"Further dark days dies lie ahead but I know the Association will not lose those ideals for our industry which began to flourish with nationalisation in 1947 but which have taken such a hammering in recent years."
T.H. Jenkins CBE MCIT
General Secretary TSSA, 1982 Annual Conference.
Contemporarily with the Beeching Report came a plan by the BRB Deputy Chairman to reorganise BR workshops and a new organisation was formed - British Railway Workshops - which, in 1970, became British Rail Engineering Ltd (BREL). By this time its workshops had been reduced to 14, with assets of approximately £60 million and an annual turnover of approximately £100 million. No fewer than 28,000 staff had been made redundant since 1962, and by 1970 the staff complement had been reduced to 37,600, of whom 5,900 were salaried. Worse was to come!
By 1982 twelve workshops remained, and then the communities around Temple Mills, Shildon, Swindon and Horwich heard the news that their livelihoods were also to be lost, with only Horwich Foundry to remain as a symbol of former skills. The closures were condemned at the 1982 TSSA Conference but a few months later the unions were told that within three years the BRB intended to reduce the number of railway staff from 191,000 to 172,000, and that BREL would have to lose a further 4,000 posts of which 500 were salaried. The main reason for this butchery was a reduction in investment and the Government's fmancial restraints on BR. The railways were now in the ridiculous position of operating trains with insufficient carriages to meet passenger demands, while BREL was desperate for new orders. BREL's problems were further compounded as the reduction in the wagon, locomotive and coach fleet also led to less maintenance work. To help relieve some of BREL's problems the TSSA called on its management to embark on a more aggressive marketing policy and to sell its skills to foreign railway companies.1 At the same time TSSA members participated in the activities of the joint action committees which had been established to defend the prosperity of their communities and save jobs. The campaign succeeded in delaying some closures, including Swindon, and celebrations to mark the 150th Anniversary of the GW Railway were due to be held at the Swindon Workshops in August 1985. Then, when it was announced in May that the works (which had once employed 15,000 staff) were due to close the following year with the loss of 2,300 jobs, the staff withdrew their goodwill and the event was cancelled.
The constant lobbying by private enterprise to remove the manufacture of capital equipment from the public sector reaped its reward with the publication of the infamous Serpell Report.2 The Government asked Sir David Serpell to examine the finances of the railways and its associated operations, and to report on the options for alternative policies that would improve the railways' financial results over the next twenty years. The committee's views were published on 20th January 1983 at a cost of over £600,000; it was condemned by the TSSA and criticised by the Financial Times and The Times. Bert Lyons said it was the most costly superficial examination of a major industry which has ever been produced.
3 One of the options it suggested was that BREL should be privatised; this was exactly what the Government wanted to hear.
With the hotels and Sealink now established in the private sector, the Government told the BRB to prepare BREL for privatisation and to distance itself from the company. In January 1986 the BRB outlined its plans to split BREL into two groups - the Maintenance Group, which was to remain with BR, formed from the workshops at Glasgow, Wolverton, Doncaster and Eastleigh, and the New Build and Repair Group based on the workshops at Crewe, Derby, York and Horwich Foundry. Reorganisation was followed by an announcement at the British Rail Council on 20th May 1986, that a further 6,750 jobs were to go within the two groups by 1989. Richard Rosser condemned the redundancies and suggested that the Board's restructuring exercise was merely a prelude to privatisation, but its representatives insisted that the matter was still under consideration, and that their proposal to split BREL was a totally separate exercise. Very few were convinced and disquiet was further exacerbated when the two groups became totally independent of each other on 1st April 1987. This was also the year when the TSSA made its debut at the CSEU Annual Conference, and Richard Rosser used the occasion to deliver a blistering attack on the Government and BR for introducing policies which were designed to run BREL down. He also reiterated his conviction that the New Build and Repair Group would be offered for sale, and despite all BR's earlier denials, the first move towards privatisation came on 16th October 1987, when Doncaster Wagon Works was sold to a management buyout team - RFS Industries. Horwich Foundry, which had been established earlier as a wholly-owned subsidiary of the BRB, was sold on 15th August 1988 to Parkfield Group plc.
