REVIEW OF CONTACT MANAGEMENT

COUNTER PROPOSAL ON BEHALF OF CRC STAFF

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SUPPORTED BY TSSA
1. Summary of Events

1.1. A review of Contact Management has been conducted by a Project Management team that consists of Simon Graham and Brian Gosden. This review was conducted in order to better support:

- The 20:20:10 strategic aims of the Force and BTPA
- The new ways of working borne out of the force wide transformation programme
- The benefits derived from the Accelerated Information Strategy
- The Chief Constables narrative and vision for the future
- The “first fix” philosophy of service delivery

1.1 The proposal recommends many changes to Contact Handling Departments throughout British Transport Police (BTP), but most significantly, proposes the closure of the Crime Recording Centre (CRC) based in Cardiff and relocating its work to the First Contact Centre (FCC) in Birmingham.

1.2 This counter proposal will show that the decision to close the CRC in Cardiff has been ill advised and will create unnecessary risk to BTP, as well as damaging the strategic aims of 20:20:10 and being in contravention to the Chief Constables vision for the future.

2. Dispute with Original Business Case

2.1 CRC staff were invited to a presentation of the original business case on the 15th of October 2014. During this meeting, employees were informed of the decision to close the CRC in Cardiff and move its operations to an enhanced FCC in Birmingham.

2.2 CRC staff are in agreement that the business case and presentation severely misrepresented the vital work that they do. The decision to close the Cardiff office was made without considering the significant impact that losing over 30 staff with extensive knowledge of Crime Recording, Home Office Counting Rules, Scottish Crime Recording Standards and the National Standard of Incident Recording will have on BTP as a whole.

2.3 It is the CPWG’s argument that the business case does not take into account the vital work completed by the CRC staff that helps BTP achieve its targets and has almost no mention of the high volume of work that comes into the department from mediums other than telephony. The business proposal also fails to investigate the potential of bringing CRC back to its fully functional staffing level and the overall benefits that this would bring back to the force both now and in the future.
2.4 In summary, the following points have become apparent following the initial Business Case

- The vital role that the CRC has in achieving BTP’s core targets has not been acknowledged or evidenced in the review
- The option to keep the Cardiff office running with its experienced staff, has not been investigated fully, nor how the staff can contribute to the evolving future of crime recording in BTP

3. The importance of crime data integrity

3.1 During the course of 2014, and under approval by the Home Secretary, HMIC carried out an inspection into the way the 43 police forces in England and Wales record crime data. This inspection, carried out between February and August 2014, is the most extensive of its kind that HMIC has ever undertaken into crime data integrity. The Inspection aimed to establish:

- How confident the public can be in the accuracy of national police-recorded crime data;
- How effective police leaders are in overseeing and providing governance to secure crime data integrity in each force;
- How effectively victims are considered when crime-recording decisions are taken in each force;
- Whether the disposals of crimes (for instance, cautions, restorative justice, cannabis warnings) suit the needs of victims, offenders, the criminal justice system and the wider public interest in each force; and
- Whether decisions in each force to declassify a recorded crime (commonly called a ‘no-crime’ or ‘no-criming’) adhere to the NCRS.

3.2 The final national HMIC report was released late November but during the last six months, reports on the crime data of individual Forces have been published during the 6 months of inspections. The full report on BTP crime data is also expected shortly, but the headline findings have already been briefed out:

- 95% of incidents that should have been raised as a crime had been
- 98% of crimes recorded had been correctly classified
- 98% of crimes recorded had been done so within the 72 hour target

It is more than likely that BTP has one of the very best records on crime data integrity currently in any Force, a credit to all those who work hard in this area and BTP should be proud of its achievements. The CRC in Cardiff is central to the standards achieved – as the CRC staff have become BTP’s specialists in crime recording.

3.3 Following some of the individual inspections, various Forces are battling to maintain their reputations because of the problems highlighted with their data. Many have had to review and improve their processes. In particular the level of knowledge and experience of HOOCR, SCRS and NCRS, and need to improve training, has been highlighted many times. Where there has been a dedicated Crime Recording function, this has often been reported as a strength.
3.4 The early HMIC reports indicate a lack of Home Office Counting Rules expertise as a particular difficulty where One Stop Shops operate within the context of other decentralised crime recording – on-line / direct Police Officer input / small hubs.

3.5 The Initial Business Case provides four Forces as ‘current best practice case studies’ p.8. Two individual HMIC inspections have been published of these Forces so far and both were critical: Cheshire and West Yorks.

3.6 Recent figures from the HMIC Crime Data Integrity inspection into Cheshire Police show the following results:

- 56% of incidents that should have been raised as a crime had been
- 93% of crimes recorded had been correctly classified
- 69% of crimes recorded had been done so within the 72 hour target

They operated a “One Stop Shop” for 22% of crime recording, which is not that comparable. The CM Business case does not mention the inspection but reports that performance is ‘good’. It omits to say that Cheshire is returning to a more centralised system where dedicated staff will be recording crime.

3.7 West Yorkshire Police were also cited by CM Management as a best practice example. HMIC examined 260 incident records and found that 221 crimes should have been recorded. Of the 221 crimes that should have been recorded, 150 were. Of the 150, 11 were wrongly classified and 5 were recorded outside the 72-hour limit allowed under the HOCR. The force has a centralised customer contact centre that have a supplementary role in recording some crime reports (13%). It is difficult to understand why this can be cited as best practice, or why it is relevant apart from as a cautionary tale.

3.8 South Wales Police was also used as a best practice case study. The recently released HMIC report praises SWP for its victim based approach and for recording at the first point of contact. However, there have been significant issues raised within the report regarding an excessive amount of “No Crimes” being raised, along with a lack of expert HOCR knowledge in the Public Service Centre. Prior to the new way of crime recording in South Wales, there were 156 no crime decisions in July 2013. In July 2014 this increased by 386 percent to 758 no crime decisions. This was described as “Excessive” by the HMIC and has led to an increased workload for the FCR in SWP. HMIC have also recommended that SWP increase the training and experience of staff in HOCR so that it adequately reflects demand and the need to deliver accurate and effective crime recording.

3.9 Where Crime recording functions have been co-located or even absorbed into a One Stop Shop, the Business Case suggests that decisions have been taken irrespective of geography. Because those relocations were within the same county (and country), it is unlikely that the Forces had to consider losing an entire team of specialists and a wholesale loss of skills.

3.10 There are three key standards with which Police Forces need to comply: the Home Office Counting Rules, the Scottish Crime Recording Standards and the National Crime Recording Standards.

3.11 Section 4 of NCRS states:
4.3.3: *Responsibility for recording crime should be placed in the hands of a dedicated and highly trained group of staff such as is common in dedicated Crime Recording/ Crime Management Units, whether centrally or locally based.*

This is to ensure a level of expertise in the practice of crime recording given the acknowledged complexity of the subject which is not thoroughly understood by operational Police Officers. Otherwise there would be no need for dedicated staff or highly trained staff.

