Single or Return - the official history of the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association

Chapter Twenty-Nine

• The Winter of Discontent;
• Thatcherism Arrives;
• Privatisation Begins;
• Changes in the TSSA.

"We have a proud and historic past. We have to try to ensure that we have the resources for a sound future."

C. A. Lyons

General Secretary TSSA, 1985 Annual Conference.

The Winter of Discontent

Following the TUC and Labour Party's decisions to return to free collective bargaining in 1978, the Government was hopeful that with inflation having decreased from 9.9 per cent in January to 7.8 per cent in October, its target of 5 per cent would be broadly acceptable to trade unionists. Any benefits that the Social Contract had brought to low paid workers had been eroded by the Government's failure to hold down prices; moreover, the private sector had seen its profits increase substantially. Mortgage rates were raised to 11¾ per cent in November 1978 and workers felt it necessary to pursue demands for more pay. Their claims were bitterly resisted by employers but Ford car workers set the norm by winning a 17 per cent increase after a nine week strike in the autumn of 1978. The "Winter of Discontent" began. Bakers advanced their earnings by 14 per cent after a five week strike, and 15 per cent was paid to BBC technicians in order to prevent disruption during the Christmas period. Separate strikes of lorry and tanker drivers followed.

In January, after an RSNT award to pay-train guards, the TSSA sought a similar payment for salaried staff, and ASLEF demanded a separate payment for Footplate Grades, based on responsibility and productivity. The Tribunal rejected both claims but found grounds for a special payment to drivers of trains which travelled at speeds of 100 miles per hour. ASLEF attempted to extend this to all their footplate members and held a series of one day strikes, resulting in chaos on the roads and bitter recriminations with the NUR over jobs and productivity. This led to BR threatening to close down the whole system and to lay off all railway workers if the strikes continued. The TSSA's General Secretary, Tom Jenkins, played a mediatory role during the dispute but he was also critical of ASLEF and the NUR. In an attempt to head off the wage onslaught the Government relaxed its pay guidelines for low paid workers, but when public sector workers were offered a mere 9 per cent they, too, came out on strike. With ambulance workers, dustmen, water, sewage staff, civil servants and others employed in the public sector now in dispute with the Government, the most vicious campaign of vilification was launched by the media. Any incident was exploited to the full and the public's perception of trade unions touched an all-time low.

On 27th March 1979, BR announced that it was considering closing 700 miles of track and replacing it with buses, as it could not continue to run loss-making services within the cash limits set by Whitehall.1 The following day, any concerns that railway workers may have had were overshadowed by a vote of "No Confidence" in the Labour Government; this was carried by one vote. James Callaghan was forced to call a General Election. The TSSA sponsored three of its members - Tom Bradley, Stan Cohen and Johnny Johnson. In addition, Jim Little, the Chairman of the London Headquarters Management branch was adopted for Thanet West; Bob Oliver, Chairman of King's Cross P&T was selected for Maldon; Robin Spencer, an organiser in the East Kent branch, stood at Canterbury.

During the election campaign the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher's leadership exploited the "Winter of Discontent" and proposed trade union reform. Their approach to public transport was to sell shares in the NFC, to achieve a substantial private investment in the company and to relax the licensing regulations to encourage new private operators. In contrast, the Labour Manifesto insisted that there would not be another Beeching; it would maintain the present network, increase investment and place as much freight as possible on the railways. A commitment was given to provide a substantial subsidy to bus services, and, where free travel did not exist, the Labour Party undertook to bring in a nationwide system of off-peak fares, and a half fare scheme for pensioners, the blind and disabled. Heavy lorries would also be made to pay, through taxation, the full share of road and environmental costs. Having failed to enact legislation for industrial democracy in the last session of Parliament, the Labour Party promised to establish Joint Representation Committees in all companies employing more than 500 people, and place a legal obligation on employers to discuss company plans with these Committees. An Industrial Democracy Commission was proposed to stimulate and monitor developments in the nationalised and private sectors.2 The General Election was held on 3rd May 1979; the Labour Party sent 269 MPs to Westminster and the Liberals 11, but the Conservatives won the election with 339 seats. All three sponsored TSSA members were returned to Parliament but the unsponsored candidates were defeated.

Table 35

Thatcherism Arrives

The election of the Conservative Government, with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, marked a watershed in British politics. Thatcher totally abandoned the consensus politics of the post-war era and into her Cabinet brought Ministers whose views represented the right wing of the Conservative Party. Those she considered "wet" or "not one of us" were gradually dismissed. Thatcher's objective was to eliminate all vestiges of socialism from the political agenda by transferring as many as possible of the nation's assets to the private sector, rolling back the welfare state, and reducing public expenditure. At the same time, she sought to strengthen the power of London's financial institutions. Thatcherism was to bring about the biggest ideological and industrial change in British society since the Attlee administration of 1945-1951, and its hallmark was greed, self-interest and, eventually, sleaze. In its wake came the worst economic crisis for generations, with bankruptcies, unemployment, homelessness and begging on the streets reaching levels unknown since the 1930s. In the meantime, bruising internal divisions within the Labour Party, the emergence of the Social Democratic Party, cuts in personal taxation, the sale of council houses, a short-lived economic boom combined with Thatcher's standing at the end of the Falklands war, proved sufficient to maintain her in office.

