"The Railway Bill is driven by ideology and a desire to reduce the amount of money the Exchequer provides for our national railway network. There are no other motives, and certainly none that have anything to do with establishing a better deal for passengers or freight customers."
R. Rosser
General Secretary TSSA, 1993 Annual Conference.
Each year since 1917, when the Association first established its Parliamentary Panel, every branch has had the opportunity of voting for those Labour Party members within the TSSA most suitable to voice its interests within the House of Commons. As we have seen, the contribution made by members of the Association in Parliament has been of great value, but in recent years although a number have been shortlisted for selection by constituency parties, very few have been adopted. Between 1978 and 1994 the TSSA used £1,165,860 from its Political Fund towards Labour Party affiliations at national and regional level, for donations, campaigns and election expenses. In 1978 it affiliated to "Trade Unions for a Labour Victory", and at a meeting held on 25th February 1985 helped to form a new organisation - "Trade Unionists for Labour". The TSSA donated £38,000 to the Labour Party's 1987 Election Campaign, an amount considerably in excess of the pro rata sum which had been suggested. A collection amongst the 272 delegates at the Annual Conference raised a further £536.57. Jim Little, the leader of the Labour Group on Kent County Council and now retired from BR, contested Bexleyheath in 1987 winning 17.8 per cent of the vote, but was defeated by the Conservative and Liberal/SDP candidates.
In 1992 the TSSA spent £115,703 of its Political Fund and donated £23,935 to the Labour Party. It continued to sponsor John Home Robertson and Alan Williams both of whom were returned to Parliament in 1987 and 1992. The Association had two other members contesting the 1992 General Election on behalf of the Labour Party. As with Jim Little in 1987, neither was officially sponsored but they were assisted with expenses. Jonathan Kelly (Manchester South) contested Tatton and Barry Elliott (Southern Management), Bedfordshire South West. These were both Conservative strongholds and despite the fact that they came second, improving the Labour vote substantially, it was the Tory who was elected.
It is probably fair to suggest that when Sealink UK Ltd and the BT Hotels were sold to the private sector, very few railway workers believed that the Government would eventually introduce a Bill to sell the railway industry, for one simple reason - it would be an irresponsible act of folly. Those that came to such a conclusion, including many senior managers, failed to grasp the ideological nature of the Government's economic programme.
On 2nd February 1988 Bert Lyons met Jimmy Knapp and was told that the NUR and ASLEF were embarking upon a Better Rail Campaign which the TSSA was invited to join. The EC agreed to do so, and the unions commissioned National Economic Research Associates to examine six aspects related to passenger service, to assess what improvements needed to be made, and to ascertain the cost and the effect on revenue. The consultants could not find any case for across the board fare reductions although carefully selected discounts did appear to be feasible. They did find widespread public dissatisfaction with the punctuality of services, overcrowding, cleanliness, booking and enquiry services, train frequency and staffing. To bring these services up to a satisfactory standard, it was estimated that 8,800 new permanent jobs and 13,050 new short-term jobs would be required, at a total estimated cost of £37 million, plus a one-off spend of approximately £500 million. With billions of pounds designated for more motorways and trunk roads, it was a small price to be paid. The unions confidently expected that the improvements would result in an increase of passenger revenue, and that a 4 per cent increase in the long term would justify the expenditure.1
The campaign was officially launched at the Charing Cross Hotel, London, on 24th March 1988, when BR's investment record, which had dropped to a figure below that of 1975-1979, was criticised, as was the Government's poor subsidy record which was consistently the lowest of any European country.2 The Better Rail Campaign sought a restoration of the Government grant to the 1982 figure to pay for the improved level of public service, to cover the £137 million operating costs and to make a contribution to the one-off capital spend. The Campaign initially focused all its attention on quality of service and an increase in investment. Later, it concentrated its efforts on opposing the privatisation of the railways, and from 1989 to 1994 the TSSA spent over £144,000 directly sponsoring its activities. Although not all of its objectives were met, the campaign was extremely influential and proved to be one of the most successful promoted by the railway unions.
The first few months were spent influencing "opinion formers" and at the 1988 Labour Party Conference, Richard Rosser supported a resolution backing the Better Rail Campaign. Presentations were made to MPs, local communities and various pressure groups, Transport 2000, the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, Rural Voice (the umbrella organisation of rural and conservation groups), Transport Consultative Committees and also the TUC and Labour Party Conferences. A formal presentation was made to the Railway Council, and leaders of the railway unions met the Secretary of State for Transport to acquaint him with their views.
The public phase of the campaign was launched on 12th December 1988 when railway employees dressed in sardine shaped costumes to reflect travelling conditions handed commuters cards to post to their MPs. The launch attracted the interest of some sections of the media, but while railway workers were promoting their case, news came of a terrible train crash at Clapham Junction, resulting in 35 dead and many injured. As a result it was decided to call off the London campaign until the New Year. When the propaganda war resumed, the BRB complained and told the unions that their members should refrain from distributing Better Rail literature on its premises. This brought further warnings from local managers but it failed to deter the activists who continued to distribute literature in order to keep quality of service high on the public's list of priorities.
A move towards privatisation came in February 1988 when the BRB declared its intention of abandoning the 1956 Machinery of Negotiation and Consultation and replacing it with a two-tier system, whilst still retaining the principle of national negotiations. To justify its position the BRB alleged that the existing procedures were now too slow and cumbersome to meet the requirements of the industry. The TSSA refuted such allegations and said that whatever the weaknesses that did exist within the 1956 Machinery, it had, on balance, served the industry well. The BRB published a wealth of material promoting its new Machinery but the TSSA's 1988 Conference responded by condemning any erosion of the principles established in 1956, and asked the EC to campaign against the Board's proposals.3
Further negotiations failed to dissuade the BRB and matters took a turn for the worse on 1st November 1988. The Board's negotiators not only withdrew their former proposals tabled in February, but also gave twelve months' notice of their resolve to terminate the 1956 Machinery, the 1958 Machinery for P&T staff, the 1972 Machinery for Management, the Railway Shopmen's National Council and the 1960 Machinery of Negotiation for Workshop Supervisors. At the same time they told the trade unions that all future bargaining would be designed to provide a direct link with the employing department, and that any future Machinery would no longer have a national basis but would be allied to five business responsibilities. These were to cover Civil Engineering, Signal and Telecommunication Engineering, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering and Operations and Services. Furthermore, staff employed by self-contained businesses such as Red Star, Railfreight Distribution, InterCity On Board Services and the BR Property Board, would have their own separate negotiations on pay and conditions of service. The industrial and political objectives of the BRB and the Government were now in harmony - to work towards ending trade union negotiations at national level, to reduce the level of pay demands and to make the industry sufficiently profitable to attract the interest of the private sector.