The CM Management’s consultation document does not indicate how BTP could comply with this in the future.

4. What is the CRC and National Crime Recording Standards?

4.1 The CRC currently undertake the majority of crime recording for BTP, recording all types of crime types from minor railway offences to violence against the person. Reports are received into CRC in a variety of ways:

- Crime reports via the telephone from both Officers and members of the public
- NSPIS logs which require a crime to be raised
- Email transfers from Home Office forces
- Out of hours pro forma’s from BTP Police Officers
- CRIS reports from the Metropolitan Police

All of the crimes must be created in accordance with the Home Office Counting Rules, National Crime Recording Standards and the Scottish Crime Recording Standards. Due to the cross-border nature of British Transport Police, CRC are a unique department within any police force in the UK in their working knowledge and regular application of the dual English & Welsh and Scottish recording standards. BTP is the only known Police Force who records crimes across three countries.

4.2 CRC have a wealth of knowledge in various areas of Police work. Their specialist skills and expertise in Crime Recording have been gained following the initial introduction of the CRC eight years ago. This table highlights the critical difference in the training programme that is received by CRC staff in comparison to FCC staff.
### Specialist Skills and Knowledge in Crime Recording

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skill Area</th>
<th>CRC TRAINED</th>
<th>FCC TRAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Office Counting Rules</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Crime Recording Standards</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Standard of Incident Recording</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Law and Crime Recording Standards</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP Bail Principles and Authority Requirement</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of Police Information (MOPI) Guidelines</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable / Intimidated / Repeat Victim Triggers on Crime</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>PARTIAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC Warning Signal Guidelines and Procedures</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forensic Awareness in Relation to Crime</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPIS Command and Control</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating and Maintaining PE / AW Records and Clearing Detection Matrix</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action Fraud Process and Updating</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*FCC operators have partial training in the stated fields as they have completed NCALT training packages upon induction to the force. However, to gain an enhanced level of knowledge, there is a requirement to perform the tasks on a daily basis and be further trained on the intricate details of each set of guidelines. The knowledge gained by the CRC in these areas has been built up over the last eight years to a high level.

4.3 “NCRS was originally proposed by the Association of Chief Police Officers after a highly critical review of 8 forces’ Crime recording procedures by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary that found a recording rate that varied between 55 and 82% across the forces. NCRS has twin aims of being victim focused and maintaining consistency of recording across all forces.”

4.4 The results achieved by BTP are a direct result of utilising the skills of highly trained, highly skilled Crime Recording Operators in the Cardiff CRC. These employees have built up a wealth of knowledge of Crime Recording Standards since the CRC opened.

4.5 The CRC creates Arrest Summons (AS) reference numbers onto the PNC for recordable offences. This helps BTP achieve the national target of creating all AS reference’s within the stipulated 24 hour period from the time of arrest. CRC were tasked to do this following very poor PNC audits some time ago. CRC staff now possess the expertise to differentiate between recordable and non-recordable offences and create accordingly in line with national guidelines.

4.6 FCC currently creates AS reference numbers out of office hours for officers over the phone. Unfortunately due to a lack of training given to FCC staff in PNC
recordable / non recordable guidelines, this can result in some AS references being created on incorrect person records or the wrong offence codes being used. This places the force at great risk as if the offence is placed on a wrong person’s record and that nominal applies for a role that requires a CRB / DBS check, then the nominal could be adversely affected by the wrong information being disclosed.

4.7 The table below shows examples of common errors when inputting onto the CRIME and PNC systems outside of the CRC, the potential risks, along with how they were rectified by CRC staff. This data shows the importance of accuracy when inputting data onto these systems and also displays how easily mistakes can be made by an operator with too many tasks to complete.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SYSTEM</th>
<th>ERROR</th>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>RESOLUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>NON RECORDABLE OFFENCE ADDED TO A NEWLY CREATED RECORD, AS WELL AS INcorrect NAME AND OFFENCE CODE ADDED. FINGERPRINTS THEN CONFIRMED</td>
<td>CRIMINAL RECORD CAN NOT BE JUSTIFIED BY BTP, FINGERPRINTS INCORRECTLY HELD, BTP LEFT OPEN TO LITIGATION</td>
<td>IDENTIFIED BY CRC SUPERVISOR FOLLOWING LOG CLOSURE. FCC AND PNC BUREAU CONTACTED IN ORDER TO REMOVE RECORD AS MATTER OF URGENCY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME</td>
<td>NAME AND CONTACT NUMBER OF VICTIM ENTERED INTO THE MODUS OPERANDI FIELD</td>
<td>INFORMATION DISCLOSABLE IN COURT AND PERSONAL DETAILS COULD EASILY BE COMPROMISED. PERSONAL DATA SHOULD NEVER BE ENTERED INTO THIS FIELD</td>
<td>FOUND WHEN CRC OPERATOR WAS UPDATING FURTHER INFO ONTO CRIME REPORT. DATA CAN NOT BE REMOVED DUE TO SYSTEM CAPABILITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNC</td>
<td>NON RECORDABLE OFFENCES ADDED TO PNC AND CRIMINAL RECORDS CREATED FOR TWO OFFENDERS.</td>
<td>IF NOT FOUND, THEN TWO NOMINALS WOULD HAVE PNC RECORDS WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION, LEAVING BTP OPEN TO LITIGATION DUE TO BREACHES OF DATA PROTECTION ACT</td>
<td>CRC SUPERVISOR ADVISED FCC OPERATOR ON IMPORTANCE OF CONTACTING PNC BUREAU IN ORDER TO HAVE THE RECORDS REMOVED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME</td>
<td>INCORRECT OFFENCE DATES USED DURING CRIME INPUT</td>
<td>CCTV INVESTIGATIONS WOULD BE FRUSTRATED AS CCTV OPERATORS WOULD BE LOOKING AT WRONG DATE</td>
<td>AMMENDED BY CRC AND FCC STAFF FURTHER ADVISED ON IMPORTANCE OF CORRECT INFORMATION BEING INPUTTED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIME</td>
<td>DUPLICATE CRIMES RAISED FOR SAME OFFENCE DUE TO CRIME REFERENCE NOT BEING INPUTTED INTO NSPS LOG FOLLOWING ORIGINAL CRIME CREATION</td>
<td>INCORRECT CRIME REFERENCES COULD BE GIVEN TO VICTIM AND ONE CRIME ALSO NEEDS TO BE “NO CRIMED”</td>
<td>IDENTIFIED BY CRC SUPERVISOR WHO LINKED DUPLICATE CRIMES AND SUBMITTED DUPLICATE TO AUDIT TO BE “NO CRIMED”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CRC staff use their expert knowledge of PNC to identify when these mistakes have been made and have the skills to correct them accordingly, thus lessening the risk for the force.