To succeed in her aim of regenerating capitalism Thatcher was determined to confront and emasculate the trade union movement. Between 1979 and 1994 the Conservative Governments introduced six important items of legislation that were skilfully drafted to weaken trade unions. Other legislation such as the Social Security Act (1980), the Public Order Act (1986) and the Criminal justice and Public Order Act (1994) also had restraining implications for trade unionists. Ostensibly portrayed as giving more rights to individual trade union members, the prime purpose of all this legislation was to curb industrial action, regulate the internal affairs of trade unions and enmesh the unions in a legal straightjacket that would reduce their ability to represent their members; thus effectively paving the way for a low cost, high profit economy based on unemployment.

Starting with the Employment Act (1980) the onslaught was remorseless. Traditional forms of trade union solidarity were undermined or outlawed; many immunities were withdrawn, and changes to determine the internal affairs of unions were enforced by the full weight of law. Paid leave for union representatives was restricted and, with the exception of the agricultural industry, Wages Councils, designed to protect the low paid, were abolished. State benefits were removed from families of those on strike by the deduction of a sum calculated to represent strike pay which it was deemed had been received, even when not actually paid by the union. "Union only" labour in commercial contracts was removed by statute; three further Employment Acts followed. With the introduction of the Trade Union Act (1984) the Government tried to weaken the political role of trade unions by requiring them to hold a ballot every ten years to determine their wish to have a political fund. The result was an embarrassment for the Government. Every one of the 37 unions affiliated to the Labour Party voted "Yes" and achieved an average vote of 83.6 per cent in doing so, whilst some unions that had never had a political fund agreed to establish one for the first time. At the 1985 TUC Bert Lyons3 announced that 69.6 per cent of the TSSA's membership had voted in favour of keeping the political fund it had established in 1910. Many felt a sense of relief and if the result did not exactly place the Association in the forefront of trade union politics, the next political ballot which took place in 1994 did. With the privatisation of the railways on the horizon the result showed that of those TSSA members that voted, 88.8 per cent were convinced of the need to retain its political fund. ASLEF achieved the best result of any union with 93 per cent in favour, the same result as in 1985, and 83 per cent of the National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers4 (RMT) voted to retain their fund.

Table 36

In 1993, came the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act. This sought to divide trade unionists by abolishing the TUC Bridlington Agreement and, where union members had agreed that subscriptions could be deducted by employers, they were obliged to give a new written authorisation which had to be reaffinned every three years. Some employers such as Associated British Ports (ABP) (the privatised BT Docks' Board) played their part by withdrawing the facility of deduction at source, and BR spitefully cancelled its arrangement with the RMT during a dispute in 1993 and substantially increased the cost of administering the transaction for the TSSA and ASLEF.

Faced with privatisation, the fragmentation of the industry and the problems of having to re-register its members, the TSSA gathered its forces to defend itself against this new attack. Since its introduction in 1967 the number of members paying subscriptions through the paybill had increased to almost 98 per cent. They were now asked to cancel this arrangement and pay by direct debit from their own bank. At the beginning of the campaign in 1994 only 16 per cent of the total membership had agreed to do so, but by the end of the year, as a result of the efforts of National Officers, the EC, full-time staff, branch officers, elected lay representatives and retired members, the situation had been transformed and 48.7 per cent had changed to the new system.5 For a variety of reasons, approximately 1,400 members were lost during the reaffirmation campaign but, ironically, it provided an incentive to make recruits. If the Government's strategy was intent on severely crippling trade unions - it failed.

Privatisation Begins

For TSSA members, the contrast between the post-war period under Attlee and the Government of Margaret Thatcher could not have been more sharply defined. The run down of the iron, steel and coal industries, continuous reorganisation, new technology and productivity agreements within the railway industry had reduced the number of railway employees from 650,000 in 1948 to 182,000 by 1979. At this stage the Association's efforts were not concentrated on building the industry but on preventing its destruction and defending its members.

On 12th June 1979, Johnny Johnson asked the first of a long string of Conservative Transport Ministers, Norman Fowler, for assurances that the profitable sectors of BR, such as Sealink and its hotels, would not be hived off to private enterprise. Fowler responded by saying that the Government was working on the matter but that the press reports indicating denationalisation were pure speculation.6 Of more immediate priority to the Government was its promise to take action on the National Freight Corporation7 (NFC). Since it was established in 1969 the NFC had made considerable progress, and in 1980, after paying £8 million interest to the Government, it announced a net profit of £2 million. Following years of receiving substantial public investment and suffering the trauma of constant reorganisation, the company was now on the verge of making substantial profits.

