against the LMS Railway Company. The same company also brought charges against Mr. Jolley, a Chief Booking Clerk at Clitheroe, who had visited many stations and attempted, often successfully, to encourage clerks to join the strike. He was accused of intimidation, but when witnesses said that all the discussions were quiet and friendly, the magistrate dismissed the case.

On 18th May, the publishers of The Derbyshire Times commenced proceedings in the High Court against the Secretary of the Chesterfield branch, G.H. Tomlinson, and twelve others. They claimed damages for libel and stated that a conspiracy existed between the defendants and the Chesterfield Trades Council. Nearly two years later, the action was dropped and all Tomlinson's expenses were paid by the proprietors. In all of these cases, including those involving members of the NUR and ASLEF, the defence was conducted by W.R. Southeard, the RCA's solicitor.

The 1926 Annual Conference

The 1926 Annual Conference had been scheduled for May, but was postponed to 6/7th June. When the delegates assembled, there were still 2,000 members out of work, and many considered they had been badly let down.83 The vast majority were in a critical mood, with some apportioning blame to the Government, others to the TUC General Council, the Railway Companies, or the EC, with Walkden also taking a measure of responsibility. It was a stormy conference and the first indication of the delegates' attitude was when Richard Rowlands proposed that if there were any reporters present from newspapers that still refused to employ trade unionists they should withdraw. This was followed by a question to establish if all those who were standing for the TUC and Labour Party delegations had responded to the strike call. The President revealed that all had done so. Walkden, who considered that the miners had been foolish to continue their struggle, then detailed the events of the strike in a passionate speech lasting over three and a half hours. He was questioned for over two hours on his report and when an attempt was made to prolong the discussion, delegates decided to terminate the session by 197 votes to 156.

Walkden faced considerable criticism and J. McCooke84 (Belfast) stated that he was far from convinced by Walkden's long and eloquent speech but he left his sharpest comments for J.H. Thomas whom he considered was one of the most doubtful and sinister figures in the Labour Movement.85 The atmosphere during the debates was electric. The Leeds branch endorsed the action of the EC and placed on record its confidence that it would bring future negotiations to a successful conclusion. The amendments covered every aspect of the strike. One from the Brighton branch demanded that in future a ballot requiring a two-thirds majority in favour should be held prior to action. This was lost, as was that from the Cardiff No.1 branch which sought to withdraw the Association from the TUC; this had the support of a mere 25 delegates. Frank Anderson was one of the EC's strongest critics and said that it had neither grit nor backbone.86 Anderson condemned the EC for signing an agreement that did not provide for the unconditional reinstatement of all the strikers and asked for a ballot to gauge the membership's opinion of the Agreement. This was seen as a vote of confidence in the actions of the EC and was defeated. Communists such as George Chandler and Rowland Hill criticised the EC for failing to appreciate the solidarity of the membership, and condemned the cancellation of the strike. Hill was sharply critical of Walkden's telegram which had said there would be reinstatement without penalties; disapproval also came from John Harris (Derby No.1) who concluded his speech by saying We have been misled, badly led, and are suffering from bad generalship. This was a cutting attack against Walkden but despite this, the amendment from those on the left was relatively mild, placing its emphasis on the future, and calling on conference to march forward by persistent organisation for 100% Trade Unionism with a view to securing ultimate victory for the Working Class.87 This was also turned down by the delegates who refused to accept even the mildest criticism of the Executive's action.

The personal attacks levelled against Walkden during the conference were not reflected in the motions or amendments submitted by the branches for debate. The only amendment to censure him for his role during the strike came from Swindon. A.W. Rawlings opened the debate and was supported by James Haworth. The amendment condemned the clause which stipulated that the strike was a wrongful act and deprecated the eulogising by Walkden of the general managers for their magnanimity in the final stages of the settlement. This, too, was defeated, and the only proposal which aroused little controversy came from the North-West London branch which protested against short-time working being confined to those who had participated in the strike. A card vote was then taken which showed that the delegates approved of the Executive's handling of the strike with 31,275 being cast in favour and 18,375 against.