4.8 Each AS reference then requires a Source Input Document (SID) to be created and then sent to an officer for updating. This is then returned to the CRC who input the details onto the PNC. The SID contains all relevant information in relation to the offence committed, nominal details and the offence disposal. This requires a national minimum standard of accuracy of 95% which has been consistently met by CRC since its inception. CRC receive several calls on a daily basis from officers with SID queries due to their knowledge and understanding of the SID system. These queries are answered swiftly and efficiently at first contact.

4.9 The target for PNC Input Accuracy is 90% and is measured by the CRC supervisors conducting monthly audits on 10% of all SID’s inputted each month. The chart below shows the audit data from September 2013 to September 2014 and displays the accuracy achieved by the CRC operators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>SIDS ARCHIVED BY CRC</th>
<th>NUMBER WITH ERRORS</th>
<th>ACCURACY RATE (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>3561</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>92.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCTOBER</td>
<td>3178</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>88.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER</td>
<td>2877</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>90.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECEMBER</td>
<td>2757</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>90.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANUARY</td>
<td>2698</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>91.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEBRUARY</td>
<td>2798</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>88.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCH</td>
<td>2687</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>92.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRIL</td>
<td>3368</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>92.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY</td>
<td>2423</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td>2504</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>93.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY</td>
<td>2573</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>91.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST</td>
<td>3011</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>95.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER</td>
<td>1698</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>89.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.10 CRC create and update all Person and Arrest Wanted (PE/AW) records onto the CRIME system and clear the outcome matrix on the system. This must occur on all crimes on which an offender is linked and enables the detection of
crime to be attributed to the correct officer. This is vital to senior officers as it allows real time detection rates to be displayed.

4.11 Amendments to bail dates and conditions are also undertaken by CRC. Police Officers contact the CRC via telephone or SID to advise them of amendments which are then made to the CRIME system and PNC. The expertise of the CRC operators has ensured that BTP complies with the ACPO Bail Principles and ensures that Bail Management procedures have been adhered to by having rebails authorised by the correct rank of supervising officers. It also enables the PNC and CRIME system to have accurate and relevant information stored on it, which in turn gives confidence to front line officers who may stop / check an offender being dealt with by BTP.

4.12 Following the introduction of Virtual Working, CRC have answered calls from members of the public, rail staff, outside agencies and other home office police forces in order to assist the FCC. All staff underwent minimal training on the system and spent a week being assisted by a Tutor. Through hard work and dedication to the role, they are now able to create NSPIS Command and Control logs in accordance with the National Standards of Incident Recording. CRC staff are also proficient in identifying the correct grade for the incident such as Immediate, Priority, Scheduled and Non Attendance and pass the log for the appropriate action or dispatch. CRC have provided vital assistance to the FCC during major events such as the 2012 Olympic Games and 2014 Commonwealth Games by taking these calls and has helped to improve the FCC’s overall level of service to members of the public.

4.13 In taking FCC calls, CRC are currently providing a “One Stop Shop” service to victims of crime. When a call is taken in CRC from a victim of crime, staff are able to use the initial details to create an NSPIS log and also create a detailed crime report from the victim’s information at the first point of contact. This results in the victim obtaining a crime reference number at the earliest opportunity and allows the crime to be passed to an officer for investigation.

4.14 Due to the specialist knowledge the CRC operators and supervisors possess, they are often called upon to answer complex and detailed questions in regards to a wide array of subjects including crime recording, PNC updating and offence disposals. The CRC has built up a reputation as an excellent source of information for officers throughout BTP and its staff are often praised for the expert advice and guidance it offers them.

4.15 CRC staff are also called upon to amend any erroneous data that is held on force systems. This can range from updating the PNC and CRIME systems so that it meets Management of Police Information (MOPI) requirements, to amending business sector codes on CRIME so that the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) have accurate data on which to base their charging data to Train Operating Companies (TOC’s) and Network Rail. Staff are empowered to liaise with other departments throughout BTP to ensure that the correct data is recorded in a timely and accurate manner in accordance with national guidelines and force policy.

4.16 The data held on the CRIME and Command and Control systems is used by the BTPA to accurately charge TOC’s and Network Rail as part of the Annual Charging Model. The following information taken from an HMIC report into funding challenges faced by BTP explains the charging model in further detail:
“BTPA is funded via the ‘user pays’ principle; as such each train operating company (TOC), freight company and Network Rail enter a police service agreement (PSA) with the authority which sets out the level of policing resource that will be provided. The charges paid by each are calculated through a charging model on an annual basis and draws on a number of information sources including crime, incident and resource data. “

4.17 Through the accurate recording of crime and incident data in the CRC, the BTPA is able to operate its charging model with accuracy and integrity, maximising the opportunities for funding and offering value for money to the customer. The BTPA Charging Consultant liaises with CRC throughout the year to ensure that all data is correctly recorded in relation to business sectors and offence locations. This relationship helps increase understanding of working practices on both sides and results in excellent quality data being achieved.

4.18 CRC liaise directly with the Victim Support agency and Victim Care Managers to help them identify victims in need of their services. This is especially important following incidents of domestic abuse or a sexual nature, as the force has an obligation to record if consent has been obtained from the victim to be contacted by Victim Support. In addition, the CRC also send Victim Letters to victims of crime on a daily basis so that the victim is kept up to date with the investigation and has the correct telephone number for their local Crime Management Unit (CMU)

4.19 There is a substantial risk to public confidence should victim support contact a victim of domestic or sexual abuse who does not want further interaction with the police or outside agencies. The victim would have made the difficult choice to no longer pursue an allegation and if he/ she has unsolicited contact from Victim Support or the Police again, then this could result in the victim feeling that their wishes have been ignored. There is also potential for it to lead to a domestic situation being antagonised further and could result in further offences being committed as a direct result of this unwanted police contact.

4.20 Details of the volume of work undertaken in CRC are shown in the following tables.
4.21 The above information shows that the CRC is already a multi-functional department which contains Omni-competent staff with a wealth of knowledge. The CRC is a vital part of BTP and has consistently enabled the force to achieve targets desired by the Home Office and has enabled TOC’s and Network Rail to have confidence in the data provided to them by BTP. When fully staffed and supported sufficiently by senior management, the CRC has thrived and improved on the service it delivers to both the force and members of the public.
4.22 The FCC call handler job is a different role to the CRC operator which is primarily a crime recording role. The primary call handler job demand is for a breadth of knowledge of the organisation, dealing with volumes of calls at pace. The crime recording job demand is for an in-depth knowledge of the rules and established good practice on crime recording. The two roles can support each other to provide resilience and cover during peak times but are distinct.