On 1st April 1988 a holding company, BREL (1988) Ltd, was formed, composed of the works at Crewe, Derby and York. The company was sold on 18th April 1989 to a consortium comprising the management and employees of BREL (1988) Ltd who had 20 per cent of the shares, with Trafalgar House and a Swedish/Swiss company, Asea Brown Boveri, as the dominant partners having 40 per cent each. With a healthy order book, net assets of £72.5 million and potential land assets estimated at between £50-£100 million, BREL was sold for £13.6 million.4 To sweeten the sale £60 million was written off BREL's historic debt.
The new owners were soon saddled with the effects of Government policy as it continued to cut back on public sector investment. The TSSA and the other unions that organised workers within BREL condemned the Government's failure to invest in the transport industry as the main reason for the continuing difficulties that faced the company. At the 1991 TUC Richard Rosser declared that privatisation was a disaster for the staff of BREL, and that the loss of railway manufacturing jobs and skills came at a time when more investment was needed in the railway industry.5 A similar view was expressed by Charlie Cullen at the 1992 CSEU Conference when he deplored the loss of jobs in BREL and said that the Government's failure to invest in the London Underground and BR had brought BREL to its knees. In March 1992, after having made a loss of £41 million in the previous financial year, Asea Brown Boveri acquired the 40 per cent of shares owned by Trafalgar House, to become ABB Transportation Ltd. On 7th June 1993 the trade unions were told that owing to the reduced workload from BR and London Underground, ABB was not working to capacity, and 900 staff were to be made redundant. A march and rally against job losses was held in York on 3rd July with local MP Hugh Bayley, Jimmy Knapp and the TSSA's Treasurer and York Councillor, David Horton,6 as the speakers.
Just before privatisation BREL had employed approximately 8,500 staff. With less than 5,000 remaining with ABB Rail Vehicles Ltd and ABB Customer Support Ltd, the prospect of a merger between ABB and Daimler Benz came on 16th March 1995. Approval was given by the European Commission on 18th October, offering the prospect of a marketing and engineering base within 40 countries. Unfortunately, with privatisation of the railways in the offing, the Government failed to place orders for the new rolling stock that was required and on 11th May the company announced that its York works, which had employed over 10,000 people in the 1950s, would close at the end of the year with the loss of 750 jobs. Now called AdTranz the long, slow destruction of British train-building continued and jobs were lost during 1995 and 1996 at Crewe, Derby and Doncaster.
The stampede to sell the profitable parts of the railway industry continued unabated and the BR subsidiaries began to prepare for privatisation. An announcement by the Minister of State for Transport on 23rd July 1987 led to the sale of British Transport Advertising to its managers (Ironlook Ltd). Gold Star Holidays (formerly Golden Rail) was sold in 1989 to Superbreak, the market leader in domestic short holidays, which had itself been sold by BR in 1983. In February 1986 BRB announced that it intended to split its catering arm Travellers Fare into two groups. Once again the BRB denied that the reorganisation had anything to do with privatisation and stated quite categorically that it had no intention of selling the company.7 Be that as it may, Travellers Fare station catering became a limited company in December 1987 after winning the overwhelming majority of the catering units that the BRB had put out to tender. A year later, with a turnover of £74,000,000 and 3,400 staff, it was sold to a management buyout group for £20.5 million. In November 1992 it was taken over by Compass Group pic. InterCity On Board Services, which remained with BR, was restructured for privatisation in 1994 and the following year, with 600 employees, was sold to European Rail Catering Ltd, a management buyout.
Freightliners ceased to hold subsidiary status within BR and in April 1989 it was merged with Speedlink and Railfreight International, to be known as Railfreight Distribution. In 1994/1995 BR's freight business was restructured; Freightliners was separated from Railfreight Distribution with the remaining business split into three (Loadhaul, Mainline and Transrail).
To pursue its political agenda the Conservative Party's 1983 General Election Manifesto said:
"The GLC has grossly mismanaged London Transport. We shall set up a new London Regional Transport Authority for the underground, buses and commuter trains in the London area. This will provide the opportunity to split the different types of transport into separate operating bodies, put more services out to private tender and offer the passenger a better performance."