The BRB's unilateral decision to terminate the 1956 Machinery led to a series of joint trade union meetings around the country and these were addressed by the three railway union General Secretaries. Reports from well-attended TSSA meetings told the EC of their wish to retain national negotiations for pay and major conditions of service, to keep negotiating bodies similar to the existing machinery, and to be able to refer to a higher level, matters on which there was a failure to agree. In addition, the members felt that there was a need within any new machinery for trade unions and management to be able to refer major issues of disagreement to non-binding arbitration. These objectives were totally at variance with the current thinking within the Board. The Machinery of Negotiation and Consultation was one of the most important subjects debated by delegates at the 1989 Southport Conference, and, in his new role as General Secretary, Richard Rosser sharply attacked the BRB's proposals. The delegates had little difficulty empathising with his views and whilst there were differing opinions on the best method of dealing with the matter, there was universal condemnation of the Board's intention to terminate the 1956 Machinery. The conference decided that the Board's proposals would be divisive, lead to industrial unrest and, ultimately, worsen the service to the public. Delegates resolved that any new arrangements agreed with the management should be no less effective than the 1956 Machinery, and that any clauses barring industrial action should be removed.4
Negotiations continued, and in December it was agreed that the termination date of the existing machineries would be extended to allow more time for discussions. In the meantime, new organisational changes, based on the foundations of sector management that had taken place between 1982-1984, were coming to fruition. On 5/6th June 1990, thirty-five of BR'S most senior managers met to consider the recommendations of a number of project groups, with the result that a new organisation came into being - "Organising for Quality". Regional management was abandoned and Business Units were introduced based on InterCity, Network SouthEast, Regional Railways, Trainload Freight, Railfreight Distribution, Rail Express Systems, BR Telecommunications Ltd and Central Services. The Business Units were then divided into Profit Centres and passengers suddenly became customers.
The BRB repeatedly emphasised that the prime purpose of "Organising for Quality" was to improve safety standards and the quality of service to passengers, and was definitely not devised to facilitate privatisation. Few were convinced, and when an internal Department of Transport report was leaked to the press referring to the possibility of selling some of the Profit Centres, it merely confirmed suspicions. Steve Coe (Sheffield) made this point at the 1991 Annual Conference and suggested, that like its many predecessors, this organisation was more about cuts, closures and job losses than quality standards. Delegates backed him by indicating their opposition to the privatising "aims" of "Organising for Quality".5
In order to proceed with its new structure the BRB decided to reactivate discussions with the railway trade unions and the CSEU. A working party was established in June 1991 under the auspices of ACAS, to resolve the conflict that existed with the BRB, and at the same time to consider their proposals for a new machinery that would also take into account the Board's new business structure. These proposals were put forward on 3rd December and covered all staff other than Management Grades who were to have their own machinery. The new structure comprised a Railway Joint Council to deal with general pay increases and conditions of service, Business Councils to deal with matters associated with their own specific function, and locally-based Profit Centre Councils. Many of the changes proposed by the Board weakened the bargaining position of employees, including a new proposal that local staff representatives would no longer be required to be members of a trade union, or to be nominated by members of a trade union. In many cases only one local representative would be elected to discuss issues with management, thus placing that individual in a vulnerable position. Nor would it be possible to involve full-time trade union officials or to refer matters to a higher body should there be a failure to agree. The Board withdrew from the existing Machineries of Negotiation and Consultation on 6th April 1992, even though no new negotiating arrangements had been reached; interim bargaining arrangements, geared to "Organising for Quality" were then used to progress negotiations. At the 1992 Conference, delegates complained bitterly at the manner in which some BR managers had conducted the consultation procedures, and it was their opinion that "Organising for Quality" had succeeded in dividing staff, decimating morale and destroying customer confidence.
6
Over twenty national meetings were held to find a solution to the differences that existed over the Board's new Machinery; by this stage railway employees were "punch-drunk" with one reorganisation after another. Agreement was eventually reached that national pay bargaining would continue and only trade unionists would be party to the machinery. Health and safety plus discipline and grievance procedures were finalised, and if there were a failure to come to terms within the Railway Joint Council, either side could propose that conciliation, mediation or arbitration should be applied. Furthermore, time off for trade union duties was granted and no local staff representative would be obliged to negotiate with management on her/his own. As from 1st January 1993, local staff representatives were elected to represent their colleagues, based on business and profit centres, and the TSSA Divisional Officers began the enormous task of training its elected lay members to take up their new roles.
Just after the 1988 Conference, sources within Whitehall let it be known that the Government was considering various ways of privatising BR, but wrangling within the Cabinet over its preferred option brought an embarrassing delay. Attempts were made to play down the disagreement, and it was eventually decided that more time was required and that no decisions would be taken before a General Election. This was good news for the TSSA and the Better Rail Campaign kept up its pressure.
After having unceremoniously cast aside the deeply unpopular Margaret Thatcher in November 1990, the Conservatives now concentrated on trying to save their political fortunes by projecting their new leader, John Major, as the nation's saviour. Uncertain of achieving success at the ballot box, the new Prime Minister decided not to hold an election immiediately, but to hang on until his Party's fortunes were felt to have improved. When Major eventually chose 9th April 1992 to seek a mandate, Labour supporters were optimistic that the Conservative era would be brought to an end. Many railway employees anticipated that the election would terminate the Government's privatisation plans. Others had similar views, and an opinion poll,7 carried out on behalf of the Better Rail Campaign by Market and Opinion Research Ltd, concluded that 60 per cent of the public thought that the Government should retain its ownership of BR and invest more money to improve services, with 26 per cent saying that it should be sold to private operators.8
The Conservative Manifesto submitted proposals that would enable the private sector to run the railway industry by franchising passenger services, reorganising BR's accountancy systems and internal structures, and selling its freight business outright. In contrast, Labour's transport policies remained close to those of the TSSA. The Labour Party's new transport programme Moving Britain into the 1990s had reaffirmed its commitment to co-ordination, but the concept of a National Transport Authority which had been included in the 1982 TUC/Labour Party Transport Policy, had been dropped. This was to be replaced by a National Transport Forum - a co-ordinating group which was to advise the Secretary of State on the nation's overall transport needs, not dissimilar to that proposed in 1976. The Forum was complemented by the Election Manifesto It's time to get Britain working which rejected the Conservative's plans to privatise the railways, promised to set performance targets to improve BR's quality of service, and to transfer more freight from road to rail. For the first time, Labour said that all road, railway, aviation, shipping and inland waterways projects would be judged on the basis of their environmental, social and economic impact; the Government's road programme was to be reviewed and bus deregulation ended.
