"I do not believe that anyone who is dealing with managements at national level can deny that the defeat of the National Union of Mineworkers has also had its effect on negotiations in other industries."
J.Mills
President TSSA, 1985 Annual Conference.
When the electorate cast their votes at the General Election on 9th June 1983, Britain had experienced its worst recession for 50 years. Manufacturing had dropped dramatically and unemployment had soared to over 3 million. It was also a year after the Argentinian forces had capitulated following their invasion of the Falkland Islands. Up to the time of the Falklands war both Labour and Conservative Parties had been equal in the polls. Margaret Thatcher decided to take full advantage of the "Falklands Factor" and with the Tories wrapped in the Union Jack, the May 1983 local elections bolstered the Government's confidence. Threatening the status quo was a new dimension in British politics - the Social Democratic Party (SDP)
This had been brought about by the defection of a number of right-wing Labour MPs who opposed Labour's shift to the left under Michael Foot's leadership, and in particular, its opposition to the European Economic Community. When the Labour Party established the terms of its electoral college on 24th January 1981 giving the trade unions, constituency parties and its MPs the right to elect its leader, enough was enough, and the following day the "Gang of Four" - Shirley Williams, Bill Rodgers, David Owen and Roy Jenkins signed the "Limehouse Declaration" which set out to realign British politics. It gained the backing of Tom Bradley, who wrote to Tom Jenkins on 9th February 1981, stating that he wished to withdraw as a candidate in the election for the TSSA delegation to the Labour Party Conference as he had decided not to serve another term on its NEC. On 3rd March he told the General Secretary that he had resigned from the Labour Party the previous day, and he, along with 12 former Labour MPs and one Conservative, helped to launch the SDP on 26th March 1981. Following Bradley's decision to resign from the Labour Party, his sponsorship was withdrawn.
To some, Tom Bradley's decision was not a total surprise, but rumours abounded that Stan Cohen was also contemplating defection. The truth was more complex. Cohen's support for developing closer links with the European Economic Community, his opposition to unilateral disarmament and, as a practising Catholic, his total opposition to abortion, were well known, and they brought him into sharp conflict with some sections of his Constituency Party. As some of Cohen's views were close to those of the SDP, he was approached by David Owen and Shirley Williams and asked to join their Party, but Cohen turned down the invitation, arguing that the best way to change Labour Party policies was to remain a member and campaign from within. However, misleading press reports of his possible defection led to a meeting with Michael Foot and Dennis Healey. Cohen assured them that he had no intention of leaving the Labour Party after thirty years membership, nor had he any intention of joining the SDP, and after detailing the political problems that he had experienced within his Constituency Party, said that he was not prepared to be the puppet of a group of Trotskyists. Throughout all this difficult period Cohen continued to retain the support of the TSSA, and although Michael Foot convinced Cohen that he should stand as a Labour candidate, on 21st February 1982 he was deselected. He was approached to stand as an Independent Labour candidate but was not willing to split the vote and provide the Liberals with a seat. Eventually, Stan Cohen returned to the railway industry and continued his work within the Association and the Labour Party.
The decision of Johnny Johnson to retire from Parliament now left Peter Kent as the Association's official standard bearer, contesting Derbyshire South. The Labour Party was pledged to develop public transport as a major social priority, electrify the main lines, purchase new rolling stock and modernise track and signalling equipment.1 The Liberals also agreed to retain the existing network and to provide a social service where necessary. Ominously, the Conservative Manifesto said that it would examine ways of decentralising BR and bringing in private enterprise to serve railway customers.
At the 1983 General Election the number of seats in the House of Commons was increased from 635 to 650. The Conservative's share of the vote dropped from 43.9 per cent to 42.4 per cent but they won 397 seats - the best result of any party since the Second World War. Despite the initial strong support shown in the opinion polls for the Alliance of Liberals and the SDP, they failed in their objective to break the mould of British politics. They obtained only 23 seats, albeit they did have 25.4 per cent of the vote and just 676,537 votes less than Labour.
The Labour Party found itself decimated in whole areas of the country and it was fortunate that, on this occasion, the electoral system operated in its favour. With 27.6 per cent of the vote it won 32.2 per cent of the seats, giving Labour 209 MPs. Tom Bradley was defeated at Leicester East, coming third with 21.1 per cent of the vote, the Labour candidate came second and the Conservative won the seat with a majority of 933. Peter Kent was beaten by the Conservative Edwina Currie, and the Liberal took third place. For the first time since 1935 the Association found itself without any representation in Parliament, and to protect its interests the EC decided to ask two Labour MPs to act on its behalf. Bert Lyons and Jim Mills approached Alan Williams, who had represented Swansea West since 1964 and had held a number of Ministerial appointments, and John Home Robertson, who had entered Parliament in October 1978 representing East Lothian. Both MPs and their Constituency Parties agreed to the suggestion, and at the 1984 Conference Jim Mills introduced them to the delegates.