The TSSA, which has had a presence within London's Bus and Underground companies since the First World War,8 saw any move to return LT to private ownership as a retrograde step. Indeed, its support for the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act, and its long held conviction that transport should be publicly owned, co-ordinated and integrated, was the antithesis of everything the Government stood for. The reason for the Government's intense hostility to the GLC's transport policy was not simply because its administration had passed from Conservative control to Labour in May 1981, but because it had taken radical measures to resolve the problem of traffic throttling London's streets.
The GLC, under its leader Ken Livingstone and its Transport Committee Chairman David Wetzel, a former bus conductor, had inherited a budget deficit of over £25 million from the Conservative administration, but as they had been elected with a mandate to cut fares and improve London's transport system, they were determined to fulfil their promise. Having carried out a consultation exercise amongst Londoners, the GLC's first decision was to extend to the Underground the free bus travel arrangements that existed for senior citizens. Bus and Underground mileage was significantly increased and a modernisation programme started. Then, on 5th October 1981, the GLC introduced a cheap fares policy, supported by an increased subsidy to LT from the rates. The GLC also attempted to include BR in the scheme, but the Government warned the BRB that for every pound it accepted from the GLC, British Rail's External Financing Limit would be cut by the same amount.
The GLC's new fare structure averaged a cut of 32 per cent which halted, and then reversed, the twenty year long decline in the number of passengers. Bus use advanced by 11 per cent and there was an increase of 7 per cent in the number of people using the Underground; at the same time car use dropped significantly. Popular though the new fares were, the GLC's transport philosophy was challenged by the Conservative controlled Bromley Council who considered that as they did not have any Underground stations within their Borough, the levy on their rates was unfair. The initial judgment supported the GLC but in the House of Lords, on 17th December 1981, five Law Lords ruled that the reduced fares were unlawful. Whilst they agreed that it was acceptable to subsidise transport, they ruled that the GLC had an obligation to break even and its low fares policy went beyond its powers as defined by the Transport (London) Act 1969. This was seen by many as a political judgment, and at the very least a narrow interpretation of the Act, but the ruling was as welcome to Margaret Thatcher as it was deplored by the TSSA.9 As a result of the judgment the GLC was prevented from providing the additional revenue support grant to offset the fare reduction, and after much debate the GLC agreed to remain within the law. Fares were increased by 96 per cent on 22nd March 1982, making travel on London buses the most expensive of any city in the world. As a direct result, 36,000 extra car commuters returned to the streets of the capital.
Some GLC Councillors called on the public to boycott the fare increases and when David Wetzel travelled by bus on the day that the new fares were introduced he insisted on paying 20p rather than the 40p demanded. Hundreds of others also refused to pay but there was not a mass response. Greater progress was made when the GLC, in conjunction with the South-East Region TUC, the LT Trade Union Defence Committee and a number of passenger and community groups, launched a "Fares Fair" campaign in defence of their policy. This received widespread support, including the active involvement of TSSA members, under the auspices of the LT Trade Unions' Defence Committee. As part of the campaign over 500,000 leaflets were distributed, and at a meeting held at Congress House on 17th February 1982, Bill Etherington supported a proposal from ASLEF condemning the House of Lords' decision and pledging total and continued support for the programme adopted by the Committee, including a day of industrial action;10 this was set for 10th March 1982. When the TSSA's Executive met on 5th March it was decided that members could not participate officially, as under Rule 34 they were unable to take part in a strike unless it was in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. Instead, they asked members to note that the strike was part of an overall campaign and invited them to consider giving it their support on an individual basis. Many chose to do so, but the decision provoked criticism from TSSA activists and other trade unionists with whom, up to now, they had been working amicably. The strike was a success and not a single Underground train or bus moved in London. A lobby of Parliament was held the following day and many members took the opportunity to press the Association's case with their MP.
The LT Trade Unions' Defence Committee, together with the South-East Region TUC, also held a series of events involving local community and women's groups, ethnic organisations, residents and students. At the 1982 Labour Party Conference Bert Lyons supported the right of local government to subsidise transport free from central government penalties, and deplored the Law Lords' decision of 17th December 1981.11 At a meeting of the TSSA London Political Committee, held at County Hall in October, Ken Livingstone said that he was determined to do everything possible to reduce fares on LT and envisaged a cut of 25 per cent taking place early in 1983. By now Livingstone was more confident of winning a legal victory, and after the GLC appealed to the High Court in January, it ruled that the reduction could be legal, as the GLC's policy had not been made on the basis of an election manifesto, but on one that had been carefully prepared as a strategy for London. Fares were reduced by 25 per cent in May 1983, and the highly successful Travelcard was introduced.