Having seen the disposal of 46 separate state-owned enterprises since 1979 and with the prospect of its own industry going the same way, the TSSA and the Better Rail Campaign worked hard for a Labour victory. At a press conference on 10th April 1992 the Better Rail Campaign published maps attributed to BR sources, showing the extensive regional line closures and downgrading of services that were expected after privatisation. Regrettably, transport failed to receive the attention it deserved, and even though Labour gained 42 seats, the Conservatives were re-elected with 336 MPs; Labour had 271 and the Liberal Democrats 20. The Government had, against all predictions, achieved an overall majority of 20 which, in the months that followed, proved to be a catastrophe for many sections of society.
This was particularly so for the public transport industry. Railway workers did not have long to wait for news of their fate. When the Queen opened Parliament on 6th May, she proclaimed that legislation would be introduced to enable the private sector to operate rail services.9 Both management and staff were further dismayed when, on 14th July, the Government published its proposals for the railway industry in the White Paper New Opportunities for the Railways. This was received with adverse criticism from transport experts, environmental groups and politicians from every party.
The Government's plan was to sell off non-core businesses outright to the private sector and to offer passenger services to private operators based on a time-limited franchise arrangement, with a Franchising Authority responsible for negotiating and monitoring the contracts. A totally separate organisation, Railtrack, was to operate the railway infrastructure, and a Rail Regulator would ensure that its charges were fair and would arbitrate in the event of a dispute. As evidence of the Government's long-standing plans to privatise the railway industry, the White Paper accepted that the reorganisations that had taken place since 1982 now gave it scope to privatise more of the individual businesses, with the added bonus that the private sector would now have the opportunity of purchasing or leasing railway stations. Railway employees were assured that their travel concessions and conditions of service would be safeguarded when they transferred to their new owners, and that their existing pension arrangements would not be undermined by privatisation. Having noted the experiences of their colleagues as a result of earlier sales this brought little comfort; understandably, there was considerable scepticism at such assurances.
The publication of New Opportunities for the Railways led to the Better Rail Campaign stepping up its activities, and dozens of public meetings took place. After analysing Transport Users' Consultative Committee reports from all over the country, the Better Rail Campaign held a press conference on 23rd September 1992, when Jimmy Knapp and Richard Rosser announced that station staff numbers had fallen from 12,000 in 1988, to 8,000, and with up to 4,000 more station jobs to go, they predicted that only 88 stations would be fully staffed within five years. Richard Rosser also warned of more vandalism, violence and graffiti, with many passengers, particularly women, frightened to wait on their own for trains. To emphasise these points, six axemen made an appearance and impersonated the Secretary of State for Transport by wearing John MacGregor masks. Later they undertook a nationwide tour drawing attention to the danger of railway service cuts.10 Better Rail Campaign packs were issued to every delegate at the 1992 Labour Party Conference, and a fringe meeting, sponsored by the Public Transport Campaign Group and the Better Rail Campaign, was held, with Richard Rosser, Jimmy Knapp and John Prescott, Labour's spokesman on Transport, as the speakers. During the conference the TSSA proposed the main composite on transport; this rejected privatisation and called for a safer, more integrated public transport system. The General Secretary told delegates that he believed that the railway industry should be based on a culture in which safety, not the state of the balance sheet was the first priority.11
At the same time, other pressure groups were expressing their own disquiet. Organised by Transport 2000, "Platform" was launched in September 1992, bringing together the Railway Development Society and 60 organisations embracing cyclists, ramblers and environmental bodies - all in opposition to rail franchising. The TSSA also expressed its opposition to the White Paper in a written submission to the House of Commons Select Committee on Transport on 12th October, and Richard Rosser pursued this verbally in December. Many industrialists were far from enamoured with the contents of the White Paper. The Confederation of British Industry told the Select CQmmittee that it considered privatisation to be ill considered and ill timed
; it condemned the Government's investment record and said that the £15 billion investment shortfall to BR had led to gross inefficiencies which had driven traffic on to the roads at a huge cost to business.12 The Railway Industry Association, whose members supplied engineering and telecommunication equipment to BR, made a similar point, and expressed alarm that up to 15,000 jobs would be put at risk.13
Having received a barrage of criticism over New Opportunities for the Railways Robert Adley14 now Chairman of the Select Committee, wrote to John McGregor, and attempted to have the legislation delayed. His views were rejected, but on 20th January 1993 the Conservative-dominated Committee issued an extremely critical interim report, casting doubts on the White Paper's credibility. Attempts were made by some fellow Conservatives to discredit Adley's views on transport as being unrepresentative; certainly his statement that pig-headed ministers might close their eyes, shut their ears, put their heads down and charge on regardless
15 was hardly the comment of a typical Tory MP. When the Committee published its final report in April, it savaged the Government and warned the House against privatising the railways as the outcome would inevitably mean higher fares and an inferior service. The TUC welcomed the report and called on Conservative MPs to give due regard to its concerns.16
Adley was proved to have been a good judge of character and the Government was not deterred, nor was it influenced by the comments of Sir Bob Reid, Chairman of the BRB, who, during a radio interview on 20th December 1992, had criticised the manner in which the Government proposed to carry out its privatisation programme. Even Lord Ridley, a former Secretary of State for Transport, and the arch exponent of privatisation in Margaret Thatcher's administration, doubted whether any small improvements arising from selling the railway were worth the political and managerial upheaval that would come as the inevitable result. Ridley perceived the railways as a good social service
17; railway workers could easily have added how much better they would have been with an adequate level of investment.
The Railways Bill, with its 132 Clauses and 11 schedules, was published on 22nd January 1993, to be challenged on 2nd February at the inaugural meeting of the "Save Our Railways" campaign. This was held at the Charing Cross Hotel, and its founding members were the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the Better Rail Campaign, Save our System Campaign, ASLEF, TSSA, RMT and Transport 2000. Launched by the actress Susannah York, political support came from Nick Harvey, (Liberal Democrat), Brian Wilson, (Labour), and Robert Adley, who quickly dispelled any views that he was the only serious Conservative critic of the Government's Bill. On the same day a lobby of MPs, Organised by the RMT and TSSA, took place to coincide with the Bill's Second Reading. Alan Williams and Richard Rosser were amongst the many speakers at a rally in the House of Commons Grand Committee Room, but the lobby failed to change minds and the Government carried the day by 33 votes. A further rally and lobby organised by the Save our Railways Campaign, was held in the Central Hall, Westminster on 20th April 1993. This was intended to direct the attention of MPs to the future of the railway network, through-ticketing and timetabling. During the evening entertainment was provided by a galaxy of stars including the singer, Leon Rosselson. Friends of the Earth held a demonstration on 26th June, demanding that "rail not road" should be the Government's first transport priority, but it failed to receive any significant support from trade unionists.
