"Conference applauds the close co-operation and outstanding unity of action demonstrated by the three railway unions throughout the negotiations and gives its wholehearted support to the Executive Committee for their determined stand in the face of unprecedented abuse from Government spokesmen and misleading reports in the national press and other news media."
Item 108, proposed by A.P. Coldrick at the
TSSA Annual Conference 1972.
When the Conservative Government took over from Labour, the long term weaknesses inherent within British industry had not been resolved and it was failing to compete effectively against international rivals; inflation was rising. To address these deficiences the Tory Government was determined to cut public expenditure, weaken the trade unions, reduce state intervention and join the European Economic Community. A reduction in personal taxation led to cuts in a wide range of social and welfare services, with price increases imposed on dental treatment and prescriptions. Museum charges were introduced, grants to public transport were cut and fares increased. Margaret Thatcher, as Minister of Education, cancelled Labour's plans for comprehensive education and increased the price of school dinners to such an extent that thousands of children stopped taking them. Thatcher achieved further notoriety and was named Thatcher the milk snatcher
when she abolished free school milk for 7 to 11 year old children. Council house rents were increased and within a year Britain's investment in housing was less than that of any other country in Europe. Once again, arms sales to South Africa were resumed. The Prices and Incomes Board was abolished in November 1970 and although the Tory Manifesto had proclaimed that competition would keep down prices, by the end of the Government's tenure the cost of food had increased by 53 per cent and prices overall had risen by 33 per cent. Unemployment rose to levels unknown for 25 years.
The Government became famous for its succession of "U-turns" belying Heath's pre-election assurance that when it made decisions, it would have the courage to stick by them.1 The biggest U-turn took place over pay and prices. Initially, the Government was determined to have no form of statutory incomes control and sought to hold down pay with a strategy based on confrontation, backed up by anti-union legislation. It set out its views on trade union legislation in a consultative document on 5th October 1970, the objective being to boost the profitability of industry. A mere 40 days were allowed for consultation and Johnny Johnson, now Labour MP for Derby South, devoted his maiden speech to the subject. He told the House that the consultation exercise was a mockery2 and its contents not only contradicted the recommendations of the Donovan Commission, but if its proposals were put into practice the number of strikes would increase.
On 1st December 1970 the Industrial Relations Bill was presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Employment, Robert Carr. It consisted of 150 clauses and 8 schedules, all designed to shackle and penalise the trade union movement. The Bill was based, to a large extent, on the United States' methods of dealing with industrial relations, but it was infinitely more severe. A new Register of Trade Unions and Employers' Associations was proposed and only by registration could trade unions secure any privileges. Designed to undermine trade unions with a range of unfair practices
, an Industrial Relations Court would be established with the power to fine trade unions if they transgressed. The right of an individual not to be a member of a trade union was to be enshrined in statute; industrial agreements were to be legally binding and any employer or individual with a grievance would be able to take the union to court. Compulsory cooling-off periods and strike ballots were to be introduced. The Labour Party submitted over 1,000 amendments to the Bill and all pairing arrangements between MPs were suspended during its passage through Parliament. By a somewhat bizarre choice, the Labour Party's opposition to the Bill was led by Barbara Castle, even though it contained elements that were remarkably close to In Place of Strife - a point not lost on her Conservative opponents. The Bill brought one benefit - the trade unions and the Labour Party once again found common ground and a joint TUC and Labour Party Committee was formed in February 1971.
Calls for the TUC to mobilise the movement to take strike action were spurned, and many trade unionists expressed their frustration by supporting the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions which had been formed in 1966. Communist led, it had vigorously opposed Labour's incomes policy and In Place of Strife, but its greatest moments were yet to come. On 14th November 1970 the Liaison Committee took its first big step to defeat the Bill with a meeting at Friends House, Euston. Present were 1,800 trade unionists representing 300 branches, 55 Trades Councils, 36 trade union district committees, 155 shop stewards committees and 4 national unions. A Day of Action, called by the Committee for 8th December, was supported by 5 national unions. Fleet Street was devoid of newspapers and approximately 750,000 workers and students came out on strike. A 30,000 strong march paraded through the streets of London and thousands voiced their protest in Liverpool. The TUC, opposed to calling a strike, held a Day of Action on 12th January 1971 when millions of workers participated in union meetings during their lunch breaks or after work. Thousands demonstrated all over the country and many took strike action. That evening, in response to a call from Percy Coldrick, TSSA members joined other trade unionists in a packed Albert Hall to hear Harold Wilson, Professor Wedderburn and Victor Feather, the TUC General Secretary, attack the Bill, but only Wedderburn was heard without being heckled.
On 21st February 1971 the biggest demonstration seen in Britain for many years was held in London, with estimates of its size varying from 140,000 to 250,000. In a mighty expression of opposition to the Bill trade unionists and their families marching 15 abreast took 3 hours to leave Hyde Park on their way to Trafalgar Square. There were hundreds of banners carried on the march, including that of the TSSA.3 Frustrated at the TUC's failure to ask its affiliates to strike, over 2 million engineering, boilermakers and sheet metal workers came out on official strike on the 1st and 18th March 1971. The 18th March was also the day chosen by the TUC for a special conference of its affiliated bodies, designed to determine its strategy should the Bill became law. A call for the 1,057 delegates to support a strike was turned down by 5,366,000 votes to 3,992,000. Equally contentious was a proposal from the General Council, that affiliates should be strongly advised
not to register, rather than compelled.
The TSSA supported the General Council and the resolution was carried by 5,055,000 votes to 4,284,000. The remaining five proposals from the General Council were carried without any disagreement; the Labour Party was asked to give a clear and unconditional assurance that the Act would be repealed when it came into office, affiliated unions were asked not to enter into legally binding agreements, not to co-operate with the work of the National Industrial Relations Court or the Commission on Industrial Relations, to withdraw from Industrial Tribunals and not to poach members, as stipulated by the TUC's Bridlington Agreement. On the 24th March, the day before the Third Reading of the Bill, the TUC organised a lobby of MPs and presented a petition to the House of Commons containing 523,000 signatures, stating their opposition.
The Bill was debated within TSSA branches, Divisional Councils and at weekend schools. The London Political Advisory Council held a meeting in the House of Commons on 2nd February 1971, with Johnny Johnson in the chair; Lord Lindgren was also present, but the main speaker was Percy Coldrick. In devastating form, the General Secretary detailed the Association's objections. Speaker after speaker echoed Coldrick's views and there was a spontaneous burst of applause when Ralph Whitehead attacked Ray Gunter's support for the Bill and called for his expulsion from the union. Coldrick told the 150 members present that he had written to all the Association's MPs asking them to take cognisance of its outright opposition to the Bill, but when the final vote took place in Parliament, Gunter abstained. By this time he had little in common with the Labour Party.
The 1971 TSSA Annual Conference supported the decisions taken at the special TUC and endorsed the actions of its delegation, but some branches feared that the TSSA would register under the Act in order to keep the tax advantages that came with registration.4 Jim Anderson5 (Glasgow South) attempted to instruct the EC not to register the Association and he was alarmed when the General Secretary asked delegates to oppose his proposition. Percy Coldrick, worried that the Association could lose its negotiating rights, asked delegates not to bolt the door
6 and to leave the final decision to the EC. The majority did as he wished but it was a bitter moment for the Executive's opponents.