However, the Government had not finished! Within three weeks of being re-elected in June 1983 and ironically, at the very moment that LT was celebrating its 50th Anniversary, the Government published a White Paper Public Transport in London. This paved the way for privatisation, removing the LTE from the democratic control of the GLC and placing it under a "holding company" - London Regional Transport (LRT). Its members were to be appointed by the Secretary of State for Transport with responsibility for determining the level of fares. General financial support for LRT would come direct from the Government, with travel concessions and additional services being financed by the London Boroughs and the shire counties in which LRT services operated. In due course, LRT returned to the more popular title London Transport as its brand name for marketing purposes. The London Transport Bill followed in December with a provision for new companies to be formed in order to facilitate privatisation.
Not satisfied with laying the basis for the destruction of London's transport system, the Government was also determined to abolish the GLC and the Metropolitan Counties, and set out its views in Streamlining the Cities. This provoked fury within the trade union and labour movement and a lengthy period of agitation, marches, demonstrations and lobbying ensued. The 1983 TUC rejected Streamlining the Cities along with Public Transport in London and Chris Godbold,12 on behalf of the TSSA, condemned the Government's decision to abolish the GLC, pointing out that it would remove local democratic accountability,13 bring higher fares, cause the withdrawal of lossmaking services, destroy integration and return London's transport to the chaotic position it had been in before the 1933 London Passenger Transport Act.14
A lobby of Parliament was organised by Capital Transport15 on 17th January 1984, and in opposition to the Transport Bill, the abolition of the GLC and the six Metropolitan Counties, a "Democracy Week" was organised by the TUC and local government unions between 26th-29th March 1984; a "Day of Action" was set for 28th March. The Association's National Officers recommended to the EC that members should be urged to support "Democracy Week" but not the "Day of Action", when they should report for duty in the normal way. This was contested by Chris Godbold, the LT Divisional Council representative, who convinced the EC that LT members should at least be given the same advice as in 1982;16 i.e. they should consider supporting the "Day of Action" on an individual basis. Even this was criticised by the Westminster branch who had expected a stronger lead from the EC and pointed out that its approach made the relationship with their colleagues in other trade unions difficult.17 Many TSSA members supported the "Day of Action" but although all LT buses and trains came to a halt on 28th March, the campaign did not succeed. The London Regional Transport Act was given Royal Assent on 26th June 1984 and the Metropolitan Counties, along with the GLC, were terminated on 31st March 1986.
The industrial and political unrest of the period should be placed in the context of the BT Hotels having been sold, Sealink UK Ltd being privatised, the BRB reviewing its options to privatise the railway workshops, and the 1984 miners' strike having commenced. The number of salaried staff employed on BR, which possessed the overwhelming majority of TSSA members, had been reduced by approximately 9,000 between 1979 and 1984, and by 1987/1988 BR's railway salaried staff would be down to 39,448.18
In July 1984, a new campaign commenced following the publication of the White Paper Buses. This sought to deregulate the bus industry and divide the National Bus Company into small units which could be offered for sale to the private sector. Opposition to the White Paper and the consequential Transport Bill united all the transport and local government unions. They had the backing of the Bus and Coach Council, the Association of County Councils and the Association of District Councils, all of whom opposed the Bill under an umbrella organisation called the "Public Transport Campaign Group", with the TSSA being represented on its Management Committee. A TUC sub-committee, on which the TSSA also had representation, focused its attention on the Bill, and a Public Transport Week was held between 24-30th November 1984. A lobby of Parliament was held on 27th November and there was a march and rally on 2nd April 1985, when 12,000 bus workers lobbied their MPs.