Vic Zaiger,18 the Head of the TSSA'S Negotiating Department was the Association's representative on the "Save our Railways" committee that worked throughout the life of the Railways Bill preparing amendments and compiling briefing papers for distribution to MPs. This committee was composed of representatives from the three main railway unions, the Metropolitan Councils, Transport 2000, the Railway Development Society, and MPs Brian Wilson and Nick Harvey. They met regularly, and during the debating period sometimes worked together for 3-4 days each week discussing the Bill clause by clause and sharing the workload according to the particular expertise of each member. The ASLEF and RMT representatives concentrated on operational issues, such as staff hours of duty, signalling and engineering matters, with Transport 2000 opposing closures of services. Of the hundreds of amendments they submitted to MPs, Vic Zaiger personally contributed 101; these covered health and safety, pensions, through-ticketing, de-staffing of stations and matters associated with the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (1981). Whilst none of their amendments was actually accepted by the Government, the contribution made by the committee was invaluable. Their work, plus the constant pressure of the various campaign groups and lobbyists, played a large part in forcing the Government to introduce 1,000 amendments to its own Bill and to make concessions on a number of important issues.
With the announcement that £450 million had disappeared from the Daily Mirror Pension Fund following the death of its proprietor Robert Maxwell, many within the railway fraternity became aware of the vulnerabilty of the BR Pension Fund in the context of privatisation. At the 1992 TUC the TSSA suggested that pension trustee boards must consist of a majority elected or appointed by members of the scheme, with the ability to make decisions on fund matters independently of the employers. David Horton told Congress that prior to nationalisation pension funds had been used by the companies to invest in the infrastructure, and as a result they had to be bailed out in 1948 as part of the nationalisation process.19
The Government put forward its views on the BR Pension Fund in January 1993 when it issued a consultative document, Railway Pensions After Privatisation - Government Proposals. This gave two options for consideration, neither of which was satisfactory to the Fund's trustees. Alan Williams was also worried about the Government's plans, and volunteered to join the House of Commons Select Committee responsible for dealing with the Railways Bill, clause by clause.
Up to February 1993 the campaign had, to a large extent, been sustained by trade union activists, but following an article by Keith Harper in the Guardian20 which said that the Treasury was seeking access to the £4.25 billion contained in the BR Pension Fund, many others became involved, feeling extremely worried and very angry. Their anxieties were not allayed when, instead of issuing a categoric denial, the Department of Transport merely dismissed the Guardian report as extremely unlikely
21. When the trustees met John MacGregor in February, he was told that his proposals contained in the consultative document would leave pensioners worse off. Alarmed at the Guardian's disclosures, the trustees and the railway unions contacted their members and urged them to write to their MPs. Thousands of letters protesting at any interference with their pension fund poured into the Palace of Westminster, and these were followed by a huge rally and lobby of Parliament by railway pensioners on 23rd March. To avoid a revolt of their own supporters, the Government agreed a Memorandum of Understanding with the BRB and the Pension Fund Trustees on 20th July, that they would revise the Pensions Clause in the Railways Bill. This they reneged on, and during a debate in the House of Lords on 12th October, the Government was heavily criticised by some of its own supporters. Persistent pressure eventually brought a categoric assurance from the Government that BR pension rights would be protected, and an industry-wide pension scheme was agreed by an Order of Parliament in May 1994. As a result, all members of the BR Pension Scheme, along with all its assets, were transferred to a new fund, the Railways Pensions Scheme, on 1st October 1994, with a BR section covering over 95 per cent of its employees and a Pensioners' Section catering for 32,000 people.
The largest rally and lobby of Parliament was organised by the Save Our Railways campaign. This took place on 26th October 1993, by which time Gallup opinion polls were indicating that 71 per cent of the public were opposed to selling the railways. An opinion poll of Tory voters in 53 marginal Conservative constituencies also indicated that 38 Tory MPs would lose their seats if the Government succeeded in privatising BR.22
An amendment to the Government's Bill, which would have enabled BR to bid for franchises, was initiated by the Better Rail Campaign and tabled in the House of Lords by Lord Peyton, the former Conservative Minister for Transport. This brought the first Government defeat on 5th July by 150 votes to 112. When the amendment returned to the Commons, a potential revolt by twelve Tory MPs fizzled out and some of BR's senior managers accused John MacGregor of a confidence trick.23 On 1st November 1993, John Home Robertson told the House that a TSSA survey of BR's most senior managers had concluded that 92 per cent of those that had replied were opposed to rail privatisation as outlined in the Bill; 77 per cent were in favour of BR retaining the ability to bid for franchises; 71 per cent were not in favour of management buyouts, and 85 per cent felt there was a conflict between management buyouts and British Rail bids.24 The Commons voted on 2nd November, by 313 to 283, that all bids for franchises should be at the discretion of the Director of Passenger Rail Franchising (who was appointed under the Act) and rejected a Lords' amendment that BR should have an unrestricted right to bid for franchises. The Railways Bill was enacted on 5th November, but throughout the 200 hours of debate, public criticism and Tory rebellions in both Houses brought substantial improvements, including a guarantee that a range of concessionary fares and Railcards would be preserved.
BR had been well prepared for privatisation but it was always the TSSA's view that "Organising for Quality" would not be the last word in railway organisation - and so it proved. Shortly after "Organising for Quality" had been completed the Government told the BRB to reorganise its business to take account of the privatisation programme, and on 10/11th June 1993 Sir Bob Reid told the trade unions of his plans to restructure the industry. Each of the profit centres that had been established under "Organising for Quality" was now to be placed within its appropriate operating or infrastructure activity and, where appropriate, reorganised. Thus commenced a period of unprecedented upheaval and uncertainty for the industry.
The reorganisation began to take effect from 1st April 1994, (appropriately All Fools' Day), with the objective of selling 51 per cent of railway services by April 1996. BR continued to operate train services and just over 100 self-sustaining business units were formed, with each unit operating as a separate company; instead of having an integrated management structure, business relationships were now determined by a maze of legal agreements and contracts.
Railtrack plc was established as a separate government-owned company, responsible for 23,000 miles of track of which 10,270 were route miles; it had 2,482 stations, 90,000 bridges and 984 tunnels, and was responsible for managing track operations and the overall safety of the network. When its first annual report was issued in September 1995 it reported a turnover of £2.3 billion and had a pre-tax profit of £189 million.
With privatisation in the offing it did not take long for Railtrack's new management team to flex its muscles. In March 1994 the company refused to continue collective bargaining arrangements for Management Grades, although it did put forward proposals for individual grievances and discipline. In May Railtrack decided that as its managers were fully aware of their personal safety responsibilities, there was no need for a formal procedural framework for Health and Safety. Deeply concerned at Railtrack's attitude the TSSA sent a questionnaire to all management members employed by the company, to determine their views. Of the 43 per cent that responded, 92 per cent considered that there should be formal collective bargaining arrangements on conditions of service. As far as pay negotiations were concerned, 78 per cent felt that a formal machinery was required, with the TSSA negotiating on their behalf. The desire for local representation through a formal procedure obtained 88 per cent approval, and 81 per cent felt that arrangements should be made between Railtrack and the TSSA for a machinery incorporating Health and Safety representatives. These views had little effect on Railtrack and the company continued to pursue its agenda to join the private sector.