The Transport Bill was published on 15th November 1979, but it went much further than had been outlined in the Conservative Party Manifesto. The Government was not intending to introduce private capital into the company but to transfer all its assets to the private sector. A new word appeared in the vocabulary of railway workers - privatisation. Very few changes were made to the Bill, but through the endeavours of the Association's sponsored MPs, and Albert Booth, who led for Labour on transport matters, important concessions were made on pensions. On 30th June 1980, the Transport Bill passed into legislation.

The NFC had assets valued at £100 million, with its principal subsidiaries being BRS, National Carriers, Roadline UK, Pickfords Removals, Pickfords Travel and Tempco International. These companies employed 26,000 people, possessed 18,000 vehicles operating from 700 locations, and was Europe's largest single freight company; it had also won approximately 10 per cent of the UK road haulage market. In a shrewd move, Peter Thompson, its Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman, proposed that its senior executives should purchase the company and that shares would be offered to its staff. It was just the type of offer the Government sought, and on 18th June 1981 the Secretary of State for Transport, David Howell, told Parliament he was considering their bid.8 After having invested £32 million into the NFC in the preceding financial year, the Minister held a press conference on 19th October 1981, and announced that the NFC would be sold to the National Freight Consortium for £53.5 million, a price which the Government's advisers, Schroder Wagg, recommended as suitable. The Government did not actually receive this amount as it had agreed to fund the company's pension deficiencies, and only £6 million was transferred to its coffers.9

The TSSA was disappointed that such a valuable asset had been sold to the private sector, but it came to realise that Peter Thompson's initiative was the best alternative. In line with Association policy, Tom Jenkins had persuaded the 1980 TUC and Labour Party Conferences to agree that a Labour Government should take back into public ownership all privatised transport companies without compensation, and the General Secretary felt obliged to warn its members within the NFC of Labour's policy. This had little effect. The fear of asset strippers taking over the company was of greater concern, and employees willingly purchased NFC shares to protect their livelihood. For many, the expectation of making a large profit from their investment was of secondary importance. A total of 6,187,500 shares at £1 each were made available, and when the offer closed, 10,233 applicants, of whom 1,296 were NFC pensioners, had applied for over 7 million shares. The average application made by employees and their families was 719 shares, with the average pensioner application being 473 shares.10 The National Freight Consortium plc was established on 19th February 1982 and some employees gained considerable rewards from their investment while others faced redundancy.

Meanwhile, the TSSA's main aim was to ensure that its members received adequate salaries and decent conditions of service. There were some setbacks. After having won recognition within Pickfords (who were now part of NFC plc) as far back as 1942, its Travel Service withdrew negotiating rights from the TSSA on 23rd October 1986 and set up a "sweetheart" Association. In August 1986, BRS gave the TSSA six months notice that pay awards for its managers would no longer be freely negotiated and that future salary increases would be based principally on management-assessed merit awards. All approaches to the NFC for access to recruit staff at its head office were rebuffed.

Apart from the NFC, no mention had been made in the 1979 Conservative Party Manifesto of the Government's intention to privatise the subsidiaries of BR, but most railway employees feared the worst, remembering only too well John Peyton's desire to sell off Sealink UK Ltd and the prestigious BT Hotels. Their fears were fully justified. On 17th March 1980 the Minister for Transport told Parliament that he intended to find ways to involve private capital in Sealink UK Ltd, BR Hovercraft Ltd and BR's lucrative property division.

The Transport Bill, published on 12th December 1980, set out terms that provided the Government with authority to direct the BRB to sell its subsidiaries, abolish the Ports' Council and dispose of the BT Docks' Board which, with its 19 ports, was the largest port authority in the country. The Bill was bitterly contested by the TSSA, and the railway union sponsored MPs. Stan Cohen was a member of the Standing Committee that dealt with the Bill, and on the floor of the House Johnny Johnson warned MPs that he believed a change of Government would lead to the renationalisation of those industries sold to the private sector, and this would take place without compensation.11 To considerable applause, Tom Jenkins made the same point at a rally of over 2,000 railway workers in the Central Hall, Westminster, on 28th January 1981. Organised by the TUC Transport Industries Committee it was addressed by Albert Booth, Len Murray, Sid Weighell and Ray Buckton, with Larry Smith, the Chairman of the Committee, presiding. A lobby of MPs followed, and Johnny Johnson, along with Tom Jenkins, told Norman Fowler of their total hostility to his privatisation plans.

"Renationalisation without compensation" was a popular slogan which the TSSA exploited to the full, but there were always powerful voices within the Labour Party and the TUC, who were opposed to such a policy, and it was dropped in 1982. The TSSA also reviewed its own attitude and as some of its members had invested heavily in the NFC, the debate ranged from those who were totally opposed to "no compensation" to members who strongly advocated its retention. In the event the delegates to the 1982 Conference compromised, agreeing that renationalisation without compensation should take place "wherever practicable"12 and in due course even this was quietly dropped.