In 1984 the National Bus Company possessed 14,000 vehicles, a staff of 55,000 and had made a net profit of £22.8 million. In preparation for privatisation all its subsidiaries were told to distance themselves from the parent company, and in 1986 London Country Bus Services (its largest subsidiary with 3,900 employees, of whom 864 were salaried staff) was told to restructure its business prior to joining the private sector; as a result, 148 of the 204 salaried staff employed at its head office and regional offices were made redundant. Similar events took place in the other subsidiaries and by 1986, with privatisation in the offing, no fewer than 5,000 jobs had disappeared from the National Bus Company. The Transport Act received Royal Assent on 30th October 1985; deregulation became operative from 26th October 1986 and with the exception of London, bus companies throughout England and Wales now competed with each other, putting at risk long established routes.
The National Bus Company's 52 bus subsidiaries, its 6 coach companies, 9 engineering companies and National Express, were sold for £323 million. Forty of the companies were purchased by management or employee teams, and when the cost of privatisation and other debts had been accounted for, the Government received £89 million.19 In scenes reminiscent of the sale of the former BT Hotels, some of the new bus owners made quick financial gains by selling parts of their property, and, despite assurances from the Government that deregulation and privatisation would bring a better service, this has not yet materialised. Many areas do have more buses, but these usually operate on profitable routes and during peak periods, whereas in the evenings and on Sundays they are few and far between, inconveniencing many sections of the community. Furthermore, whilst competition does exist in some cities, privatisation has brought new monopolies. Following the dissolution of the Scottish Transport Group and the sale of its bus services, by 1995 continuing mergers led to the seven biggest bus groups in the UK controlling over 60 per cent of the market. Unprofitable routes were abandoned, and fares rose by 33 per cent in real terms in Metropolitan areas outside London between 1985 and 1992.20
As a result of privatisation many bus workers have seen their conditions of service worsened, their working day lengthened and pension prospects dashed. After four years local authorities called for a review, as privatisation and deregulation had failed to deliver the benefits that had been promised by its advocates. Millions of passengers had similar thoughts and a report by the Local Authority Association in 1994 showed that the number of people using buses had dropped by 20 per cent in Metropolitan areas since deregulation.21 A further blow to the Government came with the publication of The Consequences of Deregulation on 14th December 1995. Issued by the House of Commons Transport Select Committee it called for a tightening of controls on the bus industry and the appointment of a regulator to curb the abuses which had taken place. The Committee pointed to the neglect of less profitable routes and said that bus services in some places were in chaos. As a result of Government policy, in the ten years since deregulation, 1.26 million passengers had been lost, and between 1987 and the end of 1994 there had been more complaints to the Office of Fair Trading about the bus industry than about all other industries put together. Under-investment had also led to older buses being used, with the proportion of vehicles over 12 years old rising from 19 per cent to 51 per cent, creating serious problems for the future, not least that of pollution.
Meanwhile, the Government's plan to privatise LRT was coming to fruition. Based on an earlier reorganisation in 1979/1980, three of its major operations were converted into limited companies in 1985 - London Buses Ltd (LBL), London Underground Ltd (LUL), and Bus Engineering Ltd. Opposition to the privatisation of any work traditionally done by LT staff was placed on the TSSA's Annual Conference agenda in 1983,22 but competitive tendering became the norm and private companies took over a wide range of "in house" duties. LRT's large and important catering department was closed and private operators were brought in to manage its business. The Business Services Department, with its internal computer software facility, was sold to CAP (UK) Ltd in May 1987; later in the year, the CAP Group acquired LRT's 32 per cent holding in Data Networks plc, a joint computer venture which had been formed with private enterprise. LRT Bus Engineering Ltd joined the private sector and has since been closed down. LT Advertising was sold to an American company, Transport Displays Inc. in August 1994.
The first stage towards privatising London's buses came in the early part of 1985 when twelve routes were put out to tender. Six of these were won by LBL, four by London Country Bus Services and Eastern National and two by private companies. Of the second group of twelve routes and services, only three were secured by LBL, with five being awarded to the National Bus Company and four going to private operators. The process continued when LBL began trading with twelve subsidiary bus companies in April 1989. In an attempt to compete against private operators the LBL subsidiaries initiated substantial job cuts and reduced previously agreed redundancy severance arrangements for short-term employees. "Low cost" bus subsidiaries, set up by LT to win routes and networks offered for tender, brought new conditions of service and cuts in pay which led to industrial action by the TGWU from 1991 onwards.