By the summer of 1994 the industry was thrown into a state of crisis when, in a long running dispute marked by management incompetence and political dogma, the RMT's 4,000 signalling members were forced to take strike action to defend their standard of living. The TSSA told its members to report for duty as usual and not to volunteer to work extended hours arising directly from the dispute, emphasising that they should not undertake any duties which were not included in their job description. As the dispute entered its twelfth week, with further days of action planned for 30th/31st August and 1st September, the BRB, in a co-ordinated plan to defeat the RMT, decided to second to Railtrack any staff who could assist the company. Following the BRB's intervention the TSSA repeated its instructions and advised members not to volunteer for secondment to Railtrack, and said that any pressure exerted by management should be reported to the Association. A year later ASLEF found itself similarly confronting BR and, after a series of one day strikes, protracted negotiations led to an agreement for a shorter working week.
European Passenger Services Ltd, with responsibility for controlling and developing business through the Channel Tunnel, was established in May 1994; and Union Railways Ltd was inaugurated on 1st April 1995 to bring the Channel Tunnel rail link to fruition; both of these were independent Government-owned companies. BRIS, (British Rail Infrastructure Services) with its 14 Service Units, seven design offices and just over 25,000 employees, was created on 1st April 1994, to provide a service and consultancy to Railtrack for maintenance, electrification, equipment and signalling. By 1st April 1995, the Infrastructure Service Units were further reorganised, and six Track Renewal Units and seven Infrastructure Maintenance Units were formed ready for sale. Red Star Parcels Ltd went to a management buyout - Rald Ltd - in September 1995 for the nominal sum of £1; they quickly announced a cut in staff from 452 to 250 as a result of the company franchising its collection and delivery service agents; new 18 month contracts were also introduced - without consultation; these excluded sick pay and travel facilities, and no provision was made for a pension fund. BR's Central Services were split into 24 business units, and BR Telecommunications Ltd, employing nearly 3,000 staff, (the largest, private, non-military telecommunications network in the country) was restructured into four businesses and its assets sold in December 1995 to Racal Network Services Ltd for £133 million. Transmark, with a turnover of nearly £10 million, had already joined the private sector in 1993. Three Rolling Stock Leasing Companies (Eversholt, Angel and Porterbrook) called ROSCOs, were established to lease trains to new passenger Train Operating Companies which were formed from 25 Train Operating Units. These Units had been directly derived from the InterCity, Network southEast and Regional Railway businesses employing, in 1995, approximately 47,000 staff. Whilst they still operated in accordance with the policies of the BRB, they were increasingly managing their operations as separate business enterprises. In November 1995 the three ROSCOs were sold to the private sector for £1.8 billion. Seven months later, amidst outrage at the original sale price, Porterbrook was sold to Stagecoach Holdings plc for £825 million - making a profit of £298 million for its management and staff buy-out team. Following the establishment of the Train Operating Companies, the Franchising Director, Roger Salmon, issued new Passenger Service Requirements for Great Western Trains Ltd, South West Trains Ltd and the London, Tilbury and Southend line (LTS Rail Ltd) on 16th May 1995. Then, on 14th September, Passenger Service Requirements were announced for the second group to be managed by the private sector - InterCity East Coast Ltd, Gatwick Express Ltd, Midland Main Line Ltd and Network South Central Ltd.
As the new service levels varied from 41 per cent on some services to 89 per cent of the current BR timetable, Save Our Railways decided to challenge the legality of the franchise. They argued that the minimum passenger service provided by franchisees should be broadly based on the current BR timetable as instructed by the former Transport Secretary, John MacGregor. On 24th November the High Court granted a judicial review and on the 7th December the Court agreed to consider all the franchises that had been offered. Hopes were dashed on 8th December when Mr. Justice MacPherson dismissed the case put forward by Save Our Railways as, in his opinion, it should not be a matter for the courts but for Parliament. Save Our Railways decided to pursue its case and on 11th December it secured leave to appeal. Four days later Sir Thomas Bingham MR, in giving the Court's judgment, found the Passenger Service Requirement set by the Franchise Director for LTS Rail to be unlawful. However, as Save Our Railways had taken three months between the issue of the Passenger Service Requirements and their legal challenge, this was considered to be detrimental to good administration and the judge declined to stop the franchise proceeding. As Save Our Railways had lodged their notice of application against the second tranche of franchises on 20th October, the Court considered that their application was acceptable and that the Franchising Director had failed to comply with the Secretary of State's ruling thus forcing him to review their levels of services.
Any satisfaction that railway workers gained from this victory was curtailed on 19th December, when it was announced that Stagecoach Holdings plc, the largest bus company in the UK, had been awarded the first franchise. Stagecoach took over South West Trains in February 1996, and in the first year the company received a Government subsidy of £54.7 million, which would reduce to £40.3 million in 2002-3. Possibly the most feared and controversial of the franchisees to date, Stagecoach's reputation was based on its aggressive attitude towards its rivals. Since its establishment in 1985, Stagecoach had forced many of its competitors out of business and had taken over thirty bus companies. It had been referred to the Office of Fair Trading on twenty four occasions, albeit on only two have the cases been upheld. For employees, more ominous were the company's immediate statements that job losses would ensue. Within three weeks the first redundancies were announced and if Stagecoach's record for discarding salaried staff in the bus industry is anything to go by, many members will be grateful for the backing and expertise of the TSSA. When James Sherwood took over interCity East Coast on 29th March he, too, raised the prospect of redundancies, adding for good measure the somewhat bizarre opinion that We have to break the communist approach to running a railway.
25
Despite the Court's ruling that the proposed LTS Rail franchise was unlawful, the Secretary of State announced that it would let the contract go ahead. The franchises for LTS Rail and the Great Western were obtained by management buyout teams on 20th December with both companies warning that staff cuts were very much a part of their strategy. The launch of the new franchises did not go to plan and just before LTS Rail commenced operations an internal audit found discrepancies on the share of money to be allocated between the privatised company and the Underground. This led to the Franchising Director cancelling the agreement that had been made with the LTS buyout group, Enterprise Rail, and an internal enquiry was launched. In April, it was Prism Rail plc (a consortium of directors from four bus companies) that was awarded the fifteen year franchise to manage LTS Rail. Under the terms of the franchise, Prism Rail will receive a subsidy of £29.5 million in the first year falling to £11.4 million in 2010-2011.