The Transport Act (1981) received Royal Assent on 31st July, and on 26th October a new company, Hoverspeed Ltd, jointly owned by the BRB and the Swedish owners of Hoverlloyd, Brostroms Ltd, was established, bringing an influx of new members to the TSSA.13 The BT Docks' Board, which had been profitable and self-financing for many years, had invested heavily in order to modernise its port facilities. With the Government determined to pass its assets to the private sector, it was renamed Associated British Ports on 1st January 1983 and the following month 49 per cent of the company was offered to the public. Cleverly, the Government also offered a free issue of shares valued at £60 to every employee, and gave one free share for every further share purchased. It was a unique arrangement that led to 8,000 of the 9,200 employees taking up the offer. Like some other state-owned companies, ABP was sold at a price well below its true value and as a result the share offer was over-subscribed 35 times. By April 1984 investors found that the shares they had purchased in February the previous year for £1.12 were now worth £2.78, and the Government sold its remaining holding in the company for £48.5 million.

BR's laundries were disposed of, and then came the turn of its luxury hotels. Starved of adequate capital and infrastructure investment for many years, the hotels were profitable but had never been able to fulfil their true potential. Private hoteliers and speculators had always been aware of their real value, and in 1983 when a management buyout failed, 23 of the hotels were quickly purchased by various companies for £50.35 million. With considerable justification, there were many complaints that the price was too low and the timing wrong. Three of the eight hotels purchased by the Virani Group were quickly resold, making a healthy profit for the speculators, and two years later the Intasun Leisure Group paid £37 million for the Grosvenor and Charing Cross Hotels. In June 1981, the world famous Gleneagles Hotel, along with the Caledonian and North British Hotels, were formed into a new company; valued at £13.5 million, its potential was such that an offer of £20 million from Arthur Bell and Sons plc in January 1984 was rejected, and it was only with the greatest reluctance that a further offer of £27 million was accepted the following month.

The hotel and catering industry has never been progressive in terms of pay and conditions of service, but trade unionism had been recognised in the railway-owned hotels as early as 1937, and since nationalisation the unions had steadily built up agreements that were among the best in the industry. Some of the new owners sought to change all this, and the TSSA had a mixed reception. It was accepted by the majority, but those who ignored the statutory Transfer of Undertakings Regulations and changed agreements and contracts of employment without negotiating, such as the Virani Group, treated the Association with hostility. There were cases of salary and grading structures being abolished, sick-pay arrangements being ignored and salary increases held back as employers sought to lower pay rates. To counter the worst excesses the TSSA was obliged to initiate a number of legal cases to protect its members. Redundancies quickly became the norm and many staff opted for early retirement. Such was the pace of change that by 1989 the 1,000 strong London Hotels branch collapsed as its members were unable to find sufficient officers. Thatcherism had been introduced into the railway industry!

Len Merryweather, the Managing Director of Sealink UK Ltd, and a long-standing member of the TSSA, always valued the positive relationship that had been built up between the trade unions and management. He was determined that the privatisation of Sealink would not go the same way as BT Hotels, and although he was able to prevent the company from being broken up and sold route by route, he could not persuade the Government that the BRB should retain a minority shareholding. The Government did, however, choose to retain a "golden share" in the interests of national security. This was because of its experience of the Falklands War, when, woefully short of a merchant fleet, a Sealink vessel (the St. Edmund) and its Harwich-based crew were despatched to the South Atlantic as a troop ship.

Merryweather, in conjunction with the NFC and others, attempted a management buyout but this failed; Sealink was sold for £66 million on 27th July 1984 to British Ferries, a subsidiary of Sea Containers Ltd, an international seafreight company whose owner and President, James Sherwood, had recently purchased five of the former BT hotels. This sale took place at a time when one large cross-channel ferry was valued at approximately £20 million. It was a bargain for Sea Containers who took over 37 ships of various size, 10 harbours and 9,390 staff of whom 2,529 were salaried. The BRB had been advised by Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd that the price was a fair reflection of the company's value, an opinion that was supported by the Government's own financial advisers. Many employees within Sealink thought otherwise and were convinced that once again public assets had been sold far too cheaply.

The TSSA met James Sherwood before the sale, and both parties were anxious to build on the good relationship that had developed since Sea Containers had purchased the railway hotels. The meeting was fruitful and Sherwood said he expected that the TSSA would continue to represent such Sealink staff as are presently members, and that the company would recognise all existing Sealink UK Ltd unions, retain the existing consultation/negotiating machinery, and provide staff with the protections they currently enjoy.14 After the transaction, Sherwood assured the General Secretary that he would comply with all existing agreements and, following representations from the union, agreed to introduce a new pension scheme based on a "mirror image" of the 1970 British Rail Superannuation Fund. The honeymoon did not last long. Without consulting the TSSA a new contract was immediately introduced excluding union recognition. New directors were engaged, some of whom cared little for the established procedures that Sherwood had pledged to uphold. Existing staff found that promotion was largely conditional upon signing the new contract and some were transferred, without consultation, to offices where the new contract was obligatory, the working week was longer and trade unions were not recognised.