In June 1991, a subsidiary of LBL, London Forest Travel, was awarded a contract for eleven routes within the Walthamstow area based on their low tender and a determination to reduce costs. New personal contracts were offered to its staff with the assurance that their wages would not be reduced providing they accepted an increase in their working week of 20 per cent, with cuts in holiday leave and sick pay arrangements. A strike by TGWU members began in July and when management responded by passing the eleven routes to other LBL subsidiaries or private companies, London Forest Travel collapsed. some garages were closed leading to job losses and a considerable displacement of salaried staff. Several other bus garages were closed as contracts changed hands and bus route tendering continued to affect the TSSA's membership. Such a concerted drive to reduce pay and worsen conditions of service had not been seen in the transport industry since the 1930s.
Plans to privatise London's buses were published on 11th March 1991 when the Government issued a consultation document, A Bus Strategy for London. This proposed selling the LBL bus subsidiaries and their fifty garages, and deregulating London's routes as soon as possible. To attract buyers, more public money was spent to update the fleet, but after the experience of privatisation outside the capital, very few wanted to see it repeated in London. Robert Adley, the Conservative Vice-Chairman of the House of Commons Committee on Transport, condemned the plan as one of party dogma - a recipe for chaos and congestion.23 Support for the Government came from the Chairman of LT, Wilfrid Newton, who expressed his disappointment that the Government's legislative calendar was unable to permit the deregulation of London's buses at that time, but he remained optimistic that it would eventually be introduced.24
The TSSA with its 1,000 managerial, technical and supervisory members employed by LBL did not share his view. The Association worked closely with the Public Transport Campaign Group, Capital Transport, and other interested bodies such as the TUC and Labour Party, to oppose the Government's objectives. Meetings and rallies were held and a petition, calling on the Government to abandon its plans, was organised in the summer of 1992. It was not only the trade unions and their allies that opposed deregulation. Some senior LT officials warned Steven Norris, the Minister for Transport in London, that chaos would result if the Government's proposals were introduced.25 The General Secretary, Richard Rosser, submitted written evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee which was conducting an enquiry into the deregulation of London's buses, and verbal evidence was provided on 5th May 1993.
In October 1993, a new campaign, "Better Bus Services" was launched. Sponsored by the TSSA, TGWU and the bus operator Grey-Green, it had the support of Capital Transport and the London Regional Passengers Committee. Before it was fully established, John MacGregor, the Secretary of State for Transport, (the ninth Conservative Minister of Transport since 1979) announced on 8th November 1993 that whilst bus deregulation in London remained the long-term aim of the Government, it did not intend to bring forward legislation to give it effect. This was a major victory, of which there had been very few in recent years, and welcome news for the public and transport unions. Nevertheless, he confirmed that privatisation would take place in 1994, and instead of tendering companies being given a fixed price to operate London bus routes with LT receiving all the revenue, operators would, in future, have to bid for the minimum subsidy that they considered would be necessary to make the service viable.
During 1992/1993 the ten LBL bus companies had a turnover of over £440 million, owned approximately 4,600 buses and operated 75 per cent of the London bus network. The following year they were sold to private bus companies or management buyouts for £220 million. Two of the companies were purchased by Stagecoach Holdings plc who, in December 1995, obtained the first private franchise to operate trains. LT no longer operated buses but it still had a statutory duty to ensure that the private contractors provided a suitable level of quality and service. To meet this remit London Transport Buses was established on 1st April 1995.
The London Tourist Board expressed strong misgivings at the lack of investment in London's buses, trains and Underground system.26 At the same time, bus services have continued to deteriorate and fares have escalated. Comparisons made with other leading cities in Europe have repeatedly highlighted London as having the most expensive fares, and in April 1995 Capital Transport said that commuters paid an average of £11.28 per week in fares, compared with an average of £5.55 in other major European capitals. They also suggested that London fares could be halved if public transport received the same level of Government subsidy as in other European cities.27
Under the new regime in London the overwhelming majority of employees experienced a worsening of their conditions of service. As a result, many skilled and experienced workers have left the industry, resulting in a shortage of staff. Privatisation has also brought pensions that are significantly less favourable than those of the LT Pension Fund. Whilst they vary from scheme to scheme they are all based on a pension age of 65 (as against 60 on LRT) even though the Sales Memoranda stated that pension arrangements should be "broadly comparable", and if they were inferior, new owners must consider what other remuneration should be given to disadvantaged employees. This policy was approved by the Government, but when problems arose they insisted that it was a matter for the companies to resolve. Nor did staff employed within LUL escape the repercussions of the Government's transport strategy. In 1988 LUL was reorganised, with its day to day management coming under the control of an Executive Board, and individual underground lines began operating as business centres. In 1993, Steven Norris revealed the true nature of the reorganisation when he said that LT was talking to banking advisers about injecting private sector finances into its business and franchises could be offered on a line-by-line basis
.28 Later denials that such a proposal was being considered were treated with the scepticism they deserved.