Further controversy arose over the sale of BR's three main freight operations - Loadhaul, Mainline Freight and Transrail Freight - (the most efficient and profitable companies of their type in Europe) to the Wisconsin Central Transportation Corporation on 24th February 1996. The American-based company had already purchased BR's mail services and the Royal Train the previous year; critics were not only furious at the price paid, Wisconsin Central's safety record in the USA and New Zealand, along with its anti-union practices gave rise to much concern. Once again threats of redundancies were immediately announced by the new owners. At the end of May, Freightliner was sold to a consortium after the Government agreed to inject £75 million into the company over five years to cover track access charges.
The sale of other sections of the railway industry continued throughout 1996 and the jewel in the Government's crown, Railtrack plc, was set for its flotation on the Stock Exchange in May. Fearing that few would be interested in investing in the company the Government decided to write-down £1 billion of Railtrack's debt and offered the public an additional dividend of £69 million, to be paid later in the year from the £190 million profit earned when it was still in the nationalised sector. Outrageously, it valued Railtrack's entire network and property assets at £1.9 billion, whereas two years earlier it had been estimated that the company was worth £4 billion with some suggestions that its real value was £6.5 billion.
In April 1996 the TSSA revealed that in a secret postal poll of a number of Railtrack Managers, 82.3 per cent of Middle Managers and 51.3 per cent of Senior Managers were opposed to the sale of Railtrack. Asked if the sale should be delayed, 73.4 per cent of all those managers contacted said "Yes", fears of safety standards largely determining their attitude. On 17th April the Labour Party condemned the sale in the House of Commons and in a motion which noted public opposition to the privatisation of the railways, said that the Government had stated, during the passage of the Railways Act (1993), that Railtrack would remain a publicly owned company for the forseeable future; this was defeated by 306 votes to 287. Shortly afterwards the Labour Party called for a Stock Exchange Enquiry into the integrity of the flotation documents, alleging that there had been a deliberate misrepresentation of the true cost of investment and that important information had been concealed from investors. This, too, failed to stop the sale, and with the clear prospect of instant profits there was a flood of applications just before the offer closed.
This had been brought about by the generous terms of the flotation and Labour's new policy towards the railways. Clare Short, Labour's spokesperson for Transport, announced the change on 29th March; she reaffirmed Labour's opposition to the sale of Railtrack and said that a Labour Government would establish a publicly owned and publicly accountable railway by the use of regulation and, dependent on resources, seek to extend public ownership and control over Railtrack. Its method of bringing back Railtrack to the public sector would be by converting any Government investment in the railways into Railtrack shares. The Green Party condemned Labour's decision and called for the renationalisation of Railtrack within the life of one Parliament. The Liberal Democrats said that they would establish a new National Railway Authority which would assume the various responsibilities of Railtrack, the Franchise Director and BR but not of the Regulator who would have extended powers to cover rolling stock leases until there was a fully competitive market in the supply of passenger rolling stock. The Liberal Democrats' desire to see Railtrack plc returned to public ownership has to be balanced against their intention to alter, by legislation if necessary, the scope and specification of rail franchises to achieve wider objectives. They advocate the creation of a small number of regional companies to manage all aspects of service including timetabling, signalling, station operations, and day to day track maintenance. They see such a system as providing a framework to facilitate comparisons of different companies, thus assisting the processes of franchising. Influence and control are their aims, not public ownership of the railway industry.
Labour's reluctance to return the railways to public ownership disappointed the overwhelming majority of the Association's membership. In 1995 the TSSA had played its part at the Labour Party Conference in persuading delegates to carry a resolution calling for the implementation of Labour's commitment to a publicly owned, publicly accountable railway system, and the return of the railways as swiftly as possible to public ownership if they had been sold. Concern that it was moving away from this position had led to a meeting between Clare Short and the TSSA's Executive in March 1996. The exchanges were sharp and she left the meeting in the knowledge that the TSSA was deeply disappointed at what they saw as a retreat from the 1995 Labour Conference decision. When the Labour Party issued its consultation document Consensus for Change in May, it set out a transport strategy that would take it into the next century. It remained committed to integration, providing high quality and reliable public transport, and to negotiations with the rolling stock leasing companies and the train builders in order to encourage high levels of investment in new stock. Consensus for Change called for a new relationship between management and staff; it rejected the concept of profit by cuts in pay and conditions, and undertook to discuss with all interested parties the possibility of staff representation on a new British Railways Board. Labour agreed to abolish the office of Passenger Rail Franchising and to give the powers of the Franchising Director to BR who would supervise the franchises already issued and resume control when their contract expired. It also sought a partnership agreement with the new rail freight companies to encourage more investment in their terminals.
By the time TSSA delegates met at Plymouth in May for its 1996 Conference 58 separate sections of the industry had already been sold, and the flotation of Railtrack was on the immediate horizon. Sharp criticism of Labour's policy statement came from Brenda Hanks in her presidential speech, reflecting the deep disillusion of the membership. Later in the week Clare Short addressed conference as a guest speaker and, in response to a request from the delegates, agreed to answer questions, possibly the first occasion that such an event had taken place. As with all speakers at a TSSA Conference she was warmly and courteously received by the majority of delegates, but neither her address nor her answers resolved their disenchantment. It was only lack of time that prevented an emergency motion, signed by 44 branches, being debated; this expressed dismay at some of the core aspects of her address. Delegates also criticised the Government's Green Paper Transport: The Way Forward. Published on the 25th April, it was the first comprehensive Government transport policy statement since they had taken office in 1979, but conference considered that it would make little contribution to the Government's earlier declared aims of reducing road usage and pollution and promoting greater use of public transport. The Labour Party was also criticised for its weak, inadequate and uninspiring
26 attitude to the Green Paper and delegates went on to instruct the EC to press the Labour Party to take the railways back into public ownership within its first term of office. Growing concern at Labour's new direction also came when delegates decided that "new Labour" was moving away from true socialist values such as creating work and protecting the disadvantaged. Although this was opposed by the EC, the proposal was carried on a card vote by 16,150 to 9,950. Sharply critical though delegates were, they still remained fundamentally committed to the Labour Party. When Mitch Tovey (Euston No.1) asked delegates to change the Association rules to permit payments from the Political Fund to an individual, organisation or political party deemed by the EC to be generally in support of TSSA policies, the motion was decisively defeated by 19,575 votes to 7,025. On the day before conference completed its business, the Railtrack share offer closed; on 20th May, trading began and, after opening at 190p, the share price rose quickly to reach a peak of 229p before closing at 220½p. When the day was over, nine per cent of the 665,000 small investors had sold their shares, making an instant profit of £61 on a minimum investment of £380 for 200 shares.