The Industrial Relations Act became operative on 5th August 1971. At the TUC that year the General Council attempted to maintain its policy to strongly advise
its affiliates not to register, but the political position had hardened. Aware that some unions were about to comply, Congress agreed, by 5,625,000 votes to 4,500,000, to instruct all TUC affiliates not to register, and to remove their names from the Provisional Register. The TSSA had already decided, in principle, to withdraw, but fearful that such a decision would lead to expulsions from the TUC, supported the minority view. The Provisional Register came into force on 1st October 1971 and Percy Coldrick told the Registrar that, subject to the approval of its annual conference in May, the TSSA should be removed from his records. This he was prepared to do, but until conference made its decision, he was obliged to transfer the TSSA. In the meantime, the TUC told all its affiliates they were expected to deregister by 30th June 1972. For a variety of reasons, not every union chose to do so; the National Graphical Association resigned from the TUC, and 21 other unions, representing 370,000 members, were expelled. By this time, the TSSA, along with colleagues in the NUR and ASLEF, had been engaged in a dispute that would determine just how effective the Government's cooling-off period, and compulsory ballots, actually were.
With instructions from the Government to hold down pay increases in the public sector, the annual pay negotiations were always going to be a difficult proposition - and so it proved. The first move came on 26th November 1971 at the Railway Staff Joint Council, when all three railway unions submitted applications for a substantial increase in pay. The BRB responded on 8th March 1972, with a derisory offer to Salaried Grades of 8.25 per cent. This was quickly raised by a further 1 per cent but as this also failed to meet the expectations of any of the railway unions it was rejected, as was their "final offer" of 9.84 per cent, made on 21st March. A further "final offer" of 10 per cent was also turned down as inadequate eight days later. There were strong reasons for this determined approach. A successful miners' strike, which had commenced with a ban on overtime on 1st November 1971, took place from 9th January to 28th February. This led to an enquiry under Lord Wilberforce which resulted in the miners receiving a pay rise of 25 per cent, with a minimum wage of £23 a week awarded to surface workers. With more than 75,000 railway workers earning less than £20 per week, the unions were resolved to increase their minimum basic rate to £20 - an increase of £2.80. Moreover, Wilberforce also awarded the mining Clerical Grades an additional £5 a week, - equivalent to 21.8 per cent in the maximum of the basic Clerical Grade scale. This significantly affected the TSSA's attitude, as the National Coal Board was one of the industries that had been used by Guillebaud as a means of comparison with the railways. The objective of the TSSA's claim was, as far as possible, to restore the relativity that had existed in each of the four previous settlements between BR salaried staff and those doing similar work in other comparable industries. To achieve this, an increase of 16 per cent was required.
Having rejected the BRB's "final offer", all three unions decided to approach its chairman, Richard Marsh, the former Minister of Transport, who had taken up his duties on 11th September 1971. Marsh met Ray Buckton, the General Secretary of ASLEF, Percy Coldrick and Sidney Greene on 6th April, and told them that he considered the Board's offer to be fair and reasonable. However, in view of the strong pressure that had been exerted, he agreed to hold a special meeting of the BRB. When he responded on 11th April, he said the Board had concluded that without any provision for deficit financing within the 1968 Transport Act, it was not possible to increase the offer. The unions considered such a response to be unacceptable, as the Wilberforce Report had already established that such an argument could not be used as an excuse to depress pay within the mining industry and, understandably, believed the same principles should apply to the BRB.
The unions were now set on a collision course with the Government and for the first time since 1926, the NUR, ASLEF and the TSSA were in agreement that industrial action was necessary to resolve their pay claim. At a joint meeting of the three railway unions on 12th April 1972 they decided to ban all overtime, Sunday, rest day and rostered day off working. TSSA members employed on the railways were advised that as from 00.01 hours on Monday, 17th April, they should follow this directive:
The day after they agreed to take industrial action, Coldrick, Buckton and Greene met Maurice Macmillan, the Secretary for Employment, and urged him to increase the amount of money available in order to progress a satisfactory settlement. Macmillan was not moved and suggested arbitration through the auspices of the RSNT as the best means of resolving their differences. This had been used successfully on many occasions, but as the post of RSNT Chairman was unfilled and no suitable successor had been found since Sir Donald Robertson had retired in December 1971, this was rejected.
A new opportunity arose when the Government indicated that extra money was now available, and Marsh suggested that an independent conciliator be mutually appointed. More confident that their aims could be accommodated, the unions agreed. The Conciliator's remit was to consider the representations of the parties to the dispute, with a view to determining the issues between them and to award.
8 Significantly, in view of the TUC's policy towards the Industrial Relations Act, it was accepted by all parties that the award would not be legally binding.
Alex Jarratt,9 who had been Secretary of the National Board for Prices and Incomes and closely involved in the 1966 Report on the pay of BR staff, was appointed as the Conciliator, but he failed to provide the solution that the trade union leaders had been led to expect. When the negotiations took place on 16th April, to the disappointment of the trade unions, the BRB reiterated its former position but agreed to increase the basic minimum wage of Railmen to £20 per week as from 1st January 1973. This was certainly not what the unions had hoped for and it was rejected. Jarratt then decided that the BRB's offer, which would increase its annual pay bill by 11 per cent, should be increased by a further 1 per cent from 1st May 1972, and as from 1st January 1973 the basic rate for Railrnen should be £20 per week, with consequential increases in differentials for all other grades.
Both ASLEF and the NUR rejected the award out of hand but the TSSA decided to seek clarification and establish the exact amount that would be allocated to Salaried Grades. At midnight the TSSA conveyed its views to the other unions and then told Jarratt they considered the award as a basis for a settlement, subject to the satisfactory clarification of their concerns. The BRB quickly confirmed that the award would provide salaried staff with an increase of 11 per cent, but refused to provide further details on other matters related to the claim. Coldrick then told Jarratt that whilst not rejecting the award, the EC were unable to withdraw their instruction to call off the industrial action.
On 17th April, Maurice Macmillan met the General Council after having made arrangements for three of its members to be flown down from the Scottish TUC, where they had been stranded by the rail dispute. He told them that unless the TUC could find constructive ways to end the dispute without further concessions from BR, or persuade the unions to hold a ballot on the Jarratt award, he would consider imposing a ballot. As there was only a marginal difference, in cash terms, between the parties, the TUC suggested that the Minister should reopen negotiations, and for their part, they would contact the railway unions. That evening the Cabinet met to prepare their plans and afterwards, when representatives of the TUC met Macmillan, he told them that no action would be taken by the Government until the TUC had met the railway unions.
The following morning, Macmillan met Buckton, Coldrick and Greene and asked them to hold a voluntary ballot. This was turned down and 20 minutes later they departed. The railway union leaders then met the TUC, and at the end of a lengthy meeting agreed that Vic Feather should contact Richard Marsh and attempt to arrange for discussions to take place. Vic Feather and the TUC's Chairman, George Smith, met Maurice Macmillan at the Department of Employment, and told him that the unions would be meeting to agree the basis for further discussions. Macmillan insisted on answers to three questions by 22.30 hours:
Vic Feather told Macmillan that the unions were not willing to call off the work to rule, but he pressed the Minister not to take any action that would prejudice new talks. After Macmillan reported back to the Cabinet, he told the TUC that the Government was willing to wait until 12.00 hours on 19th April for the unions to suspend their work to rule and to commence negotiations. Feather told the unions of Macmillan's decision and said that if they did not accept it, the Government would ask the Industrial Relations Court, which had been established under its President, Sir John Donaldson on 1st December 1971, for an Order to introduce a cooling-off period of 21 days.
The work to rule continued and on 19th April Percy Coldrick received a letter inviting the union to be represented at a Hearing of the Court at 16.00 hours. As the TSSA had been advised that the instructions sent to its members had not been unlawful, the EC decided to ask for the TUC's permission to attend the Industrial Relations Court. This was refused, as it contravened the decision made at the Congress in March 1971. The TSSA abided by the ruling but decided to send its solicitors as observers. After the Hearing, ASLEF told the TUC that according to the legal advice it had received, if the unions had been represented they would possibly have been able to prevent an Order being issued. The General Council then reversed its decision and from 4th May, affiliates were able to defend themselves against offensive action in the Industrial Relations Court. This change of policy was challenged at the 1972 Congress but the General Council's view was upheld.