In 1989 the introduction of a pilot scheme "Action Stations" between Harrow, Watford, Amersham and Chesham, without trade union agreement, brought a series of one day strikes by the NUR. With the ultimate intention of extending the scheme throughout the Underground system, the "Action Stations" concept would have brought far-reaching changes to employees' prospects for promotion, with fundamental changes to the transfer and redundancy arrangements. Posts would disappear and staff who had only ever been involved in operating responsibilities would be expected to take on booking office duties, and vice versa, subject to tests and interviews. The TSSA was unable to persuade LUL to drop its scheme and members were asked not to apply for advertised positions in the Harrow area. Discontent led to a strike ballot and in a 53.1 per cent poll, 548 Association members had voted "Yes" and 313 "No". An indefinite strike of its booking clerk and supervisor members was set for 00.01 hours on 8th May; this was called off after the NUR decided not to continue their action following an injunction brought by LUL that the wording on its ballot paper did not establish that the issues were subject to a trade dispute. The pilot scheme was deferred and the differences were resolved under the auspices of ACAS and a joint Management/Trade Union Working Party. Deep cuts in grants continued to affect LRT's finances and as a direct result it was announced that 1,000 jobs, many of which included booking office and managerial posts, were to go. A meeting of 300 LUL members expressed fears that this would result in increased vandalism, fare evasion and attacks on individuals, and that the repeated threats of bomb explosions highlighted the need for more staff, not less. The assistance of the TSSA's sponsored MPs was engaged and Alan Williams put down an Early Day Motion on the job losses, which quickly gained the support of MPs including Joan Ruddock, the Labour spokesperson on transport. A succession of meetings failed to move LUL, and following calls from branches and the LT Divisional Council to take strike action, the EC agreed to hold a ballot, with a recommendation to vote "Yes". Ballot papers were sent to all TSSA members employed in the operating, supervisory and booking office grades who were asked if they were prepared to take part in a strike in furtherance of the dispute with LUL. The result, announced on 23rd April 1991, showed that of the 1,552 papers sent out, 575 had voted "Yes" and 289 "No". The EC determined that the strike would commence on 9th May but negotiations at ACAS brought a significant movement in LUL's position and the strike was called off.
Even greater sacrifices were demanded by LUL when they revealed their Company Plan to the trade unions on 26th November 1991. This envisaged a cut in staff from 21,000 to 16,000 by 1995, with booking clerks the biggest losers, and far-reaching changes to conditions of service and pay for those that remained. To measure the acceptability or otherwise of the Company Plan, a ballot was held of all the Association's LUL members which indicated that an overwhelming majority rejected the proposals. Whilst discussions took place between the trade unions, ACAS and LUL to resolve the growing crisis, a new Machinery of Negotiation was introduced on 11th August 1992 following difficult and protracted negotiations.
With LUL intent on introducing their Plan progressively as from 1st November 1992, the company refused to go to ACAS for mediation. It reaffirmed its policy of achieving the required staffing reductions by avoiding compulsory dismissal and utilising the voluntary severance arrangement, providing that it received the co-operation of the trade unions and there was no disruption to the system. However, this was accompanied by the threat that any industrial action could bring compulsory redundancies at the statutory rate - considerably less than the level which had been agreed with the unions.