When W.E. Williams delivered his Financial Report it was listened to with great interest as there had been widespread press speculation that the Association was bankrupt. This was far from true, but the allegations continued, and Walkden felt obliged to write to all the newspapers published in London to refute their statements. In his letter, he told them that the RCA's funds were not exhausted; they had good credit with the bankers and they had not been obliged to realise any of the Association's assets. Nor indeed had they found the need to secure an overdraft. The only newspapers to print the Association's letter were The Times88 and the Daily Herald. The strike cost the union approximately £200,000 but the Treasurer was able to show that the RCA still remained a very effective organisation with merely 2,361 of the 66,130 members in arrears, averaging £1 13s 4d (£1.65) per member. The total funds of the Association at the end of 1926 were £119,832, and at the end of 1927, £139,000. Of the three railway unions, the RCA had weathered the financial storm the best. So hard hit was ASLEF that they were obliged to discontinue their affiliation to the ITF. When the ITF appealed for funds to set up an office in Rome all its affiliates were asked to donate towards the cost. The RCA was the only transport union in a position to do so and its contribution was second only to that of the German Transport Workers89; despite this, it still remained reluctant to donate further funds to the MFGB.

The Association's relatively healthy financial position had been brought about by a willingness to increase subscriptions when the necessity arose. Nevertheless, it was not until 1909 that members began to pay one shilling (5p) per month; with 4d (1.6p) a week from 1916 and 6d (2.5p) per week from 1917 to 1921. At this stage, payments for unemployment, convalescence and death benefits had increased sharply, and the EC decided to ask members to raise subscriptions once again. A special conference at Birmingham on 6th March 1921, then approved, somewhat controversially, the doubling of subscriptions from 6d (2.5p) to the relatively high figure of one shilling (5p) per week. This contrasted sharply with the NUR, whose members paid 5d (2p) per week. As the decision led to a significant loss of members a further special conference was held in December 1923 and a new system of payment was introduced, designed to bring back those who had lapsed. Members now paid their subscriptions at one of three levels, dependent on the "Friendly" benefits desired. The one shilling (5p) subscription was retained for Section "A" members; those in Section "B" paid 9d (3.7p), with the minimum being 6d (2.5p) for Section "C" members. The policy was extremely controversial, but it enabled the Association to improve its financial base, and those who remained out of work after the strike received benefits that were superior to those of any other union involved.

Table 16

All members who had been on strike or suffered short-time working, were exempt from paying subscriptions and at the 1926 Conference delegates agreed to ask each employed member to contribute the sum of at least £1, which could be paid over ten weeks to assist those who were on short-time work or unemployed. This eventually raised £18,064 which, along with £10,000 from the Benevolent Fund, enabled the Association to pay benefits ranging up to £2. For those who were suffering special hardship, a special grant was provided.

There was very little other business discussed outside the debate on the General Strike. There were, however, two items which were of long term interest. One established the right of branches to hold their own bank accounts, and the second related to the procedure of annual conference. When the SOC had been initiated in 1908, it had always been elected as the first business of conference. The sheer size and growing complexity of the conference had brought complaints over the years that changes were required; delegates had always followed the advice of the EC and rejected any alteration but by 1926, conference finally agreed that an SOC of five would be elected by delegates to prepare the following year's business. The first SOC to be elected on the new basis was:

When conference concluded the hall echoed to the singing of Auld Lang Syne and The Red Flag.

Chapter Fifteen - Footnotes

[1]. TGWU formed 1st January 1922.

[2]. The Railway Service Journal April 1921.

[3]. The Railway Service Journal April 1921.

[4]. My Story J. H. Thomas, page 63.

[5]. Daily Herald 31st July 1925.

[6]. R Smith was elected President of the MFGB in 1922 and A J Cook, General Secretary in 1924.

[7]. RCA EC Minutes 17th May 1925.

[8]. The Times 24th March 1926.

[9]. RCA EC Minutes 25th July 1925.

[10]. RCA EC Minutes 25th July 1925.

[11]. RCA EC Minutes 30th July 1925.

[12]. Manchester Guardian 4th August 1925. The occasion was also reported in the Daily Herald but only the Manchester Guardian chose to include this part of MacDonald's address.

[13]. The General Strike W. H. Crook Quoted from New York Times 19th August 1925.

[14]. The Times 13th March 1926.

[15]. The Times 13th May 1926.

[16]. The Railway Service Journal May 1926.

[17]. The Railway Service Journal July 1926.

[18]. RCA EC Minutes 29th/30th April 1926.

[19]. The Mining Crisis and the National Crisis 1926. TUC.

[20]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd May 1926 Vol. 195 Col. 79.

[21]. The Times 3rd May 1926.

[22]. Irish Times 3rd May 1926.

[23]. RCA EC Minutes 29th April 1926.

[24]. Daily Herald 3rd May 1926.

[25]. The Times 3rd May 1926.

[26]. Evening Citizen 3rd May 1926.

[27]. A Workers' History of the General Strike, Page 21. R. W. Postgate, E. Wilkinson MP, J. F. Horrabin.