Since the Conservative Government was elected in 1979, 48 major publicly owned businesses have been sold and approximately 950,000 employees transferred to the private sector, many losing their jobs in the process. The Government has gained approximately £64 billion from the sale of public assets but it has been estimated that nearly £8 billion has been lost through undervaluing their price;27 moreover, no less than £450 million has been paid to consultants, lawyers and accountants during the privatisation of BR.28 £287 million was spent on reorganising and then breaking up the network. £68 million was wasted by setting up the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising and the Rail Regulator, and the overall cost of preparing BR for sale, including redundancies, was estimated by the Labour Party at approximately £1.5 billion. This was money that could have been used to improve safety standards or assist in electrifying the network which, at 3,051 route miles, is far below the level of other Western European nations. Higher than necessary fares were introduced to prepare the way for the new franchisees with further pressure forced to become profitable in its own right.
Public and trade union concerns that safety levels could be placed in jeopardy as a result of privatisation have continued, and warnings of what lies ahead for both traveller and tax-payer came from the Conservative-dominated House of Commons Select Committee on Transport on 19th July 1995. Now under the chairmanship of the former Transport Minister, Paul Channon, it claimed that service levels could well deteriorate and that privatisation would eventually prove to be between £500-£700 million per year more expensive than public ownership. When the Central Rail Users' Consultative Committee issued its 1995 Annual Report later that month it showed that the quality of train travel had declined since the privatisation process began. Its chairman, Major-General Lennox Napier, expressed his strong misgivings and said that he saw the fragmented industry starved of funds, and whilst it was not crumbling, it was fraying at the edges.29 Further criticism of the Government's transport programme came in July, when Friends of the Earth30 said that thousands were killed every year and millions suffered needlessly as a result of our polluted environment, with vehicle and industrial fumes bringing health costs of £14 billion per year. Friends of the Earth placed much of the blame for this on the Government's lack of commitment to public transport. Society has paid a very high price indeed for abandoning Labour's 1947 transport objectives.
The anxieties of railway employees were reflected internationally. Ideologically-driven attempts to reduce the state sector led a number of Governments to introduce various methods of privatising transport, but none had chosen such a disastrous arrangement as that planned for BR. The ITF, which now had 400 transport trade union affiliates in 110 countries, became concerned at this trend and held a conference at Budapest on 24th-25th October 1995 with "The Railways: Structures and Ownership" as its theme. Railway managers and trade unionists from all over the world met to share experiences and the TSSA sent its President, Brenda Hanks, Paul Birch the EC member for Lancs & Cumbria, and Richard Rosser, as delegates. In his speech the General Secretary highlighted many of the problems facing the public as a result of privatisation. His views were reinforced by the Director General of the Swedish Railways, Stig Larsson, who was amazed that John Major's Government had decided to split the infrastructure and operations of Britain's railways. Larsson spoke with authority as a similar arrangement had been in operation in Sweden for seven years and had proved a costly mistake.
Meanwhile, the Government's plans were coming to fruition; the magnitude of the change and its impact on the TSSA was staggering. The Association was now negotiating with 80 undertakings, a number which will increase as privatisation becomes a reality. The railways had, in effect, returned to the anarchic period prior to 1919 when the RCA negotiated its first national agreement with the private companies in order to bring sanity to the industry. This is a lesson that the new franchisees and owners will ignore at their peril. It is also a comfort to know that the expertise of the Association's full-time staff will be equal to this task and the membership is fortunate to have employees who are totally dedicated to their interests.
When the Conservative Government came to power in 1979 the number of people employed by the BRB and its subsidiary companies was 181,971. At the end of 1995 the number dropped to 100,264, a decrease of 9.1 per cent on the previous year even after allowing for the 12,000 employees that had been transferred to Railtrack. The withdrawal of collective bargaining rights by some companies has hindered recruitment and although just under 3,000 people joined the TSSA in 1995, only in Ireland did recruitment actually increase. During the year 10 branches were closed, one of these being John O' Groats that had served the Association for nearly eighty years. A few were reorganised or merged and two new branches came into existence. Amongst the 17,000 people that left the railway industry between 1993-1995 as a result of redundancy, many were experienced TSSA members. They will be greatly missed, but at the same time a new generation of activists are emerging to take up the challenge.
| Year | 1987 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 | 1994 | 1995 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New Members | 2,926 | 2,392 | 3,244 | 4,193 | 4,129 | 3,883 | 4,095 | 4,468 | 2,950 |
| Left Service or Died | 4,730 | 5,706 | 4,174 | 3,245 | 2,732 | 2,716 | 5,224 | 4,191 | 3,182 |
| Lapsed or Withdrawn | 460 | 451 | 410 | 474 | 276 | 332 | 511 | 2,578 | 1,287 |
| Total Members | 43,560 | 39,795 | 38,435 | 38,909 | 40,030 | 40,874 | 39,234 | 36,933 | 35,414 |
In so many ways the values and traditions treasured by members of the TSSA begun under the leadership of John Stopford-Challener and Alexander Walkden, and its membership owes them, and their successors, a great deal. As the TSSA approaches its Centenary its annual conference has retained the exhilarating atmosphere of former years; it remains the pinnacle of the Association's activity and justly deserves to be called its "parliament". Social events still form an invaluable part of conference, with long-standing functions such as the Irish Night, the Scottish Night and the Socialist Fellowship as popular as ever. Lunch-time fringe meetings take up much more leisure time, and then, of course, comes the real business of conference - to determine policies on a wide range of transport, social and political issues. Prominent trade union and political leaders have continued to address conference, and in the past twenty years delegates have met representatives from the Polish trade union Solidarity, and railway trade union leaders from the USSR, USA, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa and many countries within Europe. Since 1989 Labour speakers have included its sponsored Members of Parliament Alan Williams and John Home Robertson; Sean Ryan TD addressed the 1996 Conference. Others include Margaret Beckett, Brian Wilson, John Prescott, Clare Short and Tony Blair. Campbell Christie, the General Secretary of the Scottish TUC, addressed conference in 1993 and John Monks, the TUC General Secretary, the following year.
The TSSA still retains its national bond with the labour and trade union movement and is affiliated to the ITF, the Scottish, Welsh, Irish and British trade union centres and the Irish and British Labour parties. Richard Rosser has been a member of the Labour Party's NEC since 1988, and Sean Kenny of the Irish Labour Party's Administrative Council since 1992. The TSSA has continued to utilise Alan Williams and John Home Robertson at Westminster and it retains its voice in Dáil Éireann through its sponsored Labour members Sean Ryan and Sean Kenny, backed-up by Labour member John Ryan, with Noel Ahern representing Fianna Fáil. Three TSSA members have been selected as prospective Parliamentary Candidates to contest the next General Election. Lawrence Quinn, a member of York P&T branch is to contest Scarborough and Whitby, and Richard Justham, employed by the TSSA in its National Negotiations Department at Walkden House, has the task of removing the "Father of the House" and former Prime Minister, Edward Heath, from his seat at Old Bexley and Sidcup; Jonathan Kelly will again seek to be the Labour MP for Tatton. The TSSA's three Political Committees continue to play an important part in the life of the Association.