The Government's application for the Order had been made by Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Attorney General, and was duly granted. At 55 minutes past midnight, the Association's caretaker at Walkden House was awakened by the ringing of the front door bell and presented with a Court Order imposing a 14 day cooling-off period rather than the 21 days requested by Sir Geoffrey Howe. Guidance was immediately sought from the Association's legal advisers who said that non-compliance would lead to the imposition of a substantial fine. The unions met on 20th April and agreed to abide by the Court's decision, but services continued to be disrupted over the weekend of the 22nd/23rd April. Eventually, with the exception of the Southern Region, normal service was restored. At Waterloo Station the police stopped two railway workers distributing leaflets which called for the work to rule to be continued, and threatened them with arrest for initiating a riot
.11 They need not have bothered. The drivers, mainly ASLEF members, were determined to continue their work to rule, and when the Southern Region's General Manager, David Binnie, told his staff that unless they resumed normal working they would not be required, the situation was inflamed. At 03.00 hours on the 24th April the first driver was sent home, and by mid-morning 284 drivers had either been sent home, walked out, or had not turned up for duty. Charing Cross, London Bridge and Victoria were closed for several hours during the peak travel period and, with a full stoppage threatened, pressure was brought to bear and Binnie's instructions were withdrawn.
On the surface relative peace was restored to the network, and Maurice Macmillan confirmed this to the Court on 25th April. The 14 day cooling-off period now began, and as one of the conditions to secure the Order had been to find a settlement, Macmillan approached the unions for a meeting. Negotiations commenced on 1st May but they proved to be a waste of time. Meanwhile, a propaganda war was in full swing and Ministers continued to emphasise that there was no hope of any additional money being found. The trade union leaders met Macmillan on 4th May to be told that he would be asking his Government colleagues to consider holding a compulsory ballot on the acceptability of the BR offer, or an extension of the cooling-off period. In fact the unions were already aware that he intended to hold a ballot, as they had heard that the names and addresses of all railway employees had been passed to the Department of Employment and the Industrial Relations Commission.
The TSSA's Executive met on 9th May and voted to reinstate their work to rule from 00.01 hours on 12th May. Based on legal advice, the work to rule was now to be in accordance with the individual's contract of employment and, with the exception of rostered overtime and Sunday work, all other overtime would not be worked. As the BRB had indicated that they would be willing to meet the unions for new talks, it was decided to withhold the announcement until 18.00 hours, to give the BRB a further opportunity to approach the unions. The TSSA met ASLEF and the NUR at its head office, Unity House, at 18.00 hours and as no approach had been made by the BRB, it was agreed to proceed with the work to rule. This decision was confirmed by the TSSA's Executive at 19.00 hours on Tuesday 9th May with 22 in favour and 1 against. The next day, after Circular 1927 had instructed TSSA members to commence their work to rule, Macmillan called a meeting of trade union and BRB representatives. When negotiations began, the TSSA reminded the Minister that the BRB had still failed to reply to their questions regarding the Jarratt award, but this failed to elicit a response and, after a brief adjournment, Macmillan announced that the Board was unable to improve upon its present offer and the meeting was terminated.
On 11th May, the Minister told the unions that he intended to apply to the Industrial Relations Court for a compulsory ballot. Later that day, the TSSA received an offer from the BRB which provided new pay scales for Salaried Grades for the first time in the dispute. Its terms failed to satisfy the TSSA, as, overall, the offer was actually less than that proposed by Jarratt; it was merely a pretext to move to the next stage of confrontation. At 16.40 hours Percy Coldrick was asked to attend a meeting at the Department of Employment, and the machinations of the Government's plan quickly became apparent. The fact that the TSSA had been compulsorily registered under the Industrial Relations Act was exploited by the Government, and when Coldrick arrived at the Department of Employment he found that neither Sidney Greene nor Ray Buckton had been invited, as both the NUR and ASLEF had already deregistered. Coldrick told the Ministry officials that the TSSA wished to be regarded as an unregistered union and he would not attend any meetings at the Department unless the NUR and ASLEF were present. At 17.00 hours, he received a phone call from Macmillan, asking if the TSSA had accepted the BRB's latest offer. Coldrick told the Minister that it had neither been accepted nor rejected, and he intended to bring it to the attention of the EC at the annual conference when it met the following week.
The Industrial Relations Act stipulated that the Secretary of State should consult trade unions, which meant registered unions, and the Minister could now go to the Court. The state machinery moved into action and at 17.45 hours, an application was made for a ballot. Ten minutes later the TSSA received a message from Morris Finer QC, who had been retained by the Association to look after its affairs, saying that the Hearing would commence at 20.30 hours that day; the TSSA's General Secretary was not informed officially until 19.00. All three unions were represented by Counsel; Professor Wedderburn represented the NUR, Peter Pain QC spoke for ASLEF and Morris Finer QC for the TSSA. At 00.15 hours, the Court was adjourned until 13.30, after Morris Finer complained, on behalf of all the unions, that they had received a mass of documentation just two hours before the Court commenced, and insufficient time had been allowed to prepare their case.
The Government's application for a ballot was based on its view that the trade union leaders were out of touch with their membership and, given the opportunity, they would accept the BRB's offer. All three Counsels emphasised the moderate nature of the railway unions and Percy Coldrick advised the Court in written evidence that Macmillan was unable to demonstrate that TSSA members were not supporting their leaders. I believe,
wrote Coldrick, I know my union better than the Secretary of State ... the ballot is an irrelevant, time-wasting intrusion in the business of negotiations.
12 The Court thought otherwise, an approval for a compulsory ballot was granted. All three unions then promptly informed the Court that they intended to appeal and, on the advice of their solicitors, the unions cancelled their instructions of the 10th May and told their members to work normally. The Appeal Court met on 14th May under Lord Denning, Lord Justice Bockley and Lord Justice Roskill; it was the first occasion that an Appeal had been heard on a Sunday. Morris Finer told the Court that the ballot was both unlawful and unjust as during the previous 14 days, unlike the TSSA, the Government and the BRB had done virtually nothing to engage in useful negotiations. Indeed, Finer stressed that during the cooling-off period only four hours of talks had taken place.13
As the Appeal Court was beginning its deliberations, delegates to the TSSA Annual Conference in Weymouth were recovering from their traditional Welcome Dance. It was the Association's 75th Anniversary and among the guests were George Thorneycroft CBE, Jim Haworth, Sir William Webber CBE, and representatives from the Belgian and German railway unions. The business of conference was dominated by the Industrial Relations Act. This failed to dampen the delegates' social activities and they participated in the usual dances and fringe meetings. Appropriately, in view of the Government's legislation, a large number paid a visit to the village of Tolpuddle, the home of six agricultural workers who, after forming a Friendly Society of Agricultural Labourers in 1834, were sentenced to seven years' transportation to Australia for administering illegal oaths.
When the conference assembled in the Pavilion Theatre, the 459 delegates, representing 296 branches, now had the responsibility of determining how the TSSA would respond to the political and industrial crisis that had enveloped the railway industry. The pay debate was scheduled, as usual, for Tuesday morning, but to the anger of delegates the General Secretary announced that as the matter was sub judice, only a factual statement could be made. By Wednesday the Court still had not concluded its business and there was a real possibility that the conference could be in the ridiculous position of being denied the opportunity to decide its views on the crisis. Sanity prevailed and the next day Lord Denning said that the Court had no objections to a resolution on the ballot being discussed, even though a decision had still not been made. The debate finally took place on Thursday afternoon and, as always, the General Secretary introduced the EC's Pay motion. In a speech lasting 70 minutes Coldrick took the delegates, stage by stage, through the progress that had been made to date; it was a masterly performance which received a standing ovation - an act unheard of in the course of such a debate. After nearly four hours delegates endorsed the actions of the EC, applauded the outstanding unity that had been displayed by the three railway unions, and instructed the Executive to press the claims for all the other undertakings with the same vigour it had displayed with BR. They also urged the membership to vote "Yes" in support of the Association's pay claim, should the ballot take place.