4.23 For FCC to be able to handle all crime types plus CRC’s other work, a prolonged training period would need to be undertaken. Given the difference in the demand of the jobs, staff shortages, and high turnover of staff within the FCC it is unlikely that training and development would be facilitated so the specialism would not be achieved. The Force Crime Registrar who is responsible for the training in crime recording has already indicated that his team do not have the capacity to train a new team.

5. Supporting BTP

5.1 In addition to receiving crime reports via the telephone from members of the public, the main part of the CRC work is to receive crime reports from Police, NSPIS logs which require a crime to be raised, Email transfers from Home Office forces; Out of hours pro forma’s from BTP Police Officers and CRIS reports from the Metropolitan Police.

5.2 There has been no recognition of the CRC’s invaluable effective service to Police Officers which frees up Officers to complete their reports and get on with operational duties.

5.3 The CRC provides effective and timely assistance and advice to officers throughout BTP. Officers are aware that CRC staff can be called upon to answer a wide range of queries on matters including Home Office Counting Rules and SID input and update, as well as resolving disputes regarding BTP jurisdiction. The CRC has become a vital source of information and is renowned throughout the force for giving accurate and up to date advice.

5.4 This knowledge and guidance has been especially prominent when new force initiatives or targets have been introduced. The CRC continues to support these projects in the following ways –
**Operation Guardian**
CRC Staff identified all Sexual Offences and added a force “Tag” to the crime report to notify the Op Guardian Team which assisted a more efficient investigation.

**Operation Magnum**
CRC used their specialist knowledge of crime to request integral information from the victims to enable a real time investigation to begin. This information included victim description, direction of travel, IMEI numbers and precise location of incident. This has led to an amount of double keying which can be easily streamlined and eliminated without effecting operational effectiveness.

**Bail Management Principles Project**
Challenging officers to ensure that correct authorising officer had been consulted prior to bail being extended. Ensuring that Bail dates and conditions had been accurately recorded onto the PNC in a timely manner from the SID document.

**Operation Leopard**
Identify metal and cable theft, adding “Tags” to the crime reports to assist in the Op Leopard team receiving the crime report at the earliest opportunity. Identifying the description of metal stolen to assist in identifying crime trends and

**BTPA Annual Charging**
Supervisors liaise with BTPA Charges model Consultant and amend Business Sectors and incident locations so that the data can be used for BTPA Charging Model.

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5.5 The BTP Supervisor email inbox receives a large quantity of requests for assistance every day. These requests are from a variety of mediums such as Crime Management Units, Senior Managers and Home Office Police Forces. The requests have to be dealt with promptly as they are often time sensitive.

5.6 Offender management are currently producing sophisticated data reports which are very able to be amended to meet varying needs that are presented. We are currently able to clearly identify the situation with offenders released on bail and what the contemporary status of each “Crime” Record is, allowing for SID updates being held in a queue for update by CRC. This level of detail enables us to focus in on poor performing locations or individuals to improve performance. This approach has resulted in a 52% drop in the last week alone in expired bails that have not been updated.

5.7 This level of focus may not yet have been reached were it not for the engagement of CRC. The CRC engagement rest at two levels; some is with the specialist expert knowledge of Crime/SID residing in individuals which is not obviously available elsewhere and some rests within the challenge processes that exist within CRC when updating the systems. Unless this expertise is effectively transferred to the department that will replace CRC there is a significant risk that Offender Management will not be able to effectively manage data around offenders.

Specifically:
• CRC currently challenges officer who for example submit SID documents that indicate a re-bail of an offender that has not been authorised by the appropriate rank. Whilst I do not believe it should be their role to refuse to accept such an update (since 1. it will delay the data input and 2. mask non-compliance with bail principles since the record will only be accepted when the documentation shows correct authorisation after the event), their intervention does provide a reminder of the policy. Once the responsibility moves away from CRC, offender management can continue to identify wrongly authorised bails but the instant reminder provided by CRC will need to be maintained

• CRC currently accepts phone call from officers where bail dates have been missed and the officer has put steps in place to locate the offender. The arrest status is changed from ARB to FTA. This needs to be completed before the end of the tour of duty on which the bail was missed so the successor to CRC will need to have systems in place to achieve this contemporary update.

• Historically it was reported that BTP could not report on post-charge bail to court. This was in fact found to be false when the expertise of individuals in relation to SIDs etc. at CRC was exploited. The force is now developing its ability to tie-in charge and anticipated pleas for Transforming Summary Justice (TSJ). This development is critically dependent upon correct data and knowledge of data sets at CRC.

6. Virtual Working – Impact and Performance

6.1 Virtualisation between FCC and CRC was introduced in 2013. As stated in the original business case, the driver for virtualisation was the introduction for recording crime at the first point of contact, in turn improving the victims experience during police contact.

6.2 The training for this involved all CRC staff becoming proficient in handling calls from non-emergency lines and creating NSPIS logs. This encompassed CRC staff becoming trained and proficient in taking any and all types of FCC call.

6.3 FCC staff were required to learn how to create four crime types of volume crime – Theft from Person, Theft of Pedal Cycle, Theft Personal Property and Theft of Luggage. FCC staff are also trained to create AS reference numbers out of hours whilst the CRC is closed between 0100 and 0700 hours each day.

The business proposal states that:

“The sharing of roles has necessitated FCC staff being fully trained in the recording of volume crime and as such already shares common skills and job description with CRC staff”

Unfortunately, this statement is significantly misleading. The FCC have only been trained currently on 4 crime types.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRIME CATEGORIES</th>
<th>CRC TRAINED</th>
<th>FCC TRAINED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE AGAINST THE PERSON</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEXUAL OFFENCES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBBERY</td>
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<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURGLARY</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VEHICLE OFFENCES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEFT</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>ONLY TPP, THEFT OF CYCLE, THEFT OF LUGGAGE, THEFT FROM PERSON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARSON AND CRIMINAL DAMAGE</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUG OFFENCES</td>
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<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC ORDER OFFENCES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSSESSION OF WEAPONS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISCELLANEOUS CRIMES AGAINST SOCIETY</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAUD</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAILWAY BYELAWS</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 This is from a list of over 400 crime types. FCC have been inputting these specific volume crimes since the introduction of virtual working which admittedly has reduced the amount of victims that have been “Double handled.” However, a large quantity of theft reports are still handled by CRC. These arrive into CRC in a number of ways:

- Telephone call direct from victim
- Telephone call from investigating officer
- Email transfer from Home Office force
- CRIS report from the Metropolitan Police
- NSPIS log created and sent through to the CRC1 queue for a crime to be recorded
- Creating crimes that have been reported from social media, often calling the victim back to confirm details of the incident

In comparison, the FCC will only create crime reports when the speaking to the victim directly on the phone.