Matters came to a head when Sealink's naval architects were told, on 12th October 1984, that they would be offered new contracts and within ten days they were to be transferred to one of Sea Containers' subsidiary companies. The TSSA quickly intervened to protect their interests. With one exception, they felt obliged to sign the new contract and relocate but everyone kept their existing conditions of service, railway entitlements and most importantly, the Sealink redundancy arrangements. It was an agreement which proved of considerable benefit ten years later when a number were faced with redundancy. The majority of Sealink's head office staff gradually signed the new contract but when Michael Foster, an active member of the TSSA, was told that he, too, was expected to transfer to Sea Containers House and sign the obligatory contract, he refused. Foster was dismissed and the TSSA took up his case. Three days before the court hearing, Sealink British Ferries made an offer that was acceptable to both the TSSA and Michael Foster.

The growing frustration and anger that Sealink's employees felt towards the new regime was expressed in an Emergency Motion at the 1985 TSSA Conference. Supported by every Sealink branch, it condemned the company for failing to honour agreements, for ignoring the machinery of negotiation, and for introducing the new contracts without consultation. It also asked the EC to determine what action should be taken to counter the anti-trade union attitude of British Ferries.15 It was supported by all the delegates, some of whom were soon to experience their own difficulties within the private sector.

Later that year matters took a turn for the worse. The threat of redundancies became a reality when Sealink's new luxury service to the Channel Islands collapsed. The likelihood of this service being successful was always questionable, and, after its traditional market was captured by a new competitor, the TSSA was told on 30th September 1986 that Sealink was withdrawing from the Portsmouth/Weymouth/Channel Islands Service from midnight, and that 630 staff, of whom 151 were shore-based salaried employees, would be dismissed within four days. Sealink's staff, unaccustomed to such management practices, were furious, and seafarers staged a sit-in on its four Portsmouth and Weymouth vessels, with backing from the NUS and the officers' union, NUMAST, at a number of ports throughout the country. To the embarrassment of Sealink's management, television coverage of the dispute showed passengers collecting money for the strikers, even though their holidays had been disrupted.

The strike and its public support brought an effective compromise in favour of the seafarers, but a series of meetings failed to obtain a satisfactory settlement for the 151 salaried staff, and a ballot of all Sealink TSSA members resulted in 647 voting for strike action and 417 voting against. NUR members employed by Sealink also agreed to strike. This was not the first time that TSSA members had taken action since 1926, but such incidents had been few and far between, and mostly related to pay negotiations. This dispute was unusual as it was the first since 1926 in which the strikers had nothing directly to gain from its immediate outcome. In a carefully planned move, the EC decided that they would ask their members at Harwich to strike for a period of four hours commencing at 18.00 hours on 12th November. On the same day, at 22.00, TSSA members at Holyhead stopped work for 24 hours. This had the desired effect and, following a series of meetings with management and ACAS, an agreement was reached on 14th November. This included reinstatement, a return to the normal machinery of negotiation, and payment for the time employees had been dismissed. There were also significant improvements to the redundancy arrangements for those who chose to leave, and alternative employment was offered to others. It was a settlement that proved to be beneficial to many others in the future.

Working life in the private sector was sharply different from that in a nationalised industry. Privatisation brought a massive cultural change, including management's attitude to trade unionism. Whereas union activity had been accepted as the norm, the attitude of new managers was often hostile. However, it was not only management that perceived trade unionism as alien, but also new employees, and perhaps the biggest problem that faced TSSA activists in the newly privatised companies was the difficulty of recruitment, particularly amongst those in the more senior posts. The vast majority had little interest in trade unionism and if they had, their contract denied them negotiating rights. The experience of the TSSA's Sealink members closely resembled that of the London Hotels branch; new contracts, redundancies and retirements quickly took their toll, and within four years a vibrant headquarters branch of over 450 had been reduced to no more than 24 - it was a warning to others.

As the economy worsened, Sea Containers found itself under financial pressure, and a hostile bid from the Swedish company Stena line led to the prospect of lengthy and expensive legal proceedings. In order to thwart the Stena Line and resolve its financial problems, Sea Containers sold some of its assets, and five years after buying the whole of Sealink for £66 million, Sea Containers proposed selling its Isle of Wight Services to Radiant Shipping for £107.5 million. This failed to materialise16 as in January 1990, Stena Line offered Sherwood £259 million for Sealink - a price he could hardly refuse. It was an amazing deal, from which James Sherwood emerged the clear winner. Not only did he make a huge profit, he retained the Isle of Wight Services, the ports of Heysham, Newhaven, Folkestone, the Lake Windermere Services, and development land at Harwich. The losers were the British people who had seen their assets sold cheaply in 1984.

When Stena Line took over Sealink a huge sigh of relief was heard from its employees and the trade unions. The new owners had a good reputation as a successful and committed company, but two years later, and operating in a political and industrial relations climate that differed sharply from that of Sweden, everything was very different. History began to repeat itself. Having paid an excessive price for Sealink and without the important winter income from the Isle of Wight Services, Stena Line now faced its own financial problems. In September 1991 the TSSA was told that the company needed to lose 700 shore-based jobs, 30 per cent of which were at its Ashford headquarters where many faced instant dismissal. In all, a total of 400 salaried employees departed. Pay was frozen until January 1993 and conditions of service for all staff worsened. The TSSA is recognised by Stena Line at port level but like the NFC it has refused to give the TSSA permission to enter its head office in order to recruit members. When the TSSA campaigned outside its Ashford offices in 1994 it resulted in complaints from management; an attitude that was no different from the one that existed on the NER in 1907, when Thomas Gill sought to get the union established at its York head office.