The prosperity of coalminers, steelworkers and railwayworkers has always been closely linked, with the transportation of steel and coal providing an important source of income to the railway industry. The amount of coal carried by rail in 1953 was 178 million tonnes and even though this had sharply decreased, by 1983 it still constituted 60 per cent of BR's freight carryings.
As on the railways, job losses in the coal and steel industries had become a way of life, and in 1979 British Steel announced plans to cut back production from 21 million tonnes to 15 million tonnes per annum. With unemployment increasing, the future was bleak. Steel workers had been defeated after a thirteen week strike in 1980 and since then large sections of the industry had been closed down. No-one felt safe and in January 1981, at the Great Western Hotel, London, the NUR, NUM and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) formed a Triple Alliance to defend their industries.
The TSSA was not invited to join the Alliance but its Scottish section approached Charles Cullen,2 the TSSA's Scottish Secretary, who, along with other TSSA members, participated in its activities and built up a positive relationship with others within the Alliance. As their industrial prospects worsened, the three founding bodies decided to expand the Alliance's membership, and at a meeting in Congress House in April 1983, the National Union of Blastfurnacemen, Ore Miners, Coke Workers and Kindred Trades, the National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers, ASLEF and the TSSA formally joined the Triple Alliance. They agreed to establish regional bodies, hold rallies in key areas, establish a formal grouping of Triple Alliance MPs and to consider joint industrial action if a serious matter directly involving any one union should occur.3
The Triple Alliance held a public meeting at the 1983 TUC and Bert Lyons warned that BR's plans to streamline its administration could lead to the loss of up to 10,000 jobs. TSSA members played their part in regional meetings and when Charlie Cullen became the TSSA's Eastern Region Secretary, he sought to foster the same relationship within the Triple Alliance that he had experienced in Scotland. To a large extent he was successful, but differences of interpretation over the objectives of the Alliance brought strains at national level, and communications between the seven unions were often ineffective. To make matters worse, the TSSA felt that decisions were being made by the three largest unions and eventually it refused to contribute to the costs of activities which it had no part in framing. Increasingly, the EC questioned the value of belonging to the Alliance and although the Association remained an affiliate its members were told not to participate in any future activities of the Yorkshire/Humberside Working Group.4
The Conservative Government was determined that the mining industry should be made profitable as a prelude to privatisation. Margaret Thatcher had made an attempt to close 50 pits in 1981, but strikes and the threat of a national stoppage forced her to retreat. As a result, the Government agreed to reduce coal imports and redundancy payments were improved. Following this climbdown Thatcher was determined not to be humiliated again and she laid her plans accordingly. After butchering over 100,000 jobs in the steel industry and defeating the 1980 steel strike, Ian McGregor was seen as the ideal person "to take on" the miners, and he was appointed Chairman of the National Coal Board in September 1983. At a huge cost to the industry stocks were built up, until, by the Spring of 1984, they had reached record levels. Contingency plans were made to import coal, and mobile police squads were organised to deal with picketing. With unemployment having risen from 1.3 million to over 3 million since Thatcher had formed her first Cabinet, the Government was now ready.
The miners had a new leader - Arthur Scargill, who had been elected as President of the NUM in 1981 with the backing of 70 per cent of the NUM's membership. The dispute began in October 1983 when an NUM conference voted to reject a pay offer of 5.2 per cent, and imposed a ban on overtime. By January 1984, 19,000 miners had been sent home, and a number of local disputes took place. Then, on 1st March, the Coal Board announced that the Cortonwood pit would close even though huge sums had been invested in it the previous year, and assurances had been given that it would remain open until 1989. On 6th March Yorkshire miners came out on strike in protest, and when Ian McGregor said that the Coal Board intended to close 20 pits and dispense with 20,000 jobs, the Scottish miners joined the strike. Two days later the NUM Executive voted to approve their action by 21 votes to 3 and permission was given to other areas to do likewise. With that authorisation, the Kent and Durham coal fields immediately stopped work The strike had begun.