6.5 Whilst it is agreed that the Virtual Working programme has shown that certain crime types can be recorded at the first point of contact, CRC staff maintain that this has always been the case, even prior to virtualisation. The AVAYA system could be utilised to place all TPP calls thorough to CRC when the options are selected on the automated system by the victim. For all other crime types such as public order or vehicle crime, where there is no requirement for a Police Officer to be despatched immediately, the FCC will create the initial NSPIS log and add a crime pro forma before passing the victim through to the CRC where a crime report will be created. Although this is a single transfer to CRC, it does enable full crime details to be taken from the victim by fully trained crime recorders during the first phone call that the victim makes to BTP.
6.6 There are only three, (easily rectified) reasons why the above model of working appears to fail. Firstly, when completing the original NSPIS log, FCC staff’s natural inclination is to take far more information than is necessary which is then double checked/ duplicated at the CRC and is a pointless exercise which lengthens the amount of time the victim spends on the first contact to BTP. Secondly, when passing through a victim to CRC, FCC staff would sometimes struggle to connect to a CRC operator at peak times due to the reduced staffing levels in CRC. Finally, when operators at either centre record TPP directly from the victim they are obliged to complete a “Theft of Property” proforma on NSPIS, the majority of which is redundant effort as it duplicated in a different format from the Crime Report and requires unnecessary double keying by a single operator.

6.7 Unfortunately, as shown by the attached statistics on the graphs below, this has only occurred since Olympic Games training in 2012 which created low operator numbers who were able to perform day to day CRC functions whilst colleagues were being trained on FCC lines. This then continued following the introduction of virtual working and following management’s decision to halt recruitment in the CRC for telephone operators. Quite simply, by streamlining the information on NSPIS proforma’s and increasing the CRC back to a manageable staffing level, the CRC could have dealt with more crime reports at the initial contact stage. This would have lead to an increase in public satisfaction and would have allowed the fully trained crime recording specialists to create detailed crime reports, as well as allowing specialist FCC operators handle calls from members of the public.
### Sept 2010 to Nov 2012

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>Amber</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
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#### FCC-CRC transfer GOS by month Before Virtual Working
![Pie chart showing the distribution of GOS by color before virtual working.]

### December 2012 to Sept 2014

<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amber</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FCC-CRC transfer GOS by month After Virtual Working
![Pie chart showing the distribution of GOS by color after virtual working.]

17
6.8 These statistics show that since the inception of virtualisation, the service that has been delivered to both members of the public and our own Police Officers has fallen short of previous standards. Whilst CRC staff see certain benefits in Virtual Working, the project was ultimately poorly planned and executed. If the project had been implemented when both the CRC and FCC had a full quota of staff, and work had been evenly distributed between both departments then the full benefits of the project could have been realised. However due to poor communication, sparse training and a lack of direction from senior management of the desired outcome of the project, the workforce of both departments were left overworked and felt unsupported by managers during this time. This was despite the operators working very hard to embrace the challenges of Virtual Working and endeavouring to make the project a success.

7. Addressing current difficulties

7.1 One of the options on the original proposal was to “Do Nothing.” It was explained that this was not a viable option due to the following reasons:

“Option 4 to do nothing is not considered to be a viable option because the contact management environment is changing and new technologies will deliver single platform systems and multi-channel communications. This technology renders the existing structure obsolete in favour of Omni-competent staff handling the full range of contacts and able to finalise those contacts at the first point of contact whenever possible.”

There are several points of dispute with this reasoning.

7.2 Firstly, to suggest not to “Do Nothing” is certainly a point that CRC staff agree with. To “Do Nothing” would be to keep the CRC running in its current form and the statistics previously shown prove that this is not a viable option. The CRC has not been run with its full staffing level since December 2012. The only recruitment in this time was of 6 new operators and one new supervisor, along with temporary staff who have recently been employed to eradicate a backlog of SID’s. Of the 6 new operators, only two remain, the others left having left for temporary roles predominantly outside of the organisation. In one month alone this year, 5 staff resigned to take new roles outside the organisation. The following chart shows this in greater detail:
7.3 There has been a recruitment freeze within the CRC for a period of time that has placed significant strain on the remaining resources as minimum staffing levels or target expectations have never been amended to reflect this decrease in staff.

7.4 The addition of 7 temporary members of staff has helped to relieve the backlog of SIDs that had arisen due to these shortages, however this has been a fairly recent development and as they have not been crime or telephony trained, they are unable to assist with other tasks in the office.
7.5 Due to the existing minimum staffing levels, staff have been historically been unable to take time off for annual leave when requested. All staff have had a large number of refusals in response to leave requests made to the CRC Roster team, as they are unable to deviate from the minimum staffing levels. Even with staff being accommodating there have been very few days over the last 18 month period where minimum staffing levels have actually been achieved.

7.6 Historically, staff sickness – both long and short term – has been an issue within CRC. There are a number of factors that have contributed to sickness being a problem within the department and responsibility for this lies with both the staff and the organisation. Ongoing and underlying issues within the CRC, which have led to some poor performance within the department, have not been addressed.

7.7 This has had an effect on morale within the department and due to a number of recent succession of temporary managers and lack of support, along with the uncertainty over the future of the CRC, this has not been rectified.

7.8 Despite this, the staff in CRC have remained professional in their activities and have continuously strived to achieve the seemingly unachievable targets that they have been set, as evidenced in PDR ratings for 2013/2014 that were predominantly “Successful.”

7.9 The issue of morale and sickness is always one that can be rectified in any workplace. In CRC, this can be achieved through consistent management that remains robust yet fair, whilst also taking the needs of staff to have a healthy work – life balance into account. This fits directly into the Chief Constable’s vision for the future, as a permanent CRC Manager could lead the CRC by example by managing with integrity and taking responsibility for the department.

7.10 Supervisors within the CRC could also be empowered to manage the sickness and leave issues correctly, directly supervised by the CRC Manager, as well as managing the office floor on a daily basis. In turn, the current Senior Operators would promote these values and help to encourage constant development in other operators.

8. SUPPORTING BTP’S FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

8.1 BTP is about to embark on an unprecedented period of transformation and although some of these projects will result in long term improvements in efficiencies throughout the force, there will also be an inevitable period of disruption whilst these are introduced.