A further sign of the company's aggressive position was its intent to terminate the arrangements for deducting trade union subscriptions through the paybill from any union that took strike action.29 The EC sought the views of its members through meetings, and a ballot was held. Of its 1,550 members within LUL, only 39 per cent responded but of these, 77 per cent were willing to strike.30 The EC advised its members not to sign the new contracts, and held a formal postal ballot; on this occasion, 373 voted "Yes", while 343 were opposed. Meanwhile, the RMT had decided not to proceed with strike action and ASLEF had called off its own ballot. As a result, the position was discussed with branch officers and the EC decided not to proceed. The earlier recommendation that members should not sign the new contracts was rescinded and some of the worst features of the Plan were amended as a result of negotiations within the Machinery.
Given the moderate approach to industrial relations that has been a feature of the TSSA since 1897, it should not be inferred from the unprecedented number of ballots for strike action within its LUL membership that they were at variance with the union's traditional outlook. This was far from the case, but the fact that so many members were willing to strike was an indictment of LUL's management style and the extreme policies of the Government. Between 1979 and 1995 the total number of employees within LT dropped from 60,449 to 34,431, but the LT Divisional Council continued to make recruits and 1,481 joined the TSSA during 1991-1994. Nevertheless, this was insufficient to meet the losses caused by the Company Plan, redundancies and retirements, resulting in the Divisional Council's membership dropping from 4,748 in 1992 to 3,555 at the end of 1995 - 9.7 per cent of the Association's membership.
[1]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1982 item 128.
[2]. The Serpell Report - named after Sir David Serpell, a former Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Transport and the Department of the Environment, former part-time BRB Director. Appointed by the Government to review railway finances 5th May 1982. His report advocated various options including a railway network of 1,630 miles and higher fares. It rejected the case for investment as urged by BR as not being good value for money. The BRB said it was confused, not coherent, disappointing, inaccurate, implausible and misleading.
(Minutes of BR Council 18th January 1984 and The Times 21st January 1983).
[3]. TSSJ June 1983.
[4]. TSSA Circular 128 10th April 1990.
[5]. TUC Annual Conference Report 1991.
[6]. D. Horton JP (North Eastern MS). Joined BR in 1960 and the TSSA in 1964. Chairman Northumberland and Durham Divisional Council 1974-1978 and East Yorkshire/Yorkshire 1983-1986. Chairman SOC; EC 1986-1992; National Treasurer since 1993. Labour Councillor York City from 1986.
[7]. The Times 14th February 1986.
[8]. In 1915, RCA members employed by companies that subsequently became LT were in the Westminster branch. An Underground branch was established in 1917 and in 1922 a branch which later became Chiswick and Acton was formed.
[9]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1982 item 103.
[10]. TSSA Circular 75 19th February 1982.
[11]. Labour Party Annual Conference Report 1982.
[12]. C. Godbold (Marylebone). Joined TSSA 1967. Secretary LT Divisional Council 1984-1988, Treasurer 1979-1981 and since 1988. EC 1981-1984.
[13]. The GLC appointed to the LTE Board a number of its councillors who were later responsible for introducing the LT Equal Opportunities Policy. This was amended as a result of an undertaking given by EC member Chris Godbold at the 1984 TSSA Annual Conference that he would endeavour to have included within the Opportunities Policy the right of all employees to be able to undertake the duties of a post regardless of sexual orientation.
[14]. TUC Annual Report 1983.
[15]. Capital Transport. London-based transport pressure group. Initially financed largely by the GLC. The TSSA affiliated in 1985 and its members have continued to play a leading role in its affairs. Keith Davies, the EC member for LT, has been its chairman since 1992.
[16]. TSSA EC Minutes 21st March 1984.
[17]. TSSA EC P&GP Minutes 26th April 1984.
[18]. Letter from Director BRB Employee Relations 27th October 1987.
[19]. The Times 27th January 1989.
[20]. TSSA written evidence to House of Commons Transport Committee Enquiry into London Bus Deregulation May 1993.
[21]. The Times 29th August 1994.
[22]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1983 item 292. This was not discussed owing to lack of time but the EC later accepted the principle of the motion.
[23]. The Times 12th March 1991.
[24]. LT Annual Report 1991-1992.
[25]. The Times 1st March 1993.
[26]. At the Crossroads: The Future of London's Transport, London Tourist Board 1992.
[27]. Morning Star 27th April 1995.
[28]. The Evening Standard 3rd December 1993.
[29]. TSSA Circular 354 17th November 1992.
[30]. TSSA Circular 334 9th November 1992.
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