Other mining areas followed suit, but some miners, notably within the important district of Nottingham, opposed the strike and continued to work. Picket lines were established by the Yorkshire miners throughout the Nottinghamshire coal field and even though approximately 25 per cent responded, they were unable to persuade the majority of their colleagues to join the strike. The Coal Board obtained an injunction to instruct the Yorkshire miners to call off its pickets but they were in no mood to comply. The state intervened in support of those who chose to work and the Nottinghamshire coal field was effectively sealed off by thousands of police using road blocks. During the first 27 weeks of the strike over 164,000 pickets were turned away from Nottinghamshire5 and road blocks were used even as far away as the Dartford Tunnel, to prevent anyone suspected of being a Kent miner travelling north of the Thames. An application to have the road blocks lifted was rejected by the courts. All considerations of cost were brushed aside in the Government's determination to win; it knew only too well that a defeat at the hands of the miners would encourage others within the trade union and labour movement to challenge its agenda. State intimidation was widespread and the level of police activity unprecedented. This led to violent scenes which were shown nightly on television.
By the beginning of March 1985 9,750 miners had been arrested,6 two miners had been killed on the picket line and three people died searching for coal. The miners were not without blame and three were charged with murder when a taxi driver was killed when taking a working miner to his pit. There is no doubt that the violence had an effect on the public's attitude to the strike, and trade unionists were not immune from the misinformation and propaganda that poured forth from the media. Only later would the extent to which they had been influenced by Government agencies be revealed. Even the BBC television coverage of scenes at Orgreave on 18th June 1984 were reversed to show the mounted police responding to a missile attack by the miners, when in fact it was the miners who were defending their bodies from police baton charges. The controversy over the NUM's decision not to ballot their members before taking strike action continued, but at a national conference on 19th April, the delegates rejected the need for a ballot. Outside the hall 8,000 miners applauded the decision.
Throughout the country hundreds of miners' support groups were established by Trades Councils, Labour Party branches, student bodies and in work places. Lesbian and gay groups made a valuable contribution and womens' groups were particularly supportive. Some of the TSSA's head office staff donated money during most weeks of the strike; they, and then later their union branch, adopted Hickleton Main Pit in South Yorkshire and assisted in financing its soup kitchen. Raffles were held to provide funds, and miners, along with their wives, were provided with accommodation for several weeks whilst in London making collections at work places. Many local groups were constantly harassed by the police, and some work place groups were intimidated by their managers, including in BR.
The supporters saw the strike in quite clear terms - 85 per cent of the miners had voted with their feet; they needed money and food to sustain their decision, and the strike support groups were willing to assist. Financial help came from all over the world and even some trade union leaders who had criticised the handling of the strike encouraged their unions to donate generously to their cause. The TSSA was not amongst that number. Arthur Scargill had few friends within the EC and the protests that had been received during the 1974 miners' strike contributed to a real concern that any substantial solidarity would provoke resignations. Its financial commitment was therefore nominal but some members did participate in local Miners' Support Groups and took collections at their place of work. The columns of the TSSJ were remarkable for their lack of comment. One supportive editorial came from the pen of Ray Lowther but other than four letters that were published in the closing stages of the strike, all further comment was absent on a dispute that was one of the longest mass struggles in international history, dominating the nation's political landscape for twelve months. Two of the letters, from members in the Waterloo branch, took opposing views. Those correspondents that had little sympathy for the strike either criticised the TSSA's donation of £1,000 that had been specifically given for food, or believed that there was no logic in the dispute. One letter recalled that miners had failed to offer their support during the Beeching period, but John Harrington, a branch organiser of Euston No.1, pointed out that if the miners lost their battle, railway workers would be next in the front line.7 The point was well made, but by then it was too late.