With its anti-union legislation now on the statute book and unemployment on the increase, the Government had created the political climate that management could exploit. In December 1988, ABP gave its managers the option of either accepting individual contracts and relinquishing their rights to trade union representation in return for a financial incentive, or retaining their existing contracts and trade union recognition. At the same time the company made clear that all future management vacancies would be advertised on the basis of new individual contracts. All the managers decided to accept the new terms, and as a result the Machinery of Negotiation lapsed. The following year all the clerical and technical staff within ABP were offered an increase above the norm if they accepted individual contracts; the majority chose to do so. To assist those who remained in membership but for whom the TSSA could no longer negotiate, the Association provided information on current trends within the economy, on salary settlements achieved elsewhere, and gave other relevant information to assist in personal negotiations with management.

Performance Related Pay soon became the norm in several companies. Thomas Cook, now owned by Westdeutsche Landesbank (West LB), introduced the Gemini system, and, when it sold its Travel Management business to American Express in 1994, the TSSA was immediately given notice that the new, notoriously anti-union owners were intent on withdrawing recognition, denying its 140 members any form of union protection.

When Sir Peter Parker departed from the BRB in 1983, many within the railway industry were sorry to see him go and feared that his successor would increasingly manage the railway as if it were already a private company. They were not mistaken. Whereas in 1980 the most senior of BR's managers had voted in favour of the TSSA negotiating their pay and conditions, seven years later this agreement was withdrawn, and every Senior Officer was offered a new contract which specifically excluded trade union representation on collective issues. To the anger of the BRB's Management Grades, Performance Related Pay was introduced in 1989 and then taken up by Northern Ireland Railways for its Professional and Management staff. To prevent staff from expressing their growing discontent to the media, a new clause was inserted into the BR Rule Book saying:

"An employee must not, without the Board's consent, make or issue any statement likely to be made public and which may damage the Board's business."17

Such was the anger within the TSSA's ranks that the 1989 Annual Conference condemned the bullying and dictatorial tactics18 that had been, and continued to be, applied by some managements who were determined to impose adverse changes in conditions of employment.

Changes in the TSSA

The retirement of Tom Jenkins in 1982 led to the election of Bert Lyons as General Secretary. He was immediately thrust into the cauldron of privatisation and with considerable skill and determination led the Association's campaign against the excesses of Sealink British Ferries and the new hotel owners. It was, however, his resolve to tackle the deteriorating financial position of the TSSA that marked his leadership.

With a drop in membership of 12,444 since 1979, the danger signals were clear. As Table 37 shows, the TSSA was not alone in facing such problems and even though Lyons and the EC were unable to reverse this downward trend, they did take action to reduce the running costs of the Association.

Table 37

* lst January.

** RMT

Faced with similar losses amalgamation was seen by many trade unions as the answer, with the result that the TUC's affiliated unions dropped from 112 representing 12,128,078 members at the end of 1978, to 68 representing 6,898,106 members at the beginning of 1995. Of the 267 registered trade unions in 1994, 45 had a Political Fund.19 A proposal by the LM Officers and Executives at the 1972 Conference instructed the EC to make an immediate approach to the British Transport Officers' Guild20 (which also catered for the most senior of BR and LT management) to establish conditions for a merger. This came to nothing and the Guild eventually joined the EETPU, the electrical and plumbing union. Delegates at the 1972 Conference also approved a motion from Birmingham No.1 to develop a closer relationship with the other main railway unions and to support the TUC's approach to encourage amalgamation. There was a positive response from ASLEF and the NUR, who also wanted to have exploratory talks with the Union of Post Office Workers. For a number of reasons progress was slow. This was regretted at the 1973 Conference which then instructed the EC to endeavour to implement the previous decision. At a meeting of the three unions on 10th December 1973, the TSSA proposed that they should meet on a regular basis to discuss items of mutual concern in addition to rates of pay and conditions of service. For its part the NUR was in favour of amalgamation, federation or some other form of positive alliance, but as the ASLEF Conference had come out against amalgamation and federation, this was not pressed.