In his speech, the General Secretary said that arrangements had been put in hand for certain national newspapers to carry advertisements calling on TSSA members to refrain from voting until they had read a special leaflet produced by the TSSA. This brought an appeal from one delegate that the Morning Star be included in the list of newspapers. Despite rumblings of discontent at such a proposal, only two newspapers carried the TSSA's advertisement that week - the Morning Star and The Scotsman. Amongst the many traditions of annual conference is one that supporters of mainly left-wing magazines and newspapers attempt to sell their publications to delegates as they enter the conference hall. The Morning Star and its predecessor the Daily Worker, has been sold virtually every day at conference since the paper was launched in 1930. It did not have a great following - its sales rarely exceeded 50 copies, limited in the main, to members of the CP and those associated with left-wing politics. The majority of delegates may have been unenthusiastic about purchasing any space in the paper but when the advertisement appeared on 17th May, sales virtually doubled.
The Court completed its Hearing on 17th May and two days later it announced that the union's appeal had been rejected, and ballot papers were sent to all BR staff. The question was, In the light of the British Railways Board Pay Offer (about which you have been informed) do you wish to take part in further industrial action?
14
The BRB and the Government, assisted by their allies in the media, launched an offensive against the trade unions. The Industrial Relations Commission placed advertisements in every newspaper, other than the Morning Star, (which was penalised by a long-standing Government embargo), telling BR employees to vote. A special issue of Railnews, the BRB's staff newspaper, was sent to all its employees giving details of the Jarratt award, with dire warnings of the consequences if further industrial action was taken. The unions sent messages to their members calling for a "Yes" vote, and meetings were held all over the country. The political stakes were very high.
The ballot was conducted by the Commission for Industrial Relations and the TSSA, aware of the problems inherent in such an exercise, offered to assist in order to ensure that the list of those eligible to vote was as accurate as possible. This offer was spurned, with the result that many ballot forms were sent to wrong addresses, or to people who had changed grade and were now ineligible to vote; some were even sent to the former addresses of employees who were dead! One TSSA member actually received 6 ballot forms, and 500 were sent to a nonexistent address in Edinburgh.15 The count took place on 28th May in the Royal Horticultural Hall, London, with 200 checkers being used at a cost of £200,000. The result was announced at the Industrial Relations Court the following day and this showed of the 154,189 BR employees eligible to vote, 129,441 had voted yes.
| Union | In Favour | Against | Abstaining |
|---|---|---|---|
| ASLEF | 24,436 | 1,043 | 108 |
| NUR | 80,894 | 10,695 | 719 |
| TSSA | 21,581 | 10,321 | 633 |
| More than one of the above | 261 | 46 | 0 |
| Votes by persons not stating themselves to be in any of the above unions | 3,269 | 1,076 | 107 |
| TOTAL | 129,441 | 23,181 | 1,567 |
The stand of the trade union leaders had been totally vindicated and the result was a devastating political setback for the Government. Coldrick, thoroughly delighted, said he was very pleased with the result although it was a foregone conclusion. I wonder whether Macmillan is left feeling as foolish as he ought to be.
16 Coldrick, Buckton and Greene now held the initiative and in view of the overwhelming result, ASLEF was insistent on further action if no satisfactory offer were made. The problem for the BRB was how to resolve the difference between the offer they proposed to pay from 5th June and the recognised date of 1st May.
Politically wounded by the reverse it had suffered, the Government decided to leave matters to the BRB. The union leaders met Richard Marsh and the Board member for Personnel, H.L. Farrimond, on 6th June. With very little separating the two sides, it was expected, in view of the ballot result, that the Board would make a further offer. This was not forthcoming and all they received was a lengthy resume of the events leading up to the ballot and an invitation for the unions to state their positions once again. The union leaders reiterated their view that implementation must be from 1st May and, after an adjournment, Marsh agreed to respond the following day. He then asked the unions to compromise, but when Sidney Greene suggested that a lump sum should be provided for the period between 1st May and the 5th June, this was rejected, and the meeting once again ended in failure. Now thoroughly angry, the union leaders decided that as from 00.01 hours on 14th June further action was required. The TSSA instructed its Workshop Supervisors and members in the Electrical, P&T, Clerical, Supervisory and Management Grades, to undertake their normal duties, but to ban all overtime unless it came within the individual's normal contract. The TSSA's decision to work to rule had been agreed, with a proviso that Vic Feather be asked to intervene if he felt any useful purpose would be served by doing so. In the meantime, the railway unions requested support from those unions whose members might be expected to handle traffic normally carried by rail. When the union leaders met Vic Feather on 9th June, he told them that the BRB was now willing to reopen negotiations. Marsh, who was suffering from a viral infection, left his sick bed to meet the unions that afternoon and said that more money could be found - if the work to rule was cancelled. Some hard negotiations took place and the BRB finally accepted, in principle, the NUR's original proposal of a lump sum payment. The next question was - how much?
A Joint Working Party was established and on 13th June at 20.20 hours, it was agreed that a lump sum would be provided, dependent on grade, plus a basic 12.2 per cent for Conciliation Grades, 12.5 per cent for Salaried Grades, 12.6 per cent for Footplate Grades and 12.8 per cent for Railmen, to be operative from 5th June 1972. An increased minimum earnings level of £20.50 was introduced from the same date. A number of beneficial adjustments were also made to salary scales, and working parties were established to review the pay structure for Footplate, Conciliation, Clerical and Supervisory staff. The benefits did not end there, as, to prevent a work to rule on the Underground, LT management had already indicated that they would honour the final agreement made with BR. The railway settlement came to £37.2 million, of which £2.2 million was in excess of the Jarratt award. The TSSA did not achieve its ultimate objective of 16 per cent, but the award was worth 13.5 per cent, considerably in excess of the 8.25 per cent originally offered by the Board. It was not only a great industrial success, but a political victory of considerable importance, as it ensured that the Heath Government never again used cooling-off periods and compulsory ballots as a political weapon.
By 1972, as a result of reorganisation, new technology or productivity agreements, the number of railway salaried staff had been reduced to approximately 42,000 - one of the largest reductions of any single grade of BR employees since nationalisation. The BRB now intended to reduce this number by a further 4,500-6,500 posts in a restructuring exercise which became known as "The Field Organisation". This arose as a direct result of the 1968 Transport Act which stipulated that the BRB was required to review its organisation, the first stage being: reappraisal of its senior management structure. In January 1971 the railway was set up as a separate business of the Board under Chief Executive (Railways). Thirteen months later a joint study team, composed of railway management and the consultants McKinsey and Co., recommended that BR's regional structure be abolished and replaced with eight "Territories". With major changes envisaged in the location of head offices, it was to be a huge exercise, with 29,000 clerical and management staff affected, of whom approximately 15,000 would be transferred to new locations. It was the biggest upheaval the Association had ever experienced - even greater than the amalgamation scheme that had taken place under the 1921 Railway Act.
Hints that reorganisation was in the offing had been circulating for some time, but when Richard Marsh attended the TSSA's 1971 Annual Conference as a guest speaker he refuted press rumours that 4,500 workers would be sacked, and said that any reductions would take place as a result of natural wastage.17 Delegates were not convinced, and Percy Coldrick promised that a Special Conference would be held before any decisions were reached with management; this took place in London, on Sunday 12th December 1971 at the Victoria Hall, Bloomsbury.