The first indication of the TSSA's official approach to the NUM dispute came on 21st February 1984 when Jim Mills, representing the TSSA, met leaders of the other railway unions, along with the TGWU, ISTC and the NUS, at Unity House. Arthur Scargill explained that the Coal Board was intending to import certain types of coal as stocks were low as a result of the overtime ban. Scargill appealed to the trade union leaders to assist in stopping the movement of these imports, whereupon the NUR, ASLEF and the NUS gave their immediate support. The ISTC and the TGWU representatives agreed to recommend that the ban be supported and Mills assured Scargill that he would report details of the meeting to his EC. When it met, it was decided not to take any action as the Executive believed it would have very little impact and in any case there would be little response from the membership.8
A further meeting of the transport unions was held on 29th March and, as Bert Lyons was unable to attend, the TSSA sent an observer. By this time 80 per cent of the pits had ceased production and Arthur Scargill once again appealed for support. The unions decided to establish a central co-ordinating committee based at the TGWU headquarters, with local committees being formed in each region, to recommend to their Executives that all coal movements be stopped, and to ask their members not to cross miners' picket lines. A press conference followed in which the TSSA played no part, but the statement issued, which was widely reported in the media, said that the TSSA had supported the decisions. A letter came from the Kent miners thanking the TSSA for its solidarity but by this time a circular had already been sent out telling the membership that the only commitment given by the TSSA at the meeting was to report back to the EC.9
When the Executive met the Association's National Officers recommended that no industrial action should be taken to support the NUM, that their appeal for financial assistance be noted, and that the membership should be instructed to work normally but not to undertake the work of any members of other unions who were acting on official union instructions to stop the movement of coal.10 The recommendation was accepted by the EC and the General Secretary advised branches that the reasons for its decision were based on the fact that the union was itself dealing with the immediate loss of 7,000 salaried posts and that to stop all movements of coal would be seen as interfering in the domestic affairs of the Nottingham area; moreover it could cause irreparable damage to some British Steel plants, leading to further job losses.11 Some members were angry, and many more were disappointed but, at the end of the day, the overwhelming majority either supported the EC or did not feel sufficiently concerned to challenge the Executive's policy. A strongly worded letter from the South London branch expressed "disgust" that the TSSA had not supported the NUM and the Euston No.2 branch was told, in response to their criticism, that the EC would examine further appeals from the miners if they related to "hardship".12 Three other branches asked the EC to do more to help the miners at various stages of the strike.
On 30th March ASLEF asked its members not to transport coal, followed by the NUR on 3rd April. The NUS also put their own jobs at risk by stopping colliery vessels, but the first sign of divisions within the Alliance came on 30th March when Bill Sirs, the leader of the ISTC said that he would not support the miners to the extent of losing jobs
in his industry and he was not prepared to see the steel industry crucified on someone else's altar.
13 The steel workers later said that they would accept coal from any source to keep the plants operating, and the Steel Corporation arranged for it to be delivered by road. The miners were intent on stopping steel production but an arrangement was made within the Alliance to supply coal to the threatened Ravenscraig steel works. Trade union leaders in the power industry advised their members to breach NUM picket lines, and seven months later the electricians voted against taking supportive action. The TGWU donated generously to the miners and their members in the docks came out on strike twice in their support, but they found it difficult to prevent some of their members distributing coal by lorry.
Despite these setbacks, thousands all over the country responded to calls from Regional TUCs to demonstrate at rallies and to support the miners by taking a half day or a full day off work. On the day that the NUR called on their members not to transport coal, 100 drivers stopped work in protest when a colleague was sent home for carrying out the wishes of his union. On 7th June Charing Cross Station was closed when railway workers walked out in solidarity with the miners, and on 13th July Jimmy Knapp told a rally that of the 356 normal daily train movements of coal, only 10 were operating and no trains were transporting oil or steel.14 As the solidarity shown by the NUR and ASLEF members began to take effect many drivers and guards were threatened or victimised by management, particularly those engaged in the Nottingham area. Some were sent home when they refused to work normally and this eventually led to a regional strike on 17th January disrupting trains from parts of London, Yorkshire and the East Midlands. So great was the movement of coal by lorry that the Chairman of BR, Bob Reid, warned staff that their solidarity with the miners could result in job losses. This view was shared by the TSSA's Sheffield branch who feared that the practice of moving coal by lorry would continue when the strike ended.15
When delegates arrived at Scarborough for their 1984 Annual Conference the BR pay settlement had not been concluded. The Government had been reluctant to give ground but faced with the real prospect of a further major strike, it conceded, enabling its forces to be concentrated on the miners' dispute. Two emergency motions in support of the miners were placed on the agenda. The first to be debated came from Newcastle P&T and this sought to persuade delegates to donate £10,000 to the miners. Knowing the position of the EC even those who backed the motion were aware that its chances of succeeding were very slim. Not that many delegates had much sympathy for an amendment from Nottingham which attempted to cut the donation to £10. The second motion came from the Eversholt House branch and suggested that the situation had changed completely since the EC had issued its Circular on 10th April, and asked delegates to take a flexible approach to the strike and provide the NUM with such assistance as can be practically provided.
16 The EC had no intention of placing on record any opinion on the strike in case it was misconstrued and members resigned in protest. As a result of its recommendation, both motions and their amendments were heavily defeated; the Newcastle motion was lost on a card vote by 32,825 to 13,875. The only thing that the miners' supporters salvaged from the conference was that Claude James was able to persuade his colleagues on the EC to grant permission for a collection to be taken amongst the delegates.