At the 1976 Scarborough Conference, Tom Patterson, a long standing advocate of a single union for railway workers, failed to persuade Conference to pursue a policy of federation between the railway unions; it preferred to maintain a close working relationship. Events took a further turn and encouraged by the TUC, a Federation of Railway Workers was initiated by the NUR and ASLEF on 28th August 1981, but little progress was made until 1983 when Jimmy Knapp was elected as General Secretary of the NUR, and the Federation of Railway Workers was relaunched on 16th June. The following year, for the first time in railway history, a joint pay claim was presented to the BRB on behalf of the two federated unions. It was always the Federation's objective to incorporate the TSSA, and an approach was made which led to Bert Lyons and Jim Mills attending a formal meeting on 11th March 1985. Jimmy Knapp and Ray Buckton attempted to persuade the TSSA to join the Federation but Bert Lyons outlined the background to the previous attempts at federation since 1973, and pointed out that the main stumbling block to any formal link rested in clause 2(h) of the Federation's constitution which stated that its objective was to work towards the establishment of one union for the railway industry. Lyons stated that there was no longer support within the TSSA for such an objective and, fearing that it would lose a considerable number of members if such a course was embarked upon, the TSSA was determined to maintain its independence.21 A further attempt to encourage the TSSA to join the Federation was made in March 1986, but any possible expectations had been soured by continual problems related to inter-union transfers between the NUR and the TSSA. It was decided not to join the Federation but to work closely with it. The Federation did not last and it was eventually dissolved on 12th July 1991.

Meanwhile, in 1979, the TSSA turned down a proposal from the East Kent branch which sought to bring about a merger with either the ASTMS or NALGO, and talks initiated by APEX22 in 1986 were confronted by grass roots' TSSA opposition and came to nothing. At the same time, the Irish Distributive and Administrative Trade Union approached the TSSA, and they were told that it had no intention of entering into discussions with any union regarding a merger.

When the NUR was conducting negotiations with the seamen's union about forming the RMT, discussions were also taking place between the TSSA and NUMAST23 with the objective of amalgamation. The membership gave the EC authority to continue negotiations, but there was always apprehension about the fact that NUMAST did not possess a Political Fund. This was raised at the 1989 Conference, and delegates decided that unless a Political Fund was established in the new organisation, negotiations must be terminated.24 Meetings with NUMAST continued, but later that year its Council decided that given their different political traditions, it would be impossible to avoid misunderstandings, and both unions went their separate ways. Much more productive had been the TSSA's successful application in 1986 to affiliate to the 2.1 million strong Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU), the central co-ordinating and negotiating body for trade unions in the engineering industry.

During the period 1974-1980 the Association's expenditure consistently exceeded its subscription income to the extent that its Central Fund showed a deficit of £872,000. Action was taken and in 1976, for the first time in its history, subscriptions were raised for two years in succession, to 30p per week for its Senior Section and 15p for the Junior Section. This failed to resolve the problem, and between 1978-1980 the Association was obliged to sell £380,000 of its investments simply to meet day-to-day running costs. The membership considered, but turned down, index-linked subscriptions and instead they were gradually increased to 70p per week by 1981. The TSSA's finances improved slightly over the next two years but the loss of 6,458 members in 1982, representing 9.8 per cent of the total, was a heavy blow for the Association.

The TSSA has always viewed changes to its internal structures with considerable caution and reforms have frequently been rejected or severely amended. Even so, Bert Lyons was resolved to tackle the Association's financial difficulties, and he proposed to the EC a series of measures that were designed to ensure the TSSA's survival. These were approved by the membership in 1983; ten of its 21 Divisional Councils25 were involved in mergers; the EC was cut from 29 to 18 (which included the President and Treasurer) and the seats that had been allocated to the Group Representatives in 1949 were abolished from 1st July 1984. Each EC member now represented all the members within her/his respective Divisional Council area. Every Council was asked to review its branches with the objective of encouraging mergers, and this resulted in their number being reduced by 31 to 227 between 1984 and 1987.

Apart from salaries, the largest single item of TSSA expenditure, and the most important occasion in the Association's calendar, is the annual conference. This was tackled head-on. The cost was reduced by changing the allocation of branch delegates, but the democratic participation of each branch was guaranteed. The result was that the number of delegates dropped from 442 representing 279 branches in 1982, to 284 representing 233 branches in 1986.

In 1983 Bert Lyons undertook to review the number and gradings of the Association's staff which had grown from 67 in 1952, when the Association had reached its peak membership of 91,514, to 85. He assured the membership that any changes would not impair the Association's efficiency26 and by careful planning, the number was reduced, without redundancies, to 63. (At the end of 1995, the number of full-time staff was 47.) The decisions of the membership to increase subscriptions, restructure the union and reduce the number of delegates to annual conference, all proved beneficial and this enabled the Association's Treasurer and subsequent President, Geoff Henman27 to report to the 1986 Conference that the Association had achieved a period of consolidation, and the Central Fund, for the fifth year in succession, recorded an excess of income over expenditure.

Reorganisation continued when, in 1989, Bert Lyons was succeeded by Richard Rosser. In 1994 he persuaded the TSSA to reduce the length of its annual conference to 28 hours, and the two Scottish Divisional Councils were combined, as were the South Wales and Western Councils. The North London Council was divided and its branches were incorporated into two other Councils, with the result that the EC was reduced to 15 (including the President and Treasurer). To counter the Government's decision to withdraw financial assistance from trade union EC ballots, it was decided that from 1995 the President and Treasurer would, for the first time since the Association had been formed, be elected every two years rather than annually, thus saving £8,250 per annum. There had also been changes made to women's representation on the EC. The Association had dropped one of the two allocated seats for "Women and Girl Clerks" in 1949 and the remaining seat in 1978. This came, ironically, at the same time as some other unions were pursuing a policy of positive discrimination in favour of women. Nonetheless, there have never been any demands to replace the women's seat and the decision brought little change to the number of women elected to the Executive, which remained at 2 or 3. By 1987 women constituted approximately 29 per cent of the Association, but at conference their representation was never more than 8 per cent. A breakthrough came in 1987 when Brenda Hanks was elected as the TSSA Treasurer, defeating three male candidates. In 1993, she became the first woman President, defeating Steve Coe28 by 8,458 votes to 3,166.