The EC recommended that the new organisation should not be opposed but that its negotiators should seek to obtain the best possible classifications, compensation and redundancy arrangements, to secure the provision of a machinery of negotiation and consultation for management staff18 and to insist upon the suspension of other reorganisations and mergers whilst the Field Organisation was being implemented. The EC's motion produced 72 branch amendments, a few of which were accepted. As the debate progressed, all the amendments that opposed the Field Organisation were decisively defeated and speeches were punctuated with warnings from some delegates that a strike would be the logical outcome of opposition. That struck a chord, but when one delegate suggested, We should let Management do just as they wish
, he was hooted down.19 It appeared that the Executive's view would be carried, and by lunch time those who opposed "Field" were thoroughly depressed. They saw little hope in the remaining amendments, with the exception of one, and it was on this that they decided to muster their forces. It was Peter Bedingfield (York P&T) who proposed the tenth amendment, which laid down a policy of non-cooperation in implementing the Field Organisation or in any other scheme of reorganisation until nine assurances had been met. In turn he was supported by Bob Ayres (Euston No.2), Malcolm Wallace20 (Shipping Division HQ) and Peter Kent (Crewe No.3). Coldrick vigorously opposed the amendment, insisting that the EC was not committed to "Field" and that the next annual conference would be consulted before any final decisions were made. Coldrick's appeal was in vain and the amendment was carried by a narrow majority, with 31,425 in favour and 30,475 against.
The following month Tom Bradley attacked the Field Organisation in the House of Commons, and said that the whole concept of BR's new territorial organisation was an absolute piece of nonsense that should be stopped forthwith
21 but the Minister was not moved. Discussions began at national level and the Field Organisation was debated in 1972 and 1973, and at the 1974 Annual Conference it was finally agreed to release details of the new structure to the relevant regional negotiating bodies. The Board estimated that approximately three years would be required to implement the new organisation, but the TSSA repeatedly warned that its target dates were far too optimistic - and so it proved. The regional negotiations continued, but eventually, with posts frozen to avoid redundancies, recruitment became a problem, and skilful negotiations at national and local level led to the BRB abandoning its plans. When rumours began to circulate that "Field" had been cancelled, representations were made to Richard Marsh on 20th January 1975, who confirmed that this was correct. The TSSA was wrongly accused of delaying consultation and putting forward excessive demands, but this was totally refuted by the General Secretary who highlighted the defects and the inefficient manner in which the Board had handled the whole exercise. With "Field" discarded, reorganisation continued in the guise of "good housekeeping" and "Sector Management", with a consequential reduction in posts and considerable upheaval for staff in some regions.
When John Peyton was appointed as Minister of Transport in 1970, he said that he did not applaud or support publicly owned industries and that he envisaged a smaller railway system within ten years. He also confirmed his strong misgivings about initiating a major investment programme and looked forward to an increasing role for private industry in the railway's shipping, hotels and property interests.22 The Government ensured that the nationalised industries were once again restricted in their ability to compete with the private sector. In April 1971, the nationalised airline BOAC was obliged to give up its West African routes to British Caledonian; in November the state owned BEA lost some of its London-Paris service. When the profitable British Transport (BT) Hotels sought to build an hotel at Gatwick Airport in 1971, permission was refused. A nationalised asset was also lost when the NFC sold the Atlantic Steam Navigation Company; the BRB was interested in acquiring the company, but the Governmen had other ideas and sold it to European Ferries. Peyton decided not to sell BR's hotels and shipping interests - their turn would come later; instead, the Minister turned his attention to Thomas Cook & Sons Ltd. Tom Bradley attacked Peyton in Parliament and with considerable foresight said that it was only a question of time before the Government produced proposals to sell other public companies, including the NFC, the National Bus Company and British Rail.23
The Transport Holding Bill, which placed Thomas Cook in the private sector, was enacted on 23rd March 1972, and a month later the Government announced that the company had been sold for £22.5 million to a consortium comprising the Midland Bank, the Automobile Association and Trust House Forte Ltd. The great sell-off had begun, and as Bradley had forecast, it would eventually lead to the sale of the whole of the railway industry. The Labour Party assured the TSSA that it would return Thomas Cook to the public sector and when later, this failed to appear in its legislative programme, the Association recorded its disappointment.24
The TSSA was recognised by the new owners of Thomas Cook and further efforts were made to recruit members when it appointed David Burn25 as the Association's Travel Trade Officer in 1973. The TSSA is acknowledged as the leading trade union in the travel trade industry and has represented travel trade staff since 1937 when it began recruiting Dean and Dawson employees.26 It remains a potential growth area but it is also amongst the most difficult of industries in which to make recruits. Even in Thomas Cook the TSSA has never been able to recruit more than 50 per cent of employees, a situation which needs to be remedied. In 1977, there were 1,398 TSSA members at Thomas Cook, 93 at Thomson Holidays, 60 at Townsend Thorenson and the remaining 65 spread over 9 companies, (including 12 in Ireland). This represented 2 per cent of the Association's total membership, but following a massive decline in employment opportunities in the railway industry, by the end of 1995 it represented 3.5 per cent
The decisions reached at the Association's annual conference are used by the EC and full-time officials to advise the Government and employers of their concerns and to formulate proposals on many matters including health and safety, improvements in pay, conditions of service and many other matters. Equally, conference provides a platform for formulating motions to be placed before national and regional trade union and Labour Party Conferences. The Pay and Transport debates tend to dominate proceedings, followed by a range of subjects under a broad heading of "Conditions of Service". The number of political issues have steadily increased since 1980 and new subjects such as the environment, human rights, Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Criminal Justice Act have been debated, but they still remain a small part of the agenda, taking up approximately 1½ hours of the 30 hours allocated.27
Europe has now become an established topic, but it was not until 1971, when the Waterloo branch opposed the Heath Government's intention to join the European Economic Community, that the subject was first debated.28 Tom Bradley,29 who personally advocated membership of the Community, confidently expected that the TSSA would eventually share his point of view, but he had first to persuade the annual conference not to accept the Waterloo motion.
The Common Market was the most contentious political issue debated at a TSSA Conference for many years, and as the 456 delegates arrived at the Winter Hall, Margate, they were met with the unusual sight of their President issuing pro-Common Market leaflets. The supporters of the Waterloo motion were not exactly idle, in fact they were very well organised. John Barton30 had the responsibility of opening the debate, with opposition coming from the Doncaster No.1 branch. Tom Bradley, with all the influence that a presidential speech can bring, spoke on behalf of the Executive and declared himself a convinced and committed European.31 He criticised the arguments of those who opposed entry and suggested it would be wrong to tie the hands of the EC before all the facts were known. Bradley then made one fatal error - even though the red light clearly indicated his time was up, he continued his speech. For generations the TSSA has been proud of the way in which it organises its conference and adheres to its time-table. Calls of "Time!" soon came from delegates, particularly those who had suffered at the hands of the President's past deference to the clock, to say nothing of his political opponents. Bradley persisted, and when he eventually sat down he had alienated some of his allies. As delegates raised their hands in favour of the motion, Waterloo's supporters called for a "Card vote". In TSSA terms, this means that at least 10 delegates have to stand in their places immediately the President calls for the vote to be taken; the count is then made, based on the number of members in each branch. It is always a matter of judgment whether a show of hands or a card vote is the best method to achieve success, but there is no turning back once the call has been made. On occasions it is an exciting part of conference procedure. Despite the rather late call for a "Card Vote" the President accepted the request. The Waterloo branch now had to wait and see if the decision had been correct. In fact visitors in the gallery who had a clear view of the hall insisted that the motion had been carried on a show of hands. After the tellers passed the result to the President, he announced that the motion had been carried, by 34,400 to 34,150 - a majority of 250. The card vote had been vindicated - just!