In defending the EC's position Bert Lyons assured delegates that the plight of the NUM would be kept under review, with the possibility that financial support would be given. An appeal from the Wales TUC in April failed to elicit a response but when the Scottish TUC wrote to the General Secretary after conference, making a special appeal to raise money that would be used for groceries, it was agreed to donate £1,000 in food vouchers, with £250 being sent to the Scottish TUC, and the Wales, Kent and Lancashire districts of the NUM. This was hardly the amount that supporters of the strike had envisaged, yet even this was condemned by the Western Region Management branch.17
At the 1984 Labour Party Conference Arthur Scargill made an impassioned speech which brought him a rapturous standing ovation. He had been similarly acclaimed a few weeks earlier at the TUC, after it had carried a resolution recording its full support for the miners and condemning the police-state tactics
18 that had been used. Scargill thanked the NUS, ASLEF, the NUR and TGWU for their unstinting support, and a statement from the TUC General Council called on the movement to give total backing for the miners' objectives, to raise sufficient money to alleviate the terrible hardship being experienced in the coal fields, and not to move coal, coke or oil, that was intended to be a substitute fuel, across NUM picket lines. The TSSA delegation opposed the NUM motion and abstained on the General Council's statement, and when the transport unions met under the auspices of the TUC on 25th September, Bert Lyons made it clear that under no circumstances could the TSSA be associated with the TUC's policy statement.19 A further financial appeal from the TUC was noted.
The South Wales NUM was fined £50,000 for ignoring an injunction to stop secondary picketing. Similarly, the NUM was also fined £200,000 for contempt, and when it refused to pay the fine, all its funds were sequestered. Under the Social Security Act (1975) strikers had no right to state benefits, although they could claim for their families. Although the miners did not receive strike pay, they had £15 per week deducted from their benefit, increased to £16 in November. By Christmas they, and their families, were in a parlous situation. The TUC set up a Miners' Hardship Fund with notable church leaders amongst its trustees, and 13/14th December were designated as Miners' Hardship Days. It appealed to the TSSA to arrange for collections within the workplace. This too was noted, and a letter from the Sheffield branch insisted that by rejecting the emergency motions at the Association's annual conference the EC was precluded from making any donation to the NUM, and asked the EC to confirm that they had no intention of doing so.20 The TUC's Hardship Appeal brought in £269,000 for the miners and within a few weeks a Christmas Appeal launched by leaders of Labour, Liberal and Plaid Cymru Parties, along with prominent sports and theatre personalities, brought in £263,400. Just before Christmas thousands of volunteers who had been collecting money day in day out since the dispute had started, found that it was not only money and food that were being donated, but children's toys. Indeed, Christmas presents, food and money came from all over the world to bring some comfort to the miners' families over the festive season.
There had always been a minority within the EC that had given support to the miners and in December an attempt was made in a sub-committee to grant a specific donation to miners' children. This was turned down, but Harmeet Lehal raised the subject at a meeting of the EC on 11th January 1985. He proposed that £1,500 be contributed directly to children's needs; this produced an amendment calling for the donation to be endorsed by a ballot of the membership or preferably given by the executive members personally. This was lost by 13 votes to 2 and Lehal's motion was decisively defeated by 11 votes to 5.21
At the beginning of December 1984, 146,256 of the industry's 196,000 miners remained on strike but when the pit gates opened after Christmas sheer desperation and hunger brought a steady return to work. By 22nd February the Coal Board claimed that over 50 per cent of all miners were working. Approximately 80 per cent of those who had started the strike a year earlier remained loyal to the end, but on 3rd March a national conference voted narrowly to terminate the strike. Two days later the miners and their families marched proudly back to work to the sound of brass bands and amidst the flurry of banners. Their distress was shared by thousands of trade unionists and support groups far and wide and it was one for which other industries would pay a very high price. At midnight on 4th March the railway unions lifted their ban on the movement of coal and despite all their denials that the Government intended to sell the coal industry, the first hints of privatisation were voiced.
There is no doubt that the majority of TSSA members had been appalled by the picket line violence and very few had time for Arthur Scargill's left-wing views. A number of branches had invited miners to address their meetings, and although there were more branches who indicated that they supported the strike than those who opposed it, in the main these were the politically active left-wing branches. The TSSA was not normally unsympathetic to those in struggle. In the early part of 1984, when the Government withdrew the right of employees at the Communications Headquarters in Cheltenham to belong to a trade union, the TSSA immediately responded to a financial request from the TUC. Members were also asked to demonstrate their solidarity by supporting rallies and meetings. This they have continued to do, and TSSA members have participated in every march and rally at Cheltenham since 1984.