In 1985, Ray Lowther, who had edited the TSSJ with great skill for twenty-five years, retired, to be succeeded by Catherine Hodges, an active member of the Labour Party and the National Union of Journalists. Unfortunately, the relationship was not an entirely happy one and a year later, Jim Cobley29 took over as Editor and commemorated its thousandth issue in June 1987. Originally sold for one penny (0.4p), by 1967 it was priced at 3d (1.2p). Then, in June 1967, it became a tabloid newspaper issued free to every member.30 From June 1995 it once again returned to a magazine format of 16 pages, still free to every member.

Table 38

Chapter Twenty-Nine - Footnotes

[1]. Morning Star 28th March 1979.

[2]. Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1979.

[3]. Charles Albert Lyons (Fleetwood, then Central and Head Office). Joined BR, the RCA and the Labour Party 1950. Joined TSSA full-time staff 1959 and appointed Scottish Secretary in 1965. LM Line Secretary 1968, Assistant General Secretary and then General Secretary 1982-1989. TUC General Council 1983-1989; member of Hotel and Catering Industry Training Board and Vice-Chairman of the ITF Travel Trade Section.

[4]. The RMT was formed in September 1990 following a merger of the NUR and NUS.

[5]. TSSA Annual Report 1994.

[6]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 12th June 1979 Vol 968 Col 1297.

[7]. In 1990, the former Minister for Transport, Norman Fowler, joined the NFC Board as Director.

[8]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 18th June 1981 Vol 6 Col 1184-1187.

[9]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 21st October 1981 Vol 10 Col. 287-288.

[10]. TSSJ March 1982. At the end of 1995 17,000 of NFC's 35,500 employees held shares in the company but the special share which gave double voting rights to employee shareholders was automatically redeemed when the percentage of shares they owned dropped below 10 per cent for a period of six months.

[11]. House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 13th January 1981 Vol 996 Col. 893-896.

[12]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1982 item 103.

[13]. In 1986 Hoverspeed was sold to Sealink British Ferries, a subsidiary of Sea Containers Ltd.

[14]. TSSJ December 1984.

[15]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1985 item 174.

[16]. Sea Containers eventually sold its Isle of Wight services, Wightlink, in 1995 for £107m. Eight months later, in the middle of redundancy talks, the new owners gave notice that they intended to terminate the existing terms of contract in April 1996. The company also announced that it planned to cut the clerical staffs' annual leave by 25 per cent, reduce sick pay, and end bargaining procedures for its Masters, managers and supervisory staff as the arrangements were considered to be "inflexible to the current needs of the business".

[17]. BR Rule Book Number 1.14.1.

[18]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1989 item 63.

[19]. Annual Report of the Certification Officer 1994.

[20]. The British Transport Officers' Guild was formed as the British Railways Officers' Guild on 24th July 1945 and changed its name in 1948.

[21]. EC P&GP Minutes 28th March 1985.

[22]. APEX; the Association of Professional, Clerical and Computer Staffs had sole negotiating rights for TSSA staff. Formed in 1890 as the Clerks' Union it later became the National Union of Clerks. It became APEX in 1972 and on 1st March 1989 it joined the GMB, formely the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union.

[23]. NUMAST; the National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers. Affiliated to the TUC, it had 23,000 members.

[24]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1989 item 61.

[25]. The 21 Councils were esablished by the 1949 Annual Conference. The LT Divisional Council was formed on 5th December 1949.

[26]. TSSJ June 1983.

[27]. G. Henman (York No.1). Joined BR in 1956 and the TSSA in 1962 after having been a member of the NUR Secretary North-East London Divisional Council; EC 1977-1983; National Treasurer 1984-1987; President 1987-1993. Members' representative BR Superannuation Fund 1970-1993; Trustee Director BR Pension Fund Board 1981-1993. Labour member York City Council 1971-1974. ITF Auditor.

[28]. S. Coe (Sheffield). Joined BR and the TSSA in 1982. Secretary of branch; Secretary and Treasurer Yorkshire Divisional Council. Chairman Sheffield TUC Transport Sub-committee.

[29]. J. Cobley MCIT (LT Executive Grades). Joined LT 1951 and the TSSA in 1952. Senior feature writer on LRT News, the LRT staff newspaper. Father of LT National Union of Journalists Chapel 1972-1984. Joined TSSA staff in 1986 as Editor TSSJ.

[30]. A proposal to issue The Railway Clerk free of charge to every member was first raised by the Aberdeen branch at the 1912 Annual Conference but was rejected.

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