[28]. RCA Circular P.1526/19 1st May 1926.

[29]. Arthur Stanley Umpleby JP (York SM&A). First secretary of branch. EC 1924-1930. Chairman Staithes Labour Party.

[30]. Public Records Office, Kew. RAIL. 253451.

[31]. Interview: E. Wilson 14th April 1994.

[32]. General Strike Reel 15 TUC Library. RCA Letter 14th June 1926.

[33]. County Express Worcestershire and Staffs, 15th May 1926.

[34]. The Locomotive Journal June 1926.

[35]. The British Worker 6th May 1926.

[36]. ITF Report of Proceedings 1926.

[37]. The Railway Review 4th June 1926.

[38]. W. Monteith JP (Glasgow Central). Joined RTCA 1906 and RCA 1911. EC 1935-1941. Chairman Scottish Advisory Council. First elected to Glasgow City Council 1943.

[39]. The Evening Times 3rd May 1926.

[40]. The General Strike in York 1926 R. I. Hills.

[41]. South Wales Echo 4th May 1926.

[42]. The Railway Pioneer June-July 1926.

[43]. RCA letter from Joint Strike Committee TUC Library General Strike Reel 9.

[44]. The British Worker 5th May 1926.

[45]. Irish LP & TUC Report 1926.

[46]. The Railway Service Journal May 1950.

[47]. Irish LP & TUC Report 1926.

[48]. The Times l0th May 1926.

[49]. Manchester Guardian l0th May.

[50]. The Railway Review 3rd December 1926.

[51]. General Strike correspondence. TUC library.

[52]. The Nine Days Page 20 A. J. Cook.

[53]. The British Worker l0th May 1926.

[54]. The British Gazette 13th May 1926.

[55]. The Railway Review 21st May 1926.

[56]. The General Strike 1926 Edited by J. Skelley, Article by P. Carter, Page 135.

[57]. Glasgow Eastern Standard 22nd May 1926.

[58]. Manchester Guardian 14th May 1926.

[59]. Bristol Evening News 14th May 1926.

[60]. Joint EC Minutes 13th May 1926.

[61]. The Times 13th May 1926.

[62]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 12th May Vol.195 Col. 878.

[63]. The Railway Service Journal August 1926.

[64]. Letter from former RCA member William Veitch 25th January 1994. Veitch was employed as a clerk at Maryhill LNER station. All eight clerks came out on strike but the Stationmaster and Chief Goods Manager refused.

[65]. Holyhead Mail 14th May 1926.

[66]. Doncaster and Thorne Advertiser 14th May 1926.

[67]. Report of emergency meeting held at Unity House 14th May 1926. ASLEF Minutes May 1926.

[68]. RCA EC Minutes 16th May 1926.

[69]. The Manchester Ship Canal Company recognised the RCA in 1918.

[70]. The Times 15th May 1926.

[71]. The Railway Review 9th July 1926.

[72]. The Evening Citizen 15th May 1926.

[73]. The Times 20th May 1926.

[74]. RCA EC Minutes 16th May 1926.

[75]. RCA Annual Report 1927.

[76]. J. Gillies (Dundee) Founder of branch 1919. EC 1930-1936.

[77]. Maurice Bonvanni (Port Talbot SM&A). Joined RCA 1912. Secretary South Wales Divisional Council 1936-1941. EC 1945-1949.

[78]. F. T. Hawkins (Birmingham Stationmasters). EC 1933-1939. Elected as Labour Councillor for Warwickshire.

[79]. RCA EC Minutes 25th June 1926.

[80]. The Railway Review 22nd October 1926.

[81]. A Moss JP (Manchester SM&A). EC 1920-1933. President, Manchester and Salford Trades Council 1932-1935.

[82]. W. R Robins (Swindon). Joined RCA 1908. Organising Secretary Swindon branch when it opened in 1911. EC 1925-1931. Elected to Swindon Town Council 1919, Alderman 1928, Mayor 1932-1933, Freeman of Swindon 1951.

[83]. Correspondence from W. Veitch 25th January 1994.

[84]. J. McCooke (Belfast). Branch secretary. Chairman Irish Divisional Council. Member Northern Ireland Labour Party. Delegate to Irish TUC. Director, Belfast Co-operative Society. Vice-President Belfast Trades Council.

[85]. The Railway Service Journal July 1926.

[86]. The Railway Service Journal July 1926.

[87]. Minutes of RCA Annual Conference 1926.

[88]. The Times 26th November 1926.

[89]. ITF Annual Report 1926.

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