8.2 These projects are in their infancy and will still require input from knowledgeable staff in order to ensure that each project reaches the maximum potential. Staff from CRC have already completed work on behalf of the Integrated System Project, producing detailed process maps for the project team and creating a comprehensive list of system requirements in order to achieve accurate, detailed crime reports and assist officers in the investigation of crime.
8.3 The proposed redundancy of CRC staff is an unnecessary risk that can be easily avoided. The future outlook of how BTP collate and handle data will vary greatly over this period and CRC staff will be a vital source of information and advice for the various project teams and will help maintain current targets through the change period. The table below shows some of the major developments that are scheduled to "Go Live" in the next 12 months.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPOSED CHANGE</th>
<th>ASSOCIATED RISKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Closure of CRC and relocation to Birmingham as part of FCC in September 2015 | • Loss of experience and knowledge in HOCR, SCRS, NSIR, PNC, Action Fraud and log closure  
• 30+ Possible redundancies  
• Reduction in quality of data held by BTP  
• Increased risk of litigation due to incorrect data being held against individuals  
• Reduction in compliance with HOCR leading to poor HMIC inspections  
• Decrease in public confidence  
• Decrease of TOC and NWR satisfaction |
| BTP Ceasing to record Non - notifiable offences on the CRIME system in April 2015 | • Erroneous data being recorded onto the NSPIS system  
• Lack of accurate data available to the BTPA for their Charging Model  
• Figures showing increase / decrease in crime could be misleading and may not stand up to scrutiny from TOC’s / Network Rail |
| New integrated system to be introduced in October 2015 | • Extensive training costs required for all staff force wide  
• Inevitable disruption during migration to new systems  
• Changes to processes in all departments in BTP  
• Possible system downtime due to network improvements, causing back log of SID and admin work |
| Mobile Solutions Project ongoing through 2014 - 2015 | • Further possible changes to processes throughout BTP  
• Possible that direct officer input could affect proposed changes once again  
• Training required for all officers in BTP  
• Severe impact on quality of data recorded and held by BTP |
| 24 Hour operation of London Underground Tube service | • Increase in violent crime and anti social behaviour crimes being reported  
• Possible increase of Staff related incidents  
• Larger quantity of calls to FCC / FCR through night time hours, decreasing time available to complete admin work as proposed in Business Case |

8.4 The desire to have “Omni-Competent” staff has already been realised to an extent in the CRC. The staff in Cardiff are experts in the HOCR, SCRS and all other elements of crime recording, as well as SID input onto the PNC. They deal with a wide range of questions from officers and members of staff from other departments. They are also fully proficient in the handling of non-emergency numbers and identifying the correct grading for these calls and placing them to FCRB / FCRL for dispatch. CRC are fully trained in AS creation on PNC and can correctly identify the differences between Notifiable/ Non-Notifiable and Recordable/ Non-Recordable offences, a skill that requires extensive knowledge and training. CRC staff are the closest fit to the omni–competent department that
the review desires and are in the best position to up-skill, if requested, to take further emergency calls or assist with social media enquiries.

Resilience

8.5 A critical factor for any Police Force. Through Virtual working, the CRC provides resilience for the FCC in non-emergency calls.

8.6 Senior figures within Contact Management have pointed to a high cost of extending phone lines/ systems to the Callaghan Square office, but within the same building is the busy post of BTP Cardiff and the FHQ centre for Management of Police Information so it is likely that Cardiff will need to be connected to all systems. This would be achieved at no additional cost.

8.7 The tenders have only just gone out for the new systems, so it is not yet known what system will be acquired and exactly its capabilities, or how they will be used within BTP at first and in the longer term. Essentially the new integrated systems will allow the sharing of information, non-duplication of input and certainly via the WWW, access in diverse locations.

First Fix

8.8 Customer service is of high importance and it is ideal if a resolution can be achieved at the first point of contact. However there are times when more specialist knowledge is required. Worse than being transferred to another line, is the experience of your enquiry being dealt with by someone getting it wrong, or being put on hold as the call handler tries to get assistance.

8.9 Figures provided by the CM Review team show that most calls transferred to the CRC, and therefore double handled, originate from the FCC however whilst these headline-figures initially seem to be high, when viewed as a proportion of the whole it is actually a very small percentage of calls handled (from a maximum of 2.49% down to as low as 1.01%). Further, these figures show a distinct downward trend.

8.10 CRC staff maintain that it has always been the case that certain crime types can be recorded at the first point of contact, even prior to virtualisation. For all other crime types such as public order or vehicle crime, where there is no immediate call to service, the FCC would create the initial NSPIS log and add a repeat/ Vulnerable Victim pro-forma before passing the victim through to the CRC where a crime report will be created during the victims first- and potentially only-outbound contact to BTP. The only improvement required would be to pare down the questioning once the need to transfer has been established, thereby reducing repetition and double keying and improving passenger satisfaction.

8.11 The CRC are already able to finalise contacts at the first point of contact if needed. The AVAYA telephony system offers the ability to route reports of thefts from victims straight through to a member of CRC. Since virtualisation, these theft calls have been routed as a priority to FCC operators, however this a setting that can be simply changed in order to pass them to CRC without the need to be
double handled. The capabilities of AVAYA mean that call priorities can be managed dynamically and efficiently throughout the day.

9. **Force Restructure and 20-20-10**

9.1 Maintaining accurate crime recording is essential to many priorities for BTP to put it simply: data integrity is not optional. If there is not enough knowledge at the centre which records crime, geographically dispersed Police Officers will have to know the detail, whether at their home base or on patrol. This has become additionally significant since the HMIC report recommends abolishing the 72 hour crime rule.

9.2 The key priority for the CRC work is the support that is provides Police Officers in discussing and working out the correct recording of crime. The confidence that BTP officers and their line management have in the CRC allows them to get on with the operational duties instead of researching Home Office Counting Rules. A multi-tasking call centre operator will not be able to be as authoritative as CRC staff due a lack of developed knowledge.

9.3 Accurate crime data is essential for getting services right for victims, enabling a higher level of care and consideration to the victim. It is important for targeted intelligence-led policing in terms of day to day operations as well as defining the overall allocation of resources. It also helps officers utilise the “Golden Hour” principles for prompt and effective police investigation. The integrity of data is also essential for public confidence to prove that crime is reducing.

9.4 Inaccurate data creates extra work for other departments such as Crime Management Units and Police Officers who may be asked to make additional enquiries to fill in gaps.

9.5 Accurate crime recording:

- Increases public confidence in the force
- Enables supervising officers to allocate resources to specific crime hot spots (Op Trafalgar)
- Enables a higher level of care and consideration to the victim
- Allows prompt and effective investigations
- Helps officers utilise the “Golden Hour” principles

9.6 There are very few, if any, forces that compare geographically to BTP and we are the only known police force who creates crime reports from three separate countries. As such, every function that BTP undertakes has significantly different challenges to those that a Home Office force would face. This reasoning dictates that to use a crime recording model similar to the previously compared Home Office forces would not be sufficient for BTP’s needs and would not offer the best customer service to victim.