When the miners began their titanic struggle against the Government, the TSSA was campaigning against the abolition of the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties. The tragedy was that the root cause of these campaigns, including the one at Cheltenham, was not seen by the membership as being part of the same struggle and, as Jim Mills said at the 1985 TSSA Conference, the defeat of the miners had its effect on other industries, and perhaps none more so than the transport industry.
In the seven years that followed the strike the coal industry underwent a period of massive restructuring and rationalisation. The industry also began to reap the benefits of its long-term investment policy. Productivity doubled and costs fell by 33 per cent; British Coal was profitable and some mines could even match the price of cheap imported coal. Arthur Scargill had always maintained that the Government had a hit-list of pit closures but this had been repeatedly denied, and when it was callously announced on 13th October 1992 that 31 of the Coal Board's 50 pits were to close with the loss of 30,000 miners' jobs, an explosion of anger swept the country. Scargill was seen to have been right all along and disapproval of the Government's policy came even from Conservative back benchers. John Major quickly became the most unpopular Prime Minister since polling began.
The attitude of the TSSA's leadership in 1992 stood in sharp contrast to that of 1984. This change had been brought about by their experiences of the Thatcher/Major administrations and moreover, it was engaged in the biggest battle of its history, defending itself against the continuous loss of jobs and the privatisation of the railway industry. Within two days of the Government's decision to close over half the coal pits the TSSA's General Secretary Richard Rosser told the membership that he, along with the leaders of the RMT and ASLEF, were to meet the BRB Chairman on 16th October to discuss the implications of the Government's ruthless action on BR and its employees.22
Emergency resolutions condemning the Government were sent to the EC from the Sheffield, Doncaster T&P, North Eastern Management branches and the LT Divisional Council. A national petition was issued to branches opposing the pit closure programme, and the biggest mid-week rally and lobby of Parliament seen in London for many years took place on 21st October 1992 with TSSA members acting as stewards or marching under the Association's banner. Heading the demonstration were Arthur Scargill, Peter Heathfield and Mick McGahey, who were cheered and applauded by thousands as they marched through the Conservative Borough of Kensington. The acclamation received by the miners was remarkable. After suffering from character assassination at the hands of the media and reviled by many, Scargill had become a hero. During the lobby a long line of political and trade union leaders waited to make speeches in support of the miners, and one of these was Richard Rosser. The extent of popular support for the miners was revealed when, despite torrential rain, a further massive demonstration was held the following Sunday, 25th October.
The 1993 TSSA Conference was vastly different from that of 1984. Delegates severely criticised the privatisation of the coal industry and deplored the fact that many jobs would be put at risk if the pit closure programme went ahead. The Government had been stunned at the extent of public support for the miners and was obliged to play for time. Its delaying tactics succeeded and after the Coal Board achieved an operating profit of £118 million in 1994 many pits were closed. Of the 203 pits producing coal in 1984, the remaining 16 joined the private sector on 29th December 1994, by which time the NUM's membership was approximately 18,000.
[1]. The Labour Way is the Better Way, Labour Party 1979 General Election Manifesto.
[2]. C. A. Cullen (Newcastle No.1, then Central and Head Office). Joined BR and the TSSA 1951; its staff in 1964. Appointed Scottish Secretary 1978, Eastern Region Secretary 1982, Assistant General Secretary 1989-1996.
[3]. Coal, Rail and Steel, Fighting For the Future, Published by the Triple Alliance.
[4]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 8th March 1984.
[5]. Financial Times 4th March 1985.
[6]. The Guardian 4th March 1985.
[7]. TSSJ March 1985.
[8]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 8th March 1984.
[9]. TSSA Circular 197 30th March 1984.
[10]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 5th May 1984.
[11]. TSSA Circular 214 l0th April 1984.
[12]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 26th April 1984.
[13]. Morning Star 31st March 1984.
[14]. Morning Star 14th July 1984.
[15]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 6th December 1984.
[16]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes item 150.
[17]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 27th September 1984.
[18]. TUC Annual Report 1984.
[19]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 27th September 1984.
[20]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 6th December 1984.
[21]. TSSA EC Minutes 11th January 1985.
[22]. TSSA Circular 302 15th October 1992.
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