The result of the debate had wider implications, and it was for this reason that both factions were keen to win. Delegates to the various bodies of which the Association was an afllliate were now obliged to oppose any proposition to join the Economic Community. The President's plea to conference not to tie the hands of the EC would have enabled national delegations to vote either way. The Labour Party held a special conference on 17th July to debate the Economic Community, and on 28th July its NEC voted, by 16 votes to 6, to launch a nationwide campaign against the terms of entry negotiated by the Heath Government. This decision was confirmed at the 1971 Labour Party Conference by 5,073,000 votes to 1,032,000. The TSSA gave its backing to a motion that opposed entry on any terms
but this was defeated, on the advice of the NEC, by 3,082,000 votes to 2,005,000. A debate to approve joining the Community took place in Parliament on 28th October 1971, with a three-line whip imposed on Labour MPs. The Tory Government carried the day, with 356 in favour and 244 against. Amongst those who supported the proposal were 48 Labour MPs, with 20 more abstaining. Two TSSA members defied the whip - Ray Gunter, who resigned from the Parliamentary Labour Party32 and Tom Bradley. The Aberavon & Bridgend branch noted with regret33 the actions of its President and former President, but even this mild rebuke of its most distinguished members was too much for the delegates at the 1972 Conference and by a subtle amendment, the criticism was deleted. Despite the poor terms obtained by the Heath Government, Britain joined the Economic Community on 1st January 1973 and a new phase of political debate began.
The TSSA's resistance to the Economic Community continued, and at the 1973 TUC Ralph Whitehead voiced its opposition to the terms of entry. An opportunity for withdrawal came when the Labour Government was elected in 1974. Committed to renegotiating the conditions accepted by the Heath administration, Harold Wilson announced on the 18th March 1975 that the objectives had been substantially, if not completely, achieved. On 9th April, the House of Commons agreed by 396 votes to 170 to remain within the Economic Community, and a referendum that would finally decide the issue took place on 5th June. At the 1975 Annual Conference delegates voted to campaign for Britain's withdrawal from the Economic Community34 but both points of view were published in the Association's Journal. Roy Jenkins argued in favour of the Community, largely on economic grounds, whereas Anthony Wedgwood Benn, who had led the campaign for a referendum inside the Labour Party, placed his emphasis on the loss of sovereignty and the inability of Parliament to control British affairs if membership continued. After the polling booths closed at 22.00 hours, the result showed that the electorate had been convinced by the lavish pro-community campaign, with 17,378,581 votes in favour and 8,470,073 against. The TSSA's opposition to the Community continued until 1985, when its conference decided against withdrawal.
By 1972 the Republic of Ireland had already decided that its future rested totally with the Economic Community regardless of a campaign by the Irish CTU and the Labour Party which favoured associate membership. A referendum was held in May 1972, with 1,041,890 voting to join and 211,891 against
When the Heath Government was elected it introduced economic policies that were designed to restrain the economy. It then reversed its strategy and pursued a policy of rapid economic growth. In July 1971, it cut purchase tax, abolished hire purchase controls and relaxed credit controls on bank lending. This proved to be a disaster. By June 1972, rumours that the pound was to be devalued were denied, but holidaymakers abroad found it increasingly difficult to change their money. Later that month the pound was allowed to "float" and decreased in value by 20 per cent. The TUC commenced talks with the Government to find ways of resolving the monetary crisis, a decision which received the support of the TSSA, and a copy of the TUC's report on the discussions was issued to every branch. The talks came to nothing and eventually all the TUC's proposals were rejected by the Government who set its own agenda. Once again, the Government made a "U-turn".
Having failed to weaken the trade union movement with the Industrial Relations Act, Ted Heath departed from his election manifesto commitment not to introduce statutory wage and price controls and announced on 26th September 1972 that there would be a £2.00 limit on pay increases and a 5 per cent peg on prices, with the exception of imported products, fresh and seasonal foods. To the fury of the Conservative right who saw the Prime Minister's new policy as a further reversal of their free enterprise principles, the statutory control of all pay, prices, rents and dividends was introduced on 6th November for a period of ninety days. This was followed by a Price and Pay Code operated by two new statutory agencies - a Pay Board and a Prices Commission. Phase 2 of the incomes policy started on 1st April 1973, restricting pay increases to £1 plus 4 per cent of the average paybill over the previous year. Phase 3 was introduced on 8th October 1973 and this brought a 7 per cent pay norm. This achieved its objective - a sharp increase in the profitability of industry.
The Government's unilateral response to the crisis was condemned by the TUC and its decision not to introduce statutory control over such key items as meat, fish, fruit and vegetables, was sharply criticised by trade unions. The Government did nothing to hold down rents, and its so-called restraint on dividends merely delayed payment. Prices continued to move sharply upwards, and just before the start of Phase 3, the Middle East war broke out leading to a huge increase in the price of oil. The Government had by this time already depleted the healthy balance of payments surplus left to it by Labour, and its deficit was running at an annual rate of £2,300 million, far worse than that faced by the Wilson Government. To pay for this the bank rate and mortgage repayments were increased to record levels, living standards fell and workers were obliged to seek substantial increases in pay.
The miners, now in a much more favourable position as a result of the oil crisis, commenced an overtime ban on 12th November 1973. The following day the Government declared a State of Emergency and introduced a 3 day working week. In addition, the Minimum Lending Rate was raised to an unheard of 13 per cent. Power engineers introduced a ban on out of hours working to further their pay claim; similarly, London firemen and thousands of ambulance workers were only willing to respond to emergency calls. On 1st January the Government further restricted the use of electricity and after a ballot, which showed that 81 per cent were in favour, the miners started an all-out strike on 10th February. TSSA members were advised not to cross official picket lines and £1,000 was donated to the NUM Industrial Action Fund. This produced a sharp reaction. Letters objecting to the donation were signed by 53 members of the Victoria branch, 50 at Reading, 3 at Leicester and 12 at Crewe. Individuals in the Glasgow Management branch and Euston No.2 also sent letters of protest to the General Secretary. Some members threatened to resign from the TSSA, and three branches, Euston No.2, Newcastle No.2 and Edinburgh No.1 asked for contributions to be withheld until the miners made some payment from their own strike funds.35
For nine weeks ASLEF had held a series of one day strikes and a ban on overtime over pay restructuring, and when the BRB restricted Sunday working some NUR and TSSA members walked out in protest. The National Economic Council forecast that 3,500,000 workers would soon be on short-time work;36 with polls indicating in January that the Conservatives had a lead of 4 per cent over Labour, speculation that an election was in the offing was rife. Heath felt that the time was still not right and he waited until 7th February, three days after the miners' ballot had been announced, before he called the election for 28th February.
Under severe pressure from the miners and bruised by the power workers, railway workers, firemen, ambulance workers and many others, Heath decided that the theme of the election was to be Who runs the country - the trade unions or the Government?
An appeal from Harold Wilson to ASLEF asking the union to call off its dispute until after the General Election was agreed to on 11th February. It was a vicious campaign and attempts were made by various right-wing groups, sections of the media and even the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, to identify the Labour Party with Communism, but Heath's gamble failed. Just before polling day, the trade figures for January revealed the biggest monthly deficit ever known, and inflation reached a new peak. To the discomfort of the Government, its own Pay Board found that a statistical anomaly in calculating miners' pay meant that they were entitled to receive more money than had been proposed. Equally embarrassing, the Tory MP, Enoch Powell, announced in a television interview that he had already voted Labour in a postal ballot, and called on those who shared his opposition to the European Economic Community to do likewise.