9.7 British Transport Police prides itself on being an innovative Police Force and our counter proposal will help enhance our already excellent reputation and increase efficiencies throughout the force.
10. Challenges ahead in crime recording

Improvements to incident closing

10.1 The CM Consultation document highlighted that internal audits have shown that the quality of incidents recorded, below, needs improvement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quality</th>
<th>Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Related</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Offences</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate crime</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cable Theft</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Crime</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Crime</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.2 CM Management propose that competing demands of incident supervision and admin tasks involved with incident closure, has lead to a lesser standard of incident recording and less availability to focus on live incident management, and have put forward that Contact Management will have to work differently to provide improved incident outcomes that demonstrate clear incident command and enhanced service delivery.

10.3 Standards of incident closure need to be addressed and the team that should close incidents would work within the CRC. All staff have undergone extensive training and are able to create NSPIS Command and Control logs in accordance with the National Standards of Incident Recording. CRC staff are also proficient in identifying the correct grade for the incident such as Immediate, Priority, Scheduled and Non Attendance and passes the log for the appropriate action or dispatch.

Non Notifiable Offences

10.4 It is proposed that Non Notifiable offence will no longer be recorded on the Crime system in April 2015. This will bring BTP in line with Home Office forces who only record notifiable crimes. Senior management have stated that they believe that this will result in a decrease of work by around 40%. Yet a recent BOXI report has shown a more realistic decrease of approximately 19%.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Notifiable</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non Recordable</td>
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<td>Non Recordable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<table>
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<th></th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Recordable</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>20628</td>
<td>8076</td>
<td>1515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.5 Even though non notifiable offences will no longer be recorded on the crime system, the nominal details etc will still have to be recorded on the NSPIS log so that it can be counted as an incident BTP have dealt with. This data will be used to help the BTPA complete their yearly charging data to send to TOC’s and Network Rail, as well as provide true data to the public on how many incidents are dealt with by BTP.

10.6 PE/AW records will still have to be recorded to show an accurate record of how offenders have been dealt with by BTP and the TOCs have a significant interest in how breaches of railway by-laws such as anti-social behaviour, drunkenness and trespass are dealt with as they represent particular problems for passenger experience.

10.7 In terms of dealing with the transition of not recording non-notifiable offences, it will be a significant change and it will be important to ensure that it is done correctly, and particularly that notifiable crimes continue to be recorded properly and other incidents which still need to be recorded on the PNC such as drunk and disorderly. Our view is that to ensure this transition does not go wrong; it would need to be overseen by the specialists in crime recording, the CRC.

10.8 Current statistics show that although log closure compliance throughout BTP is currently not in line with the required standard, CRC have a very good compliance rate that is climbing steadily.
These statistics show that CRC staff are best placed to utilise their current skills in becoming log closure specialists in the newly created DIU.

New integrated system

10.9 The force is currently undergoing a tendering process to procure and deliver new integrated core systems (Crime, Intelligence, Case and Custody) that will interface with a new Command and Control system.

10.10 CM Management say that the key impact for Contact Management will be:

*The ability to create a nominal record, once, across core systems without the requirement to enter the details again across any of the other systems, or the*
next time the individual is dealt with. This will significantly reduce double keying within Command & Control and Crime systems currently experienced.

Search more efficiently and quicker with easier and more complete access to information across the core systems. Have a single sign on facility for the new core policing system. Staff will no longer require different logins and passwords for core systems. The ability to produce key management information outputs that are timely, accurate and capable of transfer between Force systems. Currently the MI is captured in silos.

10.11 The comment that new technology will render the existing structure obsolete has not yet been proven correct. The proposed new integrated force system has been described in the proposal as a “Key enabler” to the new structure being successful however, this new system is still being developed / sourced and its full capability has not yet been established. The Integrated Systems Team has a planned implementation date of October 2015. This date has been described as dependant on when approval of the business case has been received and will only be achievable if there is an “Uninterrupted Procurement.” Inevitably, there are delays when introducing new technology so this date could well move further into the future.

10.12 In addition to this, there will be a need to migrate data from the old system to the new. When Home Office forces have undertaken changes to force systems, there is generally a time period when both the old and new system run side by side, so that ongoing investigations can be run alongside more recent ones. This could prove to be a very uncertain and complicated process which has an element of risk in relation to the data that is held by BTP.

10.13 A more sensible approach would be to wait until the new system has been decided upon and then plan ahead for the future accordingly. The new integrated system will be one of the biggest challenges and changes to BTP in recent history and the Force should not plan to lose its specialist crime recording function in the middle of this change when the precise use of the system is still unknown.

Police Officers input

10.14 CM Management have stated: ‘a further force project (The Mobile Solution) will then follow which will deliver a next generation 4G mobile solution for all front line police officers. This will enable them to work remotely, accessing most of the Force systems to provide police status/ action/ location updates directly. This may lead to fewer police officer interactions with Contact Management staff in the future.’

10.15 A number of Forces have introduced direct police officer crime inputting, whether on mobile devices or on office based applications. The problems with these processes came up in the HMIC inspections and led to criticism and review, especially when combined with lack of specialist staff.

10.16 The experience of Cheshire, one of the CM Management’s best practice case studies, highlights this with the Inspection report stating ‘The decentralised nature of crime recording in the force makes it difficult for the FCR to implement effective on-going monitoring and oversight of crime recording accuracy. This difficulty is exacerbated by the insufficient number of staff provided to carry out the quality
assurance monitoring’. Some 18 months ago the force introduced direct officer crime recording. This was supported by a mandatory two day course for every operational person. The decision to move to officers inputting crime records directly coincided with the removal of the crime recording bureau, in its place, crime and intelligence hubs were set up in each of the three local policing commands. We note that the crime reviewers who are the designated decision makers have moved recently to a centralised team to work alongside the FCR, however there are still insufficient members of staff to provide effective on-going quality assurance monitoring.

10.17 Many Police Forces which have introduced direct inputting have experienced a range of difficulties in this – technical problems, operational impact, investigate to record problems, and most of all, inaccuracy because of the lack of detailed knowledge of Home Office Counting Rules of Police Officers. The data becomes even more scrutinised because those recording crime are again those operating under targets to reduce crime.

10.18 The need for validation is apparent and BTP will need a proper structure and system to achieve this, containing staff who are specialists in crime recording. We believe this will be the CRC in the future

New channels of communication - Social media

10.19 The CM Consultation document is very focussed on the need to change Contact Management to adapt to new forms of contact from the public - currently email, Twitter and text message. There has been gradual increase in these forms of contact over the last 5 years and they now form 9% of contact and rates are likely to similarly increase for some time.

10.20 Despite the strong focus, no particular increase in the resources for social media were proposed, or changes in practice (apart from Cardiff closing). A team of 6 staff were the designated resource for FCC now and in the future. We suggest that there is a plan to increase this number over time given the expected growth in social media and improving media control for adverse publicity.