At the end of 1995 the Political Fund had a surplus of £14,093 with £88,000 available for campaigning at the next General Election. Its National Treasurer, David Horton, told the 1996 Annual Conference: We will have no shame in proclaiming from the rooftops where that money will be spent ... Labour is the only party which has the ability to reverse the seventeen years of Tory disasters that have culminated in the break-up of our once fine railway industry.
Even though the proportion of members contributing to the Political Fund has dropped from its peak of 99.9 per cent in 1918, it still stands at the high figure of 88 per cent in Britain and 95.4 per cent in Northern Ireland; in the Republic of Ireland, 97.4 per cent pay the political levy. This commitment is not reflected at branch level, and affiliations to Trades Councils and local Labour Parties are proportionately fewer than in former years. In 1996, only 35 of the TSSA's 198 branches were affiliated to 94 Labour Parties, but the most significant change has been the sharp decline in the participation of members in their local co-operative movement. Interest in local government, however, still remains strong, and during recent years several members have been elected as leaders of their communities. In 1995, approximately 30 were known to have been local councillors, three being Liberal Democrats, one Fianna Fáil, one Conservative, and the remainder representing Labour. No fewer than 25 members were Labour Constituency Party secretaries, five were chairmen and two were treasurers.
Political and industrial education still remains important to the TSSA and weekend schools are a feature of Divisional Councils' activities. Members also have the opportunity of attending a variety of industrial relations courses, and the bond between the WEA and the TSSA, begun in 1903, continues. The Association also retains its links with Ruskin College that were established by John Stopford-Challener in 1904. It holds an annual summer school at the college and in 1994 the TSSA, in conjunction with Unity Trust Bank, offered a scholarship at the College. This was won by Steven Citric, a member of the Cardiff branch. Stopford- Challener would, no doubt, have been delighted at the progress made by the continued relationship with Ruskin, but one wonders how he would have reacted when he found out that the Association now had a woman member on its Governing Body and Executive Council who was also the Association's President!
After many years of good housekeeping the TSSA has not been troubled by some of the financial problems faced by other unions over the past decade. In 1994 the Association's recorded total assets were nearly £13.85 million - approximately £375 per member. Compared with the average assets for all trade unions with over 100,000 members (£70 per member), and those below 100,000 members31 (£194 per member), the TSSA is in a relatively healthy financial position. The Association's Central Fund had a balance at the end of 1995 of £5,604,587; its Benevolent Fund, started in the era of Charles Bassett-Vincent and managed so carefully by Thomas Upton and his successors, had £54,445; the Provident Benefit Fund stood at £4,325,747.
Many of the Association's objectives have been met, some have not. The Channel Tunnel is a reality; nationalisation of the railways, first called for by the RCA in 1910, has come and nearly gone. Industrial democracy, with workers on company boards, remains a feature of Irish industry only. The co-ordination and integration of a publicly-owned transport system has still to be attained. Nevertheless, the TSSA's record of improving conditions of service, pay, pensions, safety and all other matters of concern to each individual member, has been exemplary. Today, many take such matters for granted and yet the lesson of history is that nothing is guaranteed and that rights won have to be defended continually. Certainly the fundamental principles that gave birth to the Association in 1897 remain the same and new generations have to be taught the importance of trade unionism.
Despite all the Government's attempts to weaken the trade union movement there are more white collar workers in unions today than ever before and opinion polls show that union objectives remain popular. This goodwill has to be tapped. The TUC, which remains Britain's largest independent voluntary organisation and the second largest trade union body in Europe, was relaunched in 1994 with a campaigning approach and policies designed to take it into the next century. The TSSA is part of this process of renewal and as branches and Divisional Councils make their plans to celebrate the Association's 100th Anniversary at Sheffield in May 1997, they can look back proudly at the advances that have been made, often in the most difficult circumstances. Its duty now is to consolidate and extend the achievements of the past by building its ranks to face the difficulties that lie ahead. In an industry that is being fragmented, the problems that transport workers face in the coming years will be resolved only with the backing of a strong and vibrant trade union. If salaried employees within the transport industry remain willing to defend and pursue their mutual interests collectively, then the future of the TSSA will be ensured.
[1]. The Better Rail Book: published by the Better Rail Campaign.
[2]. In the financial year to 31st March 1994, BR's support from public funds as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product was 18p whereas the average for the Community of European Railways (excluding Britain) was 59p. The Public Support Obligation per supported passenger mile fell from 5.78p in 1985/86 to 3.41p in 1993/94.
[3]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1988 item 77.
[4]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1989 item 26.
[5]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1991 item 101.
[6]. TSSA Annual Conference Minutes 1992 items 96, 97, 98.
[7]. In contrast to the March 1992 MORI Poll, a 1948 Gallup Poll concluded that 33 per cent thought that nationalisation of the transport industry would be successful, 29 per cent a failure and 7 per cent thought it would have no effect.
[8]. TSSA Circular 107 1992 Annual Conference Report.
[9]. The Times 7th May 1992.
[10]. Morning Star 24th September 1992.
[11]. Labour Party Annual Conference Minutes 1992.
[12]. The Times 17th December 1992.
[13]. The Times 26th January 1993.
[14]. Robert Adley MP supported a publicly owned transport industry and, as far as his views on transport were concerned, he was respected within the TSSA. When he died on 13th May 1993, an Emergency Motion regretting his death and extending condolences to his family was carried at the TSSA Annual Conference.
[15]. The Times 21st January 1993.
[16]. TUC Annual Report 1993.
[17]. The Times 30th December 1992.
[18]. V. Zaiger (Central and Head Office). Joined the TSSA in 1971 and its full-time staff in 1978. In 1987 he became Personal Assistant to the General Secretary; Organising Officer in 1988, and in 1990 Head of the National Negotiating Department. Member of the Labour Party; Director Transport 2000; Member Save our Railways Campaign Committee and Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety. He also sat on the Management Committee of the Public Transport Campaign Group and the Public Transport Information Unit.
[19]. TUC Annual Report 1992.
[20]. The Guardian 8th February 1993.
[21]. The Times 8th February 1993.
[22]. TSSA Circular 293 8th June 1993.
[23]. The Times 29th October 1993.
[24]. House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 1st November 1993 Vol. 231 Col. 58.
[25]. Morning Star 30th March 1996.
[26]. TSSA Annual Conference 1996 Emergency Resolution on Transport Green Paper.
[27]. Observer 3rd September 1995.
[28]. Independent on Sunday 4th August 1996.
[29]. Daily Telegraph 1st August 1995.
[30]. Prescription for Change, Friends of the Earth.
[31]. Certification Officer's Annual Report 1995.
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