The Manchester, Glasgow and London Political Advisory Councils37 played their part in the election campaign and the TSSA donated £6,000 to the Labour Party.38 Seven members of the TSSA were adopted as Labour Party candidates, one of whom, Richard Rosser,39 was destined to join the Labour Party's NEC in 1988 and to become the TSSA's General Secretary the following year. Three candidates were returned to Parliament, Tom Bradley, Stan Cohen and Johnny Johnson. Johnson was appointed as a Government whip but was obliged to resign after eight months owing to his commitments as an MP and as TSSA Treasurer. In 1976, Stan Cohen acted as PPS to the Minister of State for Employment, Harold Walker, and then to Gordon Oakes, the Minister of State for Education in 1977.
| Candidate | Constituency | Labour | Conservative | Others | Majority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| W. H. Johnson | Derby (S) | 26,613 | 19,470 | 10,121 | 7,143 |
| T. G. Bradley | Leicester (E) | 23,474 | 22,061 | 3,662 | 1,413 |
| R. Rosser | Croydon (C) | 20,039 | 21,353 | 11,346 | - |
| S. Cohen | Leeds (SE) | 17,827 | 8,373 | 7,386 | 9,454 |
| J. Champion | Hendon (N) | 14,673 | 17,285 | 8,585 | - |
| J. F. Little * | Lewes | 10,875 | 30,423 | 16,166 | - |
| R. Eccles ** | Newcastle (N) | 9,813 | 12,793 | 6,772 | - |
* Not elected to the TSSA Parliamentary Panel. Stood as Labour and Co-operative Party candidate.
**Member of the TSSA Parliamentary Panel but unsponsored.
The Labour Party gained only 37.1 per cent of the vote, its worst share since 1931, although it won 301 seats, as opposed to the Conservatives 297. Only the Liberals, with 14 seats, and the nationalist parties, improved their position since the previous election. With the first hung Parliament since 1929, Heath was reluctant to resign and attempted to form an alliance with the Liberals. This failed, and a minority Labour Government came into office on 5th March. It quickly resolved the mining dispute, and the hated Industrial Relations Act which had produced so much industrial strife was repealed. Sir John Donaldson and his detested Industrial Relations Court departed, but not before he had imposed huge fines against the Amalgamated Engineering Union for its principled refusal to recognise its decisions. On 3rd May Sir John Donaldson ruled that all the union's assets should be seized to purge its contempt of Court; a serious industrial crisis was only averted when its debt was paid anonymously. To assist in improving industrial relations, the new Labour Government introduced the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. The rate of VAT was cut from 10 to 8 per cent and pensions were raised, with corresponding increases for widows, invalids and those on supplementary benefit. The trade union movement rejected the concept of statutory wage controls but did agree to a new proposal to restrain pay claims - the Social Contract. Before this came into effect, Harold Wilson, as Prime Minister, called a General Election for 10th October. Labour was returned to power with 319 seats, the Conservatives 277 and the Liberals 13. The Government now had an overall majority of 3! With the exception of Jim Little who stood again at Lewes and slightly improved his vote, all other TSSA candidates saw their votes drop; Peter Kent stood in Northwich and John Champion40 contested Hendon (North). These three were unsuccessful. Not so were candidates Tom Bradley, Johnny Johnson and Stan Cohen, who were all returned to Parliament.
The TSSA leadership had been convinced for some time that gains could be made through a new Labour-led prices and incomes policy, rather than the law of the jungle
(as it was described by Johnny Johnson41), and had submitted to the 1972 Labour Party Conference a motion calling for the Labour Party and TUC to formulate a prices and incomes policy. This was accepted, on a card vote, by 3,398,000 votes to 2,633,000, but when TSSA members read the conference report in the November TSSJ some branches complained. The text of the motion proposed by the EC had actually been rejected by the Association at the 1972 Conference and was therefore inappropriate for submission to other trade union and labour movement bodies. This was described as an unfortunate error
made by the EC and the TSSA delegation.42
The Social Contract, which dominated the life of the Labour Government, had been developed through the TUC and Labour Party Liaison Committee. Designed to avoid the mistakes made by the 1964-1970 Labour administration, it published Economic Policy and the Cost of Living in 1973. The TUC's document Collective Bargaining and the Social Contract was published on 26th June 1974. This accepted that the opportunity for an improvement in living standards was limited and that the prime objective was to ensure that real incomes were maintained. David Mackenzie,43 who had replaced Percy Coldrick as General Secretary in 1973, was convinced that the Social Contract was the answer, providing we adopt a responsible and restrained attitude
.44
In July 1975, with inflation running at 26 per cent, the Government announced that a £6 per week pay limit would operate from 1st August for 12 months, followed by wage restraint for several years. The TUC General Council voted by 19 to 13 to accept the Social Contract and in September Congress gave it their approval by an overwhelming majority. A special TUC, held on 16th June 1976, approved its extension to August 1977 by an even larger margin - 9,262,000 votes to 531,000. It provided for a measure of tax relief, combined with an increase of 5 per cent on total earnings, with a minimum of £2.50 per week and a maximum of £4.00.
The Social Contract was not solely about wages. The Government gave a firm assurance that it would bring down inflation and introduce policies that would reduce unemployment to 700,000 by 1978. Improvements were to be made to the social wage, with a special emphasis on housing, child benefits, pensions and health. During the period 1973-1975, the social wage actually increased by over 30 per cent, with many of the cuts in education and health services introduced by the Heath administration restored. A substantial increase was made in housing expenditure; rents were frozen in the first year of the Labour Government but unemployment continued to be worrying.
Tom Bradley, as Chairman of the Labour Party, attended the 1976 TUC as a fraternal guest. In his speech he emphasised the impact that the Social Contract had made on the economy, and with unemployment on the increase said that it had to be the number one priority for the Government. With an eye on the future, he told delegates that the only alternative to Labour was not a gentle reforming Conservative administration of the centre, or a rent-a-crowd revolution on the streets, but the most right-wing reactionary Government we have seen in our lifetime.
45
In October 1974, Harold Wilson had said that the Labour Party's objective was to bring about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of wealth and power in favour of working people and their families.
46 With more than a quarter of the population living on or near the poverty line47 this was a laudable objective, but one that Wilson never seriously attempted. Furthermore, by 1976 the Government was faced with a deteriorating economic situation owing, in part, to the "dash for growth" budgets of the Tory administration. Wilson resigned as Prime Minister on 16th March 1976 but his replacement, James Callaghan,48 continued the same policies. Public expenditure once again became a target of the Treasury and to avert a sterling crisis, the Government announced on 29th October 1976 that it would borrow £2,300 million from the International Monetary Fund to finance its Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. The TUC warned the Government that the Social Contract would be imperilled if the loan led to stringent cuts in public spending, but to no avail. Harsh terms and strict monetary targets were imposed and severe cuts were made to public sector budgets. Three months later a standby credit of £2,300 million was announced - the largest ever granted by the International Monetary Fund.
On 23rd March 1977, the Government survived a vote of no-confidence by 322 votes to 298 after the Prime Minister and the Liberal leader, David Steel, announced a "Lib-Lab Pact". This arose from an agreement made with the liberals that they would support the Government in return for consultation on policy matters and a free vote on proportional representation for elections to the European Economic Community. It was to last until the summer of the following year.