10.21 CRC contribute currently to handling social media reported crimes by crim the report and closing the incident accordingly. These logs which have been created through social media are often hard to crime because of the lack of detail from the reporting person. When people contact BTP via social media, they are unaware of the amount of detail we require in order to create a crime report. This leads to back and forth messages with the reporting person and in the majority of cases results in the person being contacted via phone by operators in order to gain further information. An increase in social media activity reporting will not lead necessarily to a real term reduction in telephony work due to this reason.

10.22 A significant part of the CRC’s work is raising crimes from emailed crime reports, received from Home Office Police Forces in addition to crime reports sent to CRC from the FCC email inbox. The amount of emails received into this inbox on a daily basis varies but can be in excess of 50 crime reports on the busiest days. An increase in social media reporting could be easily managed through a shared email inbox of which both FCC social media staff and CRC operators have access.

10.23 CM management are proposing the live web-chat would encourage the reporting of specific crimes but it should be noted that a particular line of inquiry
for the HMIC inspection was the failure to properly record sexual offences crimes and those involving more vulnerable victims. The Inspections reported significant inaccuracy from a lack of knowledge of HOCR.

On-line crime recording by the Public

10.24 A further development on the CM Management agenda is on-line crime recording. This is a developing trend in smaller Police Forces and again subject to varying degrees of concern regarding the accuracy of crime data.

10.25 The need for scrutiny and validation is even more essential to ensure that the data is accurate because the public as victims will be entering the data.

10.26 The need for a dedicated unit to validate this information is obvious and if BTP were to lose the CRC, the Force would lose its most experienced and knowledgeable resource in order to validate the data.

11. CRC Counter Proposal

11.1 CRC staff and TSSA are proposing the creation of a Crime and Data Integrity Unit based in Cardiff, utilising the skills and experience of current staff.

11.2 The Crime and Data Integrity Unit (CDIU), Cardiff, can offer a bespoke service to the British Transport Police and help the force to achieve the targets of 20:20:10, by providing a resilient, professional and highly skilled service to Officers, Senior Management and the Public.

11.3 The CDIU model incorporates a Centre of Excellence of Crime Recording along with the proposed Data Integrity Unit, as well as highly skilled and Omni-competent staff who can offer resilience to the FCC in taking calls from the public during major incidents or peak times.

11.4 A revitalised management team will provide strong leadership and improve how the centre operates. Empowered supervisors can also assist a permanent manager promote the Chief Constable’s VITAL Behaviours.

11.5 The CDIU model offers a fantastic support network to Police officers who can be assured of expert assistance in all HOCR and PNC related queries. This will maintain the high standard of compliance with HOCR and result in crimes being recorded in a consistent and timely manner in line with HMIC guidelines.
11.6 The capabilities of the telephony system AVAYA can be better utilised to route victims of volume crime straight through to CDIU operators who can record a crime at first contact, eliminating the need for double keying of information or double handling of the call.

11.7 On-going projects such as the Integrated Systems and Mobile Solutions project can be assisted by the CDIU to ensure that they are successfully implemented. Should direct officer input of information become a reality in BTP, then the CDIU can adapt to a role of Crime Validation, ensuring that HOCR is still followed. This would offer an enhanced level of quality control that through accurate crime recording and would continue to help the force reach the desired 20% reduction in crime by 2019.

11.8 PNC updating would be conducted by the Data Inputter’s in CDIU in line with force and national policies. This would result in accurate data being MOPI compliant, along with enabling Commanding Officers to have up to date detection information available. TOC ASN Requests would still be completed by dedicated FCC staff in Birmingham, with DIU staff offering assistance with any overflow of work as per the current practice.
11.9 A005 Data Evaluators would be responsible for all Command and Control logs being closed in line with NSIR and NCRS, allowing the data to be used for management and performance needs. This would enable FCRB, FCRL and FCC staff to offer a better service to callers and would increase the resilience they can offer to each other.

11.10 CDIU operators can continue to assist FCC during peak times or during major events or incidents. If an incident occurs where FCC are required to assist the control rooms with emergency calls, then staff can be confident that the CDIU can dynamically manage non emergency line calls during that period, offering the same excellent level of professionalism and customer service as their FCC colleagues. Having the CDIU based in Cardiff offers extra resilience should an incident render either the Birmingham or London control rooms incapacitated.

11.11 CDIU operators can assist the social media team when required by monitoring the BTP Twitter and Facebook pages for reported incidents. The need for back and forth messages with the reporting person would be decreased by CDIU identifying those incidents where a crime has taken place and obtaining a contact number to record a crime or incident at the earliest opportunity. This process would be mirrored when Online Crime Reporting is introduced. As command and control logs will be closed by the Data Evaluators, Supervisors would have sufficient time to perform this function. This would help the force achieve a 10% increase in passenger confidence.

11.12 The Office Manager would take primacy for all HR and Sickness related issues. This would enable a fair, consistent and professional approach to be taken towards these matters. The post holder would be a single point of contact with the CDIU HR representative which would further enhance their knowledge of relevant SOP’s and would lead to a better relationship between HR and CDIU staff.

11.13 Due to the skills that staff in the CDIU will hold, they would also be perfectly positioned to offer support to other departments such as the CMU’s or Real Time Intelligence (RTI) RTI themselves are suffering from a lack of staff throughout the night and should the new CDIU be re-introduced back to a 24/7 shift pattern, then they would be able to offer their expertise to these departments. This would provide an efficient service to officers who are requesting PNC / CRIME checks through the evening and would be especially helpful for officers who are dealing with offenders of non-notifiable offences and wish to find out if the nominal has had previous contact with BTP.

11.14 Through very little up skilling, the CDIU staff could also be trained in further PNC functions such as VOD’s (Vehicle Online Descriptive Search) and QUEST (Query Using Enhanced Search Techniques), which would help to support the PNC Bureau, who are also understaffed. This all leads to further efficiencies throughout the force and is a model that offers better value for money to the force.

12. Conclusion

12.1 This proposal is in line with the Chief Constables vision for the future – Specialist people with specialist skills will be performing their roles to a high
standard, assisting BTP and providing a more efficient and professional service to victims of crime

12.2 We are in favour of a forward thinking, planned future that combines utilising a key specialist resource with new technology to provide the best police service for victims and most effective support for Police Officers and other internal customers.

- A renewal in the management of the CRC, with senior management taking responsibility for the long term development of the centre, and embracing the VITAL challenges of leadership, being active, innovative.

- Stopping the recruitment freeze and ensuring that the CRC can operate at a realistic staffing level

- Ensuring that the staff are engaged in the long term plan for future of crime recording and that the management are open to the ideas of staff for improvement. Allowing the team to work. They have great ideas!

- A plan that maximises services to add value now and has the capacity to flexibly adjust to deal with the challenges and potential benefits of new technology in the future