The TSSA continued to support the Social Contract, but not without some industrial conflict amongst its members. On 24th March 1975, 5,000 BREL Workshop Supervisors, most of whom were TSSA members, placed an embargo on all overtime and worked according to BRB rules until their claim was settled. Unemployment had risen to over 1,500,000 by September 1976 and, despite a series of Government-led schemes to assist the unemployed, by March 1979 it had only dropped to 1,402,254. Inflation had been reduced to 8.3 per cent by 1978 but by May the following year it was once again more than 10 per cent. Important subsidies on essential foods such as bread, flour, butter, cheese, milk and tea, introduced by the Government when they took over, were gradually phased out. The Government also relaxed its controls on prices to improve the profitability of industry. The railway subsidy, which had been increased from £75 million in 1970 to £400 million by 1975, was cut, along with the subsidies paid to other nationalised industries. Train fares increased sharply, resulting in a loss of passengers. The National Bus Company, which had a statutory duty to break even, was heavily reliant on subsidies from local and county authorities, but as they, too, faced financial difficulties, their grants decreased. In 1975/76 the National Bus Company was forced to reduce its total route mileage by over 10 million miles and it still accrued a deficit of £17 million. The average fare per passenger mile on LT's buses increased from 2.5p for the period 1972-1974 to 3.lp in 1975. From then on, it escalated to 5.6p by 1978. The average fare per passenger mile on its trains rose from 2.3p in 1972 to 6.3p in 1978.49 Cuts were all-embracing. Education and National Health Service budgets were reduced, ophthalmic and school meals charges were increased. Eventually, the only part of the Government's counter-inflationary strategy that remained intact was pay restraint.
During 1977 TSSA branches complained that the Government was not keeping to its side of the Social Contract, and, faced with growing resistance from its affiliates, the TUC was unable to give any guidance on pay norms. Instead, it stressed the importance of avoiding a pay explosion and asked union negotiators not to attempt to catch up on lost earnings brought about by Phase 1 and 2 of the Social Contract. The Government, for its part, wanted pay to be restricted to ensure that the overall rise in earnings did not exceed 10 per cent During the early part of 1978, the Government indicated that it sought a Phase Four norm of no more than 5 per cent, and at the TSSA's Annual Conference the President and General Secretary still recommended the merits of an incomes policy in one form or other. The delegates, who had seen their pay differentials narrowed compared with other grades in the industry, voted for the return of free collective bargaining as from 1st August 1978, emphasising that the Government should not discriminate against public sector workers in their pay negotiations.50 The 1978 Labour Party and TUC Conferences said "No" to the Government's 5 per cent, "No" to wage restraint and voted to return to free collective bargaining.
[1]. Conservative Party Manifesto 1970.
[2]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 26th November 1970 Vol. 807 Col. 672.
[3]. The TSSA banner was made in 1963 by Eva Colley and TSSA member Harold Colley. It later transpired that the pre-war RCA banner had been lost. It was found in the attic of an EC member in 1976 after being taken home from a May Day Rally sixteen years earlier.
[4]. As a registered trade union the TSSA was able to secure relief from taxation on investment income used for provident funds. The TSSA stood to lose approximately £54,500 in 1971. In 1976 the Association received a repayment of tax amounting to £170,000 for the years 1972-1974 as a result of legislation passed by the Labour-dominated House of Commons.
[5]. J. Anderson (Glasgow South). Joined TSSA 1961. Chairman SOC.
[6]. TSSJ June 1971.
[7]. TSSA Annual Report 1972.
[8]. TSSJ June 1972.
[9]. A. Jarratt, Managing Director International Publishing Corporation.
[10]. Morning Star 19th April 1972.
[11]. Morning Star 22nd April 1972.
[12]. The Times 13th May 1972.
[13]. Morning Star 15th May 1972.
[14]. TSSA Annual Report 1972.
[15]. The Times 26th May 1972.
[16]. Morning Star 1st June 1972.
[17]. In a letter to the TSSA dated 11th February 1972 the Chief Executive (Railways) wrote, It is hoped that natural wastage will absorb much of the redundancy but there are too many imponderables to be able at this stage to give any firm assurances.
TSSA EC Minutes 10th March 1972.
[18]. The Machinery for Management Staff employed on BR and its subsidiaries became operative on 4th August 1972.
[19]. TSSJ January 1972.
[20]. Malcolm Wallace (East Kent). Joined TSSA 1970. Secretary North London Divisional Council 1978-1988, Chairman SE London Divisional Council 1995; TSSA Scrutineer; SOC. Chairman Socialist Fellowship since 1981. Chairman, Chelmsford Trades Council 1977-1982 and since 1990. Member Chelmsford Star Co-operative Society Education Committee.
[21]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 26th January 1972 Vol 829 Col 1369.
[22]. The Times 25th June 1970.
[23]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 24th November 1972 Vol 826 Col 358.
[24]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1975 item 123.
[25]. D. Burn (Central and Head Office). Joined TSSA 1956 and its staff in 1960. Travel Trade Officer, Western Region Line Secretary, then LM Secretary. Labour Councillor London Borough of Havering 1968-1978.
[26]. Dean and Dawson was founded in 1871. In 1904 it was purchased by the Great Central Railway; it passed to the LNER in 1923 and in 1948 became a subsidiary of Thomas Cook Ltd. In 1960 Dean and Dawson was absorbed into Thomas Cook.
[27]. The 1994 Annual Conference decided that, as from 1995, the conference would be reduced to 28 hours.
[28]. Although the Common Market was placed on the agenda of the 1963 TSSA Annual Conference it was not debated owing to a shortage of time.
[29]. T. G. Bradley was Chairman of the Trade Union Committee for Europe.
[30]. J. Barton (Waterloo). Joined TSSA 1951. TSSA Scrutineer 1969-1979.
[31]. TSSJ June 1971.
[32]. Ray Gunter resigned from the Parliamentary Labour Party on 16th February 1972; sat as an Independent and applied for the Chiltern Hundreds on 3rd March 1972.
[33]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1972 item 90.
[34]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1975 item 142.
[35]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 8th March 1974.
[36]. The Times 10th January 1974.
[37]. The London Political Advisory Council changed its title to London Political Committee in 1975, at which time it had 61 TSSA affiliated branches with a membership of 19,799.
[38]. In 1947 the RCA subscription was 4 shillings (20p) per four weeks and its Political Fund contribution was 4d (1.7p). In 1994 subscriptions were £6.40 and the Political Fund contribution, set at 3½ per cent, was 22.4p. Apart from sponsoring MPs, it provides affiliation fees to national, regional and local Labour Parties and enables the TSSA to campaign on issues that are vital to the members' interests. Between 1945-1975, the Association used £571,236 from the Fund.
[39]. R. Rosser JP (Westminster then Central and Head Office). Joined LT in 1962 and TSSA in 1963. Appointed to TSSA staff 1966 as Research Officer. Subsequently held appointments as Finance and Organising Officer, LM Regional Divisional Secretary and Assistant General Secretary before his election as General Secretary in 1989. In 1994 under new legislation he was the first TSSA General Secretary to be re-elected to his post. Elected to Hillingdon Borough Council 1971-1978; Parliamentary candidate Croydon Central 1974; Labour Party NEC since 1988. Chairman ITF Tourism Section since 1990.
[40]. J. Champion JP (Underground). EC 1969-1975. SOC. Labour Councillor London Borough of Barnet. Unsponsored Parliamentary candidate 1974.
[41]. TSSJ June 1978.
[42]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes lOth November 1972.
[43]. D. Mackenzie (Inverness then Central and Head Office). Started work on the railway 1936. Joined RCA 1940 and its staff 1946. Western Region Line Secretary, London Midland Line Secretary, Senior Assistant and then Assistant General Secretary. General Secretary 1973-1977. Deputy Member ITF, Railway Section Committee 1974-1977.
[44]. TSSJ July 1974.
[45]. TUC Annual Report 1976.
[46]. Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1974.
[47]. The Rising Tide of Poverty F. Field.
[48]. In 1977 James Callaghan was the first Prime Minister to be a guest speaker at a TSSA Annual Conference.
[49]. LTE Annual Report & Accounts Financial Results 1969-1978.
[50]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1978 